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A Heuristic Methodology for Locating Monitoring Stations to Detect  
 
Contamination Events in Potable Water Distribution Systems 
 
 
James R. Chastain, Jr. 
ABSTRACT 
The requirements to protect public water systems from intentional contamination have 
expanded in the years following September 11, 2001.  The areal extent and non-linear 
nature of water demand and movement in the distribution system makes efficient 
location of sampling points difficult.  This difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
contamination conceptually can occur at any point and at any time within the distribution 
system.  Small to mid-sized water systems are especially at a disadvantage in 
addressing this issue due to limited resources available to them. 
This paper proposes a heuristic methodology to identify strategic locations within the 
system that can be established as critical detection points for such occurrences.  The 
process uses off-the-shelf software and is structured to be accessible to small and mid-
sized water system managers.  This methodology is different from others proposed in 
the literature in that it uses computer simulations to create a database of water system 
response to contamination at every node in the system.  A process is developed to mine 
this database systematically after considering concentration thresholds and “time since 
injection” parameters.  Finally, using pivot tables and graphs, a network of monitoring 
locations is identified to provide efficient coverage of the system under the conditions 
imposed.
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Chapter 1 Problem Statement 
Introduction 
September 8, 1853 was a critical day for the water industry.  On that day Dr. John Snow 
removed the handle from the Broad Street well which helped to stem the spread of 
cholera during the London epidemic (Aldrich, Griffith, & Cooke, 1993).  In doing so he 
ushered in a new era not only in the field of analytic epidemiology but also in the role 
and responsibilities of public water supplies.  A safe, reliable public water supply has 
always been a requirement for a sustainable community but from that point forward there 
was a new realization of the effect that water quality played in disease transmission and 
public health.   Water supplies at the turn of the last century faced widespread fear of the 
effects of cholera, dysentery and other critical waterborne diseases. However, as the 
understanding of disease and its etiology improved, water utilities developed strategies 
to address those threats.   The result was dramatic reductions in the morbidity and 
mortality of the population they served. 
September 11, 2001 also will serve as a date which initiated a major paradigm shift in 
the water industry. Many of the design and operational practices incorporated throughout 
a water system are built on a foundation of public trust and the common good.  However, 
now, in addition to accidental contamination, the possibility of intentional contamination 
of water supplies to disrupt society to achieve certain political or ideological goals must 
be considered.   Water supplies have evolved into much more complex and 
sophisticated systems since Dr. Snow sought to protect consumers against the threat of 
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waterborne disease approximately 150 years ago.  Now as a different dimension to an 
old problem asserts itself, it will be necessary to break down preconceived patterns of 
thinking and look carefully at each component of the infrastructure and examine its 
vulnerability, while keeping the overall framework in view. 
A recent study proposed a helpful framework for addressing the water supply 
infrastructure as a whole (Haimes, Matalas, Lambert, Jackson, & Fellows, 1998).  Their 
analysis recommends using a multivision risk identification method called Hierarchical 
Holographic Modeling (HHM) to “harden” individual water supplies against attack.  This 
approach seeks to look at these complex systems in a holistic manner, as series of 
interconnected and overlapping sub-systems.  Somewhat in the spirit of “a chain is no 
stronger than its weakest link”, HHM seeks to identify and model all the components that 
compose the water system and affect its operation so the interactions and weaknesses 
may be exposed.  Fifteen categories are proposed as comprising the basic 
decomposition of a water supply infrastructure.  They are: 
Category A:  Physical Components 
Category B:  Scope of Impact (individual, plant, local, state, regional, national, or 
international) 
Category C:  Temporal (ability to detect, respond, and recover from a time perspective) 
Category D:  Maintenance (policies and capability) 
Category E:  Organizational (decision-making structure) 
Category F:  Management (security, short/long term emergency response) 
Category G:  Resource Allocation (prioritization of funds including system hardening) 
Category H:  SCADA (cyber-tampering, modeling accuracy, data management) 
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Category I:  Systems Configuration (interconnection of physical, institutional, 
organizational and management configurations) 
Category J: Hydrology (water sources and characteristics) 
Category K: Geography/Physiography  
Category L: External Ffactors (natural hazards, situations generating threats) 
Category M: System Buffers (redundancy, over-design) 
Category N:  Contaminants (what range of contaminants can compromise a system) 
Category O: Quality of Water (what safety and aesthetic characteristics must be met) 
Whether or not one agrees with the system decomposition they propose, it is correct to 
point out that a wide range of factors contribute to the reliable delivery of water to the 
consumer with an acceptable quality level.  And, while all can agree with the 
multifaceted approach to reducing system vulnerability, models of the individual sub-
components must be defined with sufficient precision to adequately describe cause-
effect responses for the system analyses. 
When designing and operating a Public Water System many factors must be considered. 
However, none is more important than producing and maintaining an acceptable water 
quality.  This is the unifying paradigm underlying the regulatory environment and the 
engineering rules of practice. 
Following this then, one important aspect of system protection involves the capability to 
effectively monitor the water for constituents that could harm consumers.  Obviously, 
without the ability to detect and quantify a contamination event, the ability to avert or 
effectively respond to it is severely constrained.  As this study ranges over a myriad of 
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diverse topics, the issue of water quality and detection of deviances from acceptable 
values forms the central theme tying it together. 
Literature Search 
Water systems are generally divided into three major components: the water source or 
supply, the treatment plant and the distribution system.  Engineering design of these 
components proceeds under the rubric of the “multiple barrier approach” in which a 
series of treatment processes or redundancies provide a safety net to assure 
downstream water quality.  Water quality is typically monitored carefully at the source 
and during treatment stages of the system as required by operational and regulatory 
guidance.  However, once the treated water enters the distribution system the level of 
monitoring effort is significantly reduced, reflecting an implicit assumption that the 
probability of water quality degradation in the distribution system is limited.  This 
assumption can no longer be considered universally valid and in fact, because of the 
geographical extent and relatively direct access, it may be asserted that the distribution 
system presents itself as the most vulnerable component of the overall system.   
Over the past decade studies have appeared which, apart from any terrorist activity, 
highlight the impact of the distribution system itself on water quality (Clark, Grayman, & 
Wymer, 1993; Craun & Calderon, 2001; Herwaldt, Craun, Stokes, & Juranek, 1992; 
Lindley & Buchberger, 2002).  Given this set of conditions, improved monitoring of the 
distribution system is becoming an increasingly crucial task.  However, there is 
surprisingly little in the literature relative to distribution system monitoring, 
characterization and protection from a water quality perspective.  More specifically, the 
literature is sparse relative to quantitative methods to locate sampling stations within a 
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distribution system which increase the probability of detecting a contamination event 
(either accidental or intentional). 
A few researchers have developed approaches which provide some guidance on the 
topic.  One of the first attempts to objectively locate monitoring stations employed a 
method that used pathway analysis coupled with integer programming to identify which 
nodes have the maximum coverage of the distribution system (Lee & Deininger, 1992; 
Lee, Deininger, & Clark, 1991) .  The methodology is helpful in situations with 
continuous, steady contamination in that the water quality effects are discerned by the 
hydraulic pathways.  Intermittent or rapidly variable water quality swings, such as those 
that might be encountered in a terrorist event, weaken this approach.  A later study 
(Kumar, Kansal, & Arora, 1997) refined the process of Lee et al. by proposing a 
methodology of re-ranking the pathway matrix to simplify its form thus making it more 
usable.   However, the same base assumptions and weaknesses still apply.  Kessler, 
Ostfeld & Sinai (1998) proposed a different, more novel approach by using the 
distribution system flows as a directed graph and incorporated an “all shortest paths” 
algorithm to find the minimum propagation times from any source node to other points in 
the system.  Kessler et al.’s method is based on the hydraulics of the system and 
contamination is inferred only on the basis of water movement.  It also assumes that 
contamination is continuous and any water passing through a contaminated node is 
considered contaminated regardless of the concentration.  Non-conservative 
contaminants are not covered under this approach.  Kessler et al. produces a pollution 
matrix for a level of service by which it is possible to estimate the volume of contaminant 
consumed prior to the first opportunity to detect under the stated assumptions.  Ostfeld 
and Salomons (2003) build upon Kessler et al.’s methodology by randomizing the 
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pollution matrix and then using a genetic algorithm to seek the “most fit” set of 
monitoring points.  Their approach expands Kessler et al. by allowing a limited number 
of events and defining a concentration hazard level.  Berry, Fleisher, Hart & Phillips 
(2003) propose a mixed integer programming solution that follows from probability 
distributions of coupled population-weighted flows and contamination points.  These risk 
points are developed through a Delphi type process.  Bahadur, Samuels, Grayman, 
Amstutz & Pickus (2003) propose a GIS approach to the task in a computer program 
called PipelineNet.  This program develops a detailed source prioritization ranking based 
upon a number of variables which are then coupled with a distribution system 
component scoring matrix and a population density and critical infrastructure matrix.  
Using a hierarchical approach the nodes are scored, ranked and related to the GIS map 
to identify the sites best suited to minimize system vulnerability. 
Each of the approaches mentioned above has its own set of assumptions and 
applicability.  From a conceptual standpoint a weakness asserted for these 
methodologies is that they do not capitalize on the power and flexibility of the extended 
period water quality models currently available.  Consequently, significant assumptions 
regarding contamination modes and characteristics must be made rather than computing 
the effects directly.  Most methodologies base their process on a limited number of 
contamination actualizations with an emphasis on the hydraulic portion of the model.  
This may not be reflective of likely contamination events, especially those that may occur 
as a pulse or discrete incident.  Also from a pragmatic standpoint, these approaches 
have seen limited application because they tend to be mathematically complex and the 
programs and concepts are out of reach of most operators or consultants. 
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The purpose of this paper is to present a methodology for the selection of optimal 
monitoring locations within the distribution system.  This methodology will be based upon 
a more stochastic approach than previously published studies.  Furthermore, an 
approach is sought which can be tailored for use by small or mid-sized community water 
systems.  It is asserted that these water systems are more vulnerable relatively speaking 
than larger distribution systems.  Smaller systems typically have thinner management 
resources, smaller dilution effects and shorter critical response times.  Certainly, subsets 
of larger systems can have similar characteristics, but again they can bring more 
sophisticated resources to bear on the problem. 
Statement of Research Questions 
It is posited, then, that the distribution system is a “weak link” in the monitoring chain and 
as such provides to those so motivated a potentially effective means of causing harm to 
the consumer.  For reasons to be discussed later in this study, it is also believed that this 
is especially true in small to mid-sized water systems.  The goal of this dissertation then 
is to outline a methodology which will guide more effective placement of water quality 
monitoring stations within distribution systems of small to mid-sized water systems.  The 
questions to be addressed in this study are: 
1. What methods have traditionally been referenced as a means to select 
monitoring station placement? 
2. Are these methods adequate and easily accessible to small and mid-sized 
systems? 
3. Can a methodology be developed, using commercially available “off the shelf” 
software, that would allow small and mid-sized operators and their consultants to 
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reliably analyze their systems to predict effective locations for water quality 
monitoring stations? 
4. What are the key parameters to be considered when trying to establish a 
monitoring station network? 
Document Organization 
This dissertation is organized to proceed through the background information and 
findings of this study in the following fashion. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the layout and design of a conventional public water 
supply and discusses the primary guidelines that govern the major components of a 
typical system. 
Chapter 3 discusses the approaches that have been used in the past to establish water 
quality monitoring station locations within a distribution system.  A discussion of the 
assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of these approaches will be discussed within 
the context of the focus of this study. 
Chapter 4 discusses the contaminants that have been historically associated with 
waterborne diseases and contamination and provides a sketch of some of the agents 
that have been identified in the literature as candidates for concern. 
Chapter 5 addresses the use of computer simulation as a tool to estimate the response 
of a water system to changes in operating conditions both from a hydraulic and water 
quality standpoint. 
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Chapter 6 combines these factors to present an approach that can be used to generate 
a database that will simulate an intentional attack upon a public water supply.  Then an 
analysis and ranking algorithm will be proposed that may be used to predict an efficient 
set of monitoring station locations for the proposed contamination scenario. 
Chapter 7 presents a sample application of the techniques and algorithms proposed and 
discuss the results. 
Chapter 8 summarizes the findings of this study and lists the primary conclusions 
stemming from this research.  Topics for additional research will also be proposed. 
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Chapter 2 Overview of the Design of a Conventional Water System 
The fundamental purpose of a public water system is to deliver water to its customers in 
adequate quantities (volume and pressure) with acceptable quality and at a reasonable 
price.  This implies two primary tasks.  The first addresses the fact that physically a 
water system operates within a supply and demand framework.  Water is essentially an 
incompressible fluid and because the demand can vary on an instantaneous basis, a 
modern water system must include a means of supplying, storing and pressuring the 
water to meet the range of demand reasonably anticipated.   The second task 
recognizes that unless the quality of the water delivered is acceptable, the water cannot 
be used without incurring some level of harm or damage.   All of this being accomplished 
within an economic framework that allows reasonable access to the resource.  
From a conceptual point of view there are several “complicating” factors that create 
much of the difficulty associated with designing and operating a water system.  They are: 
1. Variability of the consumer demand 
2. Incompressibility of water 
3. Friction (energy) loss in transport systems 
There are, of course, many other factors that present difficult technical and operational 
challenges, but these three in particular have widespread implications on the design of 
the physical system. 
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Consumer demand can vary significantly in time and space.  Facility planning requires 
significant attention to the nature and location of users within the system as well as 
changes in environmental, economic and regulatory impacts.  Regardless of changes in 
flow demand, the quality of the water produced must remain within regulatory guidelines 
and the volume and pressure must stay within acceptable levels.  That is, increased 
demands in one part of the system should not adversely impact the level of service in 
other locations.  This is complicated by the second factor in that efficiency of storage 
cannot be achieved in the same way that a compressible fluid can.  Thus, storage is on 
a 1:1 basis and can require significant capital investment to provide sufficient volume to 
meet changing system demand.  Storage and demand must be matched within 
reasonable limits because it is possible to build too much storage, in which case water 
can become stagnant, giving rise to water quality concerns. 
Finally, the fact that water can have significant friction (energy) loss in its transmission to 
the consumer makes analysis, design and operation challenging.  Considering the 
factors mentioned above, water will be demanded in varying quantities literally from 
moment to moment within the system.  Energy loss through this variable demand is 
inherently non-linear and thus creates significant difficulties in developing analytical 
solutions to distribution system design. 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the means by which conventional water 
systems meet these requirements.  A discussion of the historical context of public water 
supplies in this country will be presented followed by a brief outline of the regulatory 
framework within which water systems operate.  Because of the nature of this study, 
more attention will be focused on the water quality aspects of the regulations than the 
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design aspects.  An outline of the components and general processes used to meet 
water system demands and water quality is then presented. 
Historical Context – the Rise of the Modern Water System 
The design and operational standards of public water supplies has evolved dramatically 
over the past 100 years.  Shortly after the turn of the century, Congress authorized the 
United States Public Health Service to develop regulations to minimize the spread of 
communicable diseases through public water supplies.  One of its first tasks was to 
develop a means to distinguish a safe water from unsafe water.  The relationship 
between acute waterborne disease and microbial activity had been recognized and, 
thus, attention was focused on improving the ability to reliably test for safe levels of 
pathogens.  The initial standards identified coliform bacteria as an effective surrogate 
parameter for microbial contamination.  The rationale being that, since coliform is an 
intestinal bacteria, a positive test would indicate that some level of fecal contamination 
must exist.  Interestingly, almost 100 years from the time the test was proposed and 
implemented, the coliform test remains the primary routine method for evaluating water 
safety from a biological perspective (AWWA, 1990). 
Concurrently, water treatment methods were being developed which could considerably 
improve water quality.  It was observed that a reduction in turbidity through simple 
filtration provided significant beneficial effects, especially for those systems that 
depended on surface waters for their basic supply.  Studies examining methods for 
disinfecting water demonstrated the efficacy of chlorine in reducing microbial levels.  
With the development of a means to safely apply chlorine at the water plant (i.e. the gas 
chlorinator), engineers began to include chlorine as a disinfectant in water supplies 
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beginning in 1908.  With the establishment of these two processes a remarkable 
reduction in various waterborne diseases followed.   Although other improvements in 
sanitation and medical treatment also contributed to this reduction, a significant portion 
of the seventy-five (75) per cent decline in the crude death rate for infectious disease 
from 1900 to 1940 can be attributed to these changes in water treatment  (Armstrong, 
Conn, & Pinner, 1999).  This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Crude Death Rate for Infectious Diseases  
In the period between 1860 and 1960 the number of centralized municipal water 
systems had grown from 400 to 19,000  (AWWA 1990).  Once the basic parameters of 
treatment were established, the rapid development of public supplies devoted much of 
its attention to the efficient and reliable delivery of water to its users.   Advances in 
treatment process design, laboratory analyses, construction methods and materials, as 
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well as use of information technologies for modeling and control of system components 
have allowed greater sophistication and efficiency in the development of this country's 
water systems. 
Regulatory framework – “What is a safe water?” 
The design and operation of potable water systems in the United States is heavily 
regulated so as to provide a framework for the protection of public health and safety.  
Therefore, to accurately provide an overview of public water systems, the regulatory 
context within which they operate must be sketched.  In fact the regulatory structure 
defines to a great extent what constitutes a “safe” or acceptable water quality, at least 
from a human consumption standpoint.  These regulations codify much of the 
professional practice which over the years has created a network of water supplies that 
are unparalleled in history for their safety and reliability.  Although taken for granted by 
most Americans, it is truly remarkable that one can travel from coast to coast drinking 
water from public supplies all along the way and not give any thought to the potential of 
contracting waterborne disease. 
In general, public water supplies are governed by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
of 1974 and its amendments along with the Lead Contamination Control Act (LCCA) of 
1988.  At this point there have been five (5) major amendments to the SDWA which 
were promulgated in 1977, 1979, 1980, 1986, and 1996.  These laws are codified in the 
U.S. Code at 42 U.S.C. s/s 300f et seq. which is also listed as Title XIV of the U.S. 
Public Health Services Act Section 1400 et seq. of the United States Code Annotated®.  
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has federal responsibility for implementing 
the law.  The regulations passed for this purpose are listed in the Code of Federal 
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Regulations at 40 CFR Parts 141 – 143 and 149.  Responsibility for the operational 
management and enforcement for these regulations has for the most part been 
delegated to the states through the primacy process.  In order to achieve primacy, states 
must stipulate to and demonstrate capacity to enforce the federal requirements as 
outlined in the law and the subsequent EPA regulations.  Any state unwilling or unable to 
meet these requirements does not receive primacy and in that case the EPA assumes 
responsibility for regulation and enforcement in that state (Kucera, 2003).   Florida has 
been granted primacy and enforces drinking water laws primarily through the Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP).  The FDEP by interdepartmental 
agreement has in turn delegated certain responsibilities to the Department of Health. 
Consequently, every aspect of a water utility is governed by the overarching 
requirements of the SDWA as implemented through state laws and regulations.  These 
regulations relate to water quality standards, testing methodologies, critical design 
criteria, source water protection, enforcement authority and consumer 
notification/awareness of violations.  Among the more prominent rules issued by the 
EPA in conjunction with the SDWA, along with their primary references, are: 
1. Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR):  40 CFR Part 141 Subpart H 
2. Disinfectants/Disinfection By-Products Rule   40 CFR Part 141 Subpart L 
3. Total Coliform Rule (TCR)    40 CFR Part 141.21 
4. Lead and Copper Rule:     40 CFR Part 141 Subpart I 
5. Information Collection Rule (ICR):    40 CFR Part 141 Subpart M 
6. Consumer Confidence Rule (CCR):     40 CFR Part 141 Subpart O 
7. Groundwater (Disinfection) Rule (Proposed):  65 FR 30194 
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These rules can have different applicability depending on the classification of the 
system.  Public Water Systems are generally classified as Community Water Systems 
(CWSs) and Noncommunity Water Systems (NCWSs).  This study addresses CWSs but 
does not explicitly consider NCWSs.  A Community Water System  is legally defined as a 
public water system which serves at least 15 service connections used by year-round 
residents or regularly serves at least 25 year-round residents (40 CFR 141.2). NCWSs 
are systems smaller than this and as such consist of components so small as to make 
monitoring system design trivial. 
Water quality standards are among the most important sections of the regulations.  They 
stipulate the chemical and biological concentrations and characteristics that constitute a 
“safe” or potable water.  The most common standards are set forth in the National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) and the National Secondary Drinking 
Water Regulations (NSDWR). 
The NPDWR, which currently consists of 87 chemical, microbiological and physical 
parameters, forms the basis of the regulatory examination of a water system’s 
performance.  These parameters are assigned enforceable criteria levels called 
Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) that define a safe potable water.  Facilities which 
exceed established MCLs are deemed in violation of their permit to operate and subject 
to enforcement action if not acceptably remedied.  There are a few parameters in the 
NPDWR that have not been assigned an MCL because they cannot be feasibly 
measured or there is uncertainty about the appropriate limits.  In those cases a 
Treatment Technique is assigned.  Thus, in systems where a particular parameter has 
been demonstrated to exist or is likely to exist, the water utility must implement the 
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treatment technique associated with that parameter in order to be deemed in compliance 
with the regulations.  In other words this is a presumptive criterion as explicit monitoring 
is not performed.  In summary, MCLs are health based criteria, they are enforceable and 
they are developed with consideration to the cost-benefit associated with them. 
NSDWRs differ from NPDWR in that they are non-enforceable guidelines that address 
contaminants that may have adverse cosmetic or aesthetic effects in drinking water.  In 
other words these parameters may affect the palatability or cosmetic/staining 
characteristics of the water, but have no meaningful impact on its safety.  While 
Secondary Maximum Contaminant Levels (SMCL) are not enforceable under federal 
law, it is noted that an individual state may elect to make a secondary parameter 
enforceable. 
In addition the SDWA requires that every contaminant with an MCL have an associated 
Maximum Contaminant Level Goal (MCLG).  This is a non-enforceable health-based 
criteria.  These are based upon the National Research Council (NRC) risk assessment 
process and are formulated to be set at a level at which there are no known adverse 
effects and with an adequate safety factor (NRC, 1983).  The MCLGs are set without 
regard to cost to achieve the stipulated concentration.    
Historically, MCLGs for carcinogens have always been set at zero following theoretical 
and practical limits to determining the existence of a threshold of action.   More recently 
the EPA has adopted a “weight of evidence” process which assigns a contaminant to 
one of three categories based on the knowledge base and potency of the carcinogen to 
determine whether a non-zero value for the MCLG may be assigned.  While not 
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enforceable, the MCLGs provide valuable information as to treatment targets to be 
achieved and potential regulatory direction in future years (Kucera, 2003). 
Of course, non-carcinogens also have MCLGs and are established based No 
Observable Adverse Effect Levels (NOAEL) or Lowest Observable Adverse Effect 
Levels (LOAEL) to determine a Reference Dose (RfD).  This is then related to a Drinking 
Water Effect Level (DWEL) which is used to compute the MCLG. 
The list of regulated contaminants continues to grow as the SDWA requires the EPA to 
monitor unregulated contaminants and add them to the NPDWR as appropriate.  
Potential contaminants are examined and monitored to determine whether they occur at 
a frequency and in concentrations that may warrant further study.  If so they are placed 
on the Contaminant Candidate List (CCL).  The CCL was initially published in 1998 and 
is reissued every five years.  These listed contaminants are first assigned a proposed 
MCLG and then they proceed through scientific study and public notification and 
comment before a final decision is made on their regulatory status. 
From this brief sketch it may be observed that Congress has established a broad and 
continually evolving framework to govern the design and operation of public water 
systems.  Water quality relative to human consumption is paramount in the legislative 
and regulatory history.  This responsibility is transferred to the design and operating 
professionals to develop the physical systems that will comply with these high standards.  
The following sections will provide an overview of the components of a water system and 
how a typical system sets about meeting the customers’ demands while operating within 
the regulatory requirements. 
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Basic Water System Design Tenants 
As briefly mentioned earlier widespread centralized urban water systems are a relatively 
new phenomenon.  With the advent of basic treatment and disinfection techniques, the 
value of reliable and safe water supply began to manifest itself as a primary economic 
component in a community’s development.  While engineers continued to make 
improvements in various aspects of its treatment and delivery, a number of guiding 
design principles emerged.  These have been formalized in professional technical 
guidelines and agency regulatory requirements. 
Reliability 
Among the most fundamental of guidelines for infrastructure design are the requirements 
for reliability and redundancy.  Reliability or robustness refers to the dependability of the 
overall system and its component parts (AWWA & ASCE, 1998).  It recognizes, for 
example, that variability of water demand is an inherent part of a water system 
operation.  Estimation of water demand is an important task and influences the selection 
and sizing of all the downstream components.  Because human consumption comprises 
only a very small part of the overall water demand it is necessary to carefully consider 
the composition of the community served.  It was recognized early on that care must be 
taken to not only define average conditions, but also to gage the impact of extreme 
events.  While there may be autocorrelation between day-to-day demands, seasonal and 
external events (ex. irrigation, fire flow, industrial user demands) can impose significant 
changes in demand patterns both on a short-term and long-term basis.  Therefore, 
system requirements (Ysusi, 2000) are typically estimated for: 
Average Daily Demand (ADD) = (total water consumed in one year) / 365 
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Maximum Daily Demand (MDD) = maximum 24-hour demand in one year 
Maximum Hourly Demand (MHD) = maximum 1-hour demand in one year 
In addition, fire flow demand and duration are estimated and generally superimposed 
upon the MDD or MHD, along with any other external demand requirements.  In more 
complex systems, the analysis of demand requirements and patterns can become quite 
sophisticated, but the principle remains the same: water must be available for the user 
when required (for statistically reasonable demands), and the water must be delivered 
with acceptable quality while maintaining at least some given minimum residual line 
pressure. 
Reliability concerns take into account all those resources necessary to properly operate 
the subject facility.  In the event of disruption of normal service this would include 
adequate provision for auxiliary power, disinfectants, chemicals and other raw materials 
that are crucial to operating the plant as designed to meet the regulatory requirements. 
Reliability also relates to delivery of water of safe and consistent quality to the consumer.  
Utilities that take their water from surface supplies (lakes and rivers) have more of a 
challenge in this regard than utilities with groundwater supplies.  This is due to the 
influence of seasonal variations and the direct impact of surface features on the raw 
water quality.  These water quality variations must be recognized and treated in real time 
before discharge to the system.  Groundwater systems are usually more consistent with 
regard to water quality.  Because they are not directly under the influence of surface 
conditions they are more stable, but many times will be more highly mineralized due to 
their long-term contact with aquifer materials.  In either case, however, reliable delivery 
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of adequate volumes of water at sufficient pressure and quality is an essential feature of 
an efficient water utility (Harberg, 1997). 
Redundancy 
Related to reliability is the concept of redundancy.  In any system where mechanical 
equipment and control systems exist, provision must be made for malfunctions; motors 
will burn out, lightning will strike control panels, pipes will rupture and the like.  The 
system must be designed to continue to function, albeit at a lower level of service, even 
when these malfunctions occur.  Therefore, all critical components are to be designed 
with duplicate units (as a minimum).  Also, the system is to be capable of delivering the 
maximum daily demand, even when the largest unit is out of service.   
The concept of redundancy extends to the power and control systems too.  Auxiliary 
power units (with appropriate fuel resources) or redundant feed from separate electrical 
grids is necessary to assure sufficient capacity to operate critical equipment or treatment 
systems.  As control systems become more integrated and sophisticated, care is 
necessary to assure that critical equipment, programs and data are duplicated or backed 
up in appropriate fashion (AWWA & ASCE, 1998).   
Distribution systems have the additional requirement of maintaining a minimum residual 
pressure of 20 psig throughout the distribution system during the stress event.  This is 
typically accomplished by on-line storage with auxiliary pumping systems or elevated 
storage tanks with adequate reserve capacity. 
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Resiliency 
Unfortunately, no human system can be designed to account for all risks so one final 
aspect of good design involves the concept of system resiliency.  Given that catastrophic 
events such as earthquakes, floods, and fires sometimes occur, thought should be given 
to 'how long will it take for the system to recover?’.  By judicious planning, certain 
aspects of the system layout can minimize the amount of time that it takes to restore 
water service to the community.  Many times this is as much a function of organizational 
and management structure as it is “pipes and pumps”.  As discussed above (Haimes et 
al., 1998) a system is composed of multiple aspects and the reliability and resilience are 
especially influenced by many aspects of the utility operation. 
Water System Components – “How do we deliver a safe water?” 
A water system is generally broken down into three primary components, the water 
supply, the treatment plant (including finished water storage), and the distribution 
system.  This is shown schematically in Figure 2.  In order to have an effective system 
each component must be matched to meet the requirements of the downstream 
element.  Each constituent has its own set of design issues and its design has actually 
evolved into complete sub-disciplines. 
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Figure 2 Generalized Layout of a Modern Potable Water System (Harburg, 1997) 
It is the thesis of this study that the vast majority of attention, both in terms of regulations 
and research, has been focused upon the first two components (the water supply and 
the treatment systems) and that the distribution system has been largely neglected from 
the standpoint of its impact on water quality.  This, of course, is to be expected in that 
the primary concern of a water utility is to find an adequate water supply with good raw 
water characteristics and then to treat it to a uniform quality that meets all health and 
regulatory requirements before release to the consumer.  However, changes in water 
quality can occur within the distribution system for a variety of reasons, and it is here 
proposed that a more reliable means of detecting those changes is necessary to 
safeguard the consumer. 
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Water Supply 
The first task of the water utility is to secure a reliable source of water with physical, 
chemical and biological properties that are within acceptable ranges.  The nature of the 
source influences these properties considerably.  Broadly classified, water supplies are 
listed as being a groundwater supply or a surface supply.  Different regulatory 
requirements apply to a water system depending on the water source. 
Typically groundwater supplies are preferable to surface supplies in that the water 
quality tends to be more stable and the volumetric yield is more predictable.  The water 
may be more mineralized as a result of extended contact with the subsurface strata, but 
the water generally is relatively pure and not as prone to biological contamination.  
However, reliable ground water sources are not available in all parts of the country.  This 
is a function of the geology of the area and whether suitable aquifers exist at a 
reasonable depth below ground.  Florida is fortunate to have several high quality 
productive aquifers.  Thus, most of the water supplied to its citizens comes from ground 
water sources. 
Surface water sources are under the direct influence of stormwater runoff or snow melt 
and are tapped by a utility through river, reservoir or lake intake structures.  Utilities 
using surface water sources must contend with daily variability in water quality (in that it 
is directly influenced by surface runoff) and seasonal volume availability which can 
dramatically affect public health issues (Craun, 1988).  The SWTR, issued by the EPA is 
quite involved and has many stringent provisions which require water utilities to carefully 
consider and monitor the ways that source water is protected, the means by which it is 
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treated and what criteria must be met (and documented) prior to being made available to 
the public. 
A special case of surface supply is brackish or ocean water.  The ocean is the largest 
reservoir of water in the world but the adverse chemical composition, until recently, has 
precluded it as a viable source water.  Interestingly, in many ways the ocean provides an 
ideal water supply, especially for coastal areas, in that the water supply is virtually 
inexhaustible and the water quality is consistently uniform.  The primary problem has 
been that the technology to treat the water was inadequate or prohibitively expensive 
compared to other source options.  Even in this case, consideration of reject water 
disposal must not be ignored. 
Water Treatment 
Once the water supply has been selected, a complete characterization of that water and 
its expected variability must be established.  In many communities it is also not 
uncommon to have multiple water sources for reliability and redundancy purposes.  This 
might also include mixed source combinations (ex. ground water and surface water 
supply components). 
Using applicable state and federal regulations as the minimum finished water standard, 
the designer considers various treatment process trains to produce the required effluent 
quality.  Careful consideration of the variability of different combinations of raw water 
characteristics, variation in consumer demand and cost of production is required.  This 
can be especially complex when blending waters from multiple sources, due to chemical 
interactions that can occur when mixed that would not occur if they were separate. 
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Process design and treatment equipment have evolved significantly over the years and 
can effectively treat many waters that previously would have been deemed marginal, if 
not unacceptable.  The most simple treatment process involves nothing more that 
chlorine disinfection before pumping it on to the consumer.  This is normally only seen 
when a high quality ground water is the source water. 
Source waters that are highly mineralized (e.g. hard waters or dissolved H2S) or waters 
from surface supplies need more careful treatment and control.  Water quality objectives 
are typically accomplished by using some form or combination of physical or chemical 
processes.  Common component processes might include aeration, pH adjustment, 
sedimentation, coagulation/flocculation and clarification, lime softening, filtration, 
adsorption processes and more recently membrane processes. 
In addition some form of disinfection will be applied.  Historically, gas chlorination has 
been the primary means of providing microbial control of product water and has 
performed remarkably in terms of overall deactivation levels and long-term effectiveness.  
However, a change in design approach is underway as research has indicated that 
chlorination of certain waters can produce process by-products that increase the risk of 
bladder cancers and some level of adverse reproductive effects.  Further research has 
indicated that all commonly used disinfectants have some level of by-product generation 
that must be controlled, with the exception of ultraviolet sterilization (AWWA, 1999; 
White, 1999). 
Any cursory review of the regulatory requirements demonstrates that in-plant monitoring 
of incoming water quality and finished water quality can be quite thorough and 
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demanding.  The laws and regulations are written to assure as much as practicable that 
the water produced by the CWS is safe to drink. 
Distribution 
Once the water has been treated it moves to the distribution network which is the final 
component of the water system.  The distribution system is composed of pumps, the 
pipe grid, storage facilities and appurtenances (e.g. valves, hydrants, and service 
connections).  Typically, the design of the distribution system has been considered 
primarily a hydraulic function.  That is, the objective is to deliver the water from the 
treatment plant to the customer in sufficient volumes and at an acceptable pressure 
while minimizing the cost of delivery.  This is accomplished by sophisticated computer 
analyses of pressure loss through pipes under varying conditions to meet regulatory 
criteria relative to residual pressure at all points in the system.  In conjunction with this, 
sizing and placement of distribution system storage is an important factor in efficient 
design because it allows flow and pressure equalization which reduces energy loss and 
can reduce pipe stress.  As mentioned earlier, because water is an incompressible fluid, 
clearwell storage at the water plant and distribution storage is absolutely necessary to 
handle the variation in pressure and demand experienced within the distribution grid.  
However, care must be taken not to oversize the pipes or storage because that can lead 
to unacceptable water age in the system. 
The water quality emphasis has tended to be associated with maintenance of the 
integrity of system rather than the water quality itself.  The implicit assumption being that 
if the water met compliance criteria when it left the treatment plant it will arrive at the 
customers tap in the same condition unless there is a breach in the structural integrity of 
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the system.  For example, backflow prevention and cross-connection control are 
important programs in most water systems.  The objective here is to protect the system 
from inadvertent connection of a non-potable water source with the potable water 
produced by the utility.  There is also considerable effort to assure that when new water 
lines are added to the system or whenever the existing system is tapped for new 
connections that the pipe and water within the pipes are within standards.  Again the 
focus of these important programs is to insure that the pipe grid integrity is 
uncompromised as opposed to detailed water quality monitoring within the network. 
Water quality is monitored in distribution systems, but maybe not to the level that one 
might think.  It is upon this portion of the system that this dissertation focuses attention 
asserting that the ability to detect contamination events, such as that imposed by a 
terrorist attack, is poorly developed in both regulatory guidance and operational practice.  
The focus of this study is to develop an approach to identify efficient monitoring locations 
with an emphasis on making those tools accessible to small to mid-sized water systems 
that in many ways represent the most vulnerable targets. 
In order to understand the context from which this need arises, it will be necessary to 
briefly explore current practice in water quality monitoring and to identify weaknesses 
that characterize the process.  This is discussed in Chapter 3. 
One other means used as an indicator of the integrity of the network is the persistence of 
a chlorine residual in the system.  Chapter 62-550.350 (6) FAC stipulates that the 
distribution system will maintain a 0.2 mg/L free chlorine residual or 0.6 mg/L combined 
chlorine residual at all times.  Chlorine residual is useful in maintaining a germicidal 
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effect within the distribution network and can also provide an indication of a potential 
breach of the system.  In other words if the residual becomes depressed in one section 
of the distribution system and not others, that would indicate a need to check the area to 
determine what is consuming the residual.  While chlorine at that level is not a powerful 
disinfectant it is still useful to address many small microbiological events (VonHuben, 
1999; White, 1999). 
A summary of many of the most fundamental design requirements is indicated in 
Appendix 1 (Health Research, 1997). 
Summary 
The fundamental purpose of a public water system is to deliver water to its customers in 
acceptable quantities (volume and pressure) with an acceptable quality and at a 
reasonable price.   In order to accomplish this, the system’s characteristics must be 
quantified to adapt to highly non-linear factors such as demand variation and energy loss 
associated with bulk transport.  The sine qua non of any potable water system, of 
course, is that the water is safe, palatable and suitable for use.   
In the United States these goals are met within a regulatory framework which codifies 
much of the engineering, operational and public health experience developed over the 
years.  The Safe Drinking Water Act, along with a number of implementation rules 
promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency provides the basis for defining 
what a “safe” water is and how it should be treated and delivered to a system’s 
customers.   
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Of fundamental importance are the 87 contaminants identified in the National Primary 
Drinking Water Regulations.  These are the contaminants for which Maximum 
Contaminant Limits are set.  These are the core parameters constituting the enforceable 
health based criteria which essentially circumscribe an acceptable water quality.  The 
National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations are also desirable targets to meet 
aesthetic or functional goals but are not enforceable.  An on-going process of scientific 
review and public scrutiny works to add to the list as additional “weight of evidence” data 
becomes available. 
Because a community’s water supply is crucial to its physical, social and economic well-
being, care is taken to design, construct and operate a system that will be available to 
meet required demands under all reasonable conditions.  To comply with that directive, 
water systems are designed with serious consideration given to reliability, redundancy 
and resiliency.  Reliability relates to a system’s capability of responding to the range of 
demands (from both a quantity and quality perspective) placed upon it.  This typically 
involves various statistical projections relative to a community’s current and future 
source and demand characteristics.  Redundancy is somewhat related to reliability but 
focuses more upon the ability of a system to function acceptably when critical 
mechanical, electrical or control systems fail.  A common example of this concept is the 
placement of multiple pumps in a station to allow continued pumping even when one or 
more pumps are taken out of service for one reason or another.  Finally, water systems 
are designed with the concept of resiliency in mind.  Emergency situations will occur 
occasionally which may require temporary redirections or other response actions to 
return service to an impaired system.  By judicious placement of pipes, valves, pumps 
31 
and the like, a resilient system will allow at least nominal service to be returned in a 
minimum period of time. 
To accomplish all these objectives, water systems are generally classified into three 
components: the water supply, water treatment systems and the distribution network.  
The water supply function is to identify, develop and protect the source system’s water.  
Water supplies generally are classified as surface sources or groundwater sources.  
Different regulations apply to a system depending on that classification. 
The water treatment system are those components that exist to alter the raw water 
characteristics of the water supply to conform to applicable regulations (as a minimum) 
to produce a safe, palatable and useful water.  The water treatment plant(s) typically 
comprise the most complex operational portion of the water system and have heavy 
monitoring requirements relative to the other components. 
Finally, the treated water is delivered to the customer via the water distribution network.  
This is composed of a pipe grid, appurtenances, storage, pumps and occasionally in-
system treatment (ex. re-chlorination).  Monitoring requirements are more rudimentary in 
many ways than those required in the supply and treatment segments of a water system.  
However, given the new post-9/11 realities, it is not prudent to allow network monitoring 
to remain tied to (blinded by) past practices.  The focus of this study is to develop an 
approach to identifying efficient monitoring locations with an emphasis on accessibility of 
those tools to small to mid-sized water systems that in many ways represent the most 
vulnerable targets. 
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Chapter 3 Distribution System Monitoring 
A key aspect of this study focuses on the capability of current monitoring practice to 
detect intentional contamination within the distribution system.  Unless the monitoring 
system is able to efficiently detect the contamination event, its existence will be revealed 
by significant clinical response through the medical system.  This, of course, is the effect 
that the monitoring effort endeavors to avoid.  This dissertation, then, seeks to address 
the question of whether current regulatory and industry monitoring practice that has 
come to focus on minute chemical concentrations (e.g. parts per billion level) can 
effectively address events that lie on the other end of the spectrum, i.e. mass 
contamination in an acute event. 
Before proposing modifications to distribution system sampling protocol, it is appropriate 
to examine the framework and practices underlying current monitoring practice.  From a 
public health perspective, the US water industry has served its customers well.   Major 
outbreaks are rare and, if an outbreak does occur, notification is prompt and specific (40 
CFR Part 141, Subpart Q).  The primary safeguards (Geldreich, 1996; VonHuben, 1999) 
for the distribution system are generally listed as being: 
1. Continuous positive pressure in the water main 
2. Maintenance of a minimum chlorine residual 
3. Cross-connection and backflow prevention 
4. Compliance monitoring 
5. Corrosion control 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, when one reviews the design, regulatory and operational 
literature it becomes apparent that until the passage of the SDWA in 1986, an 
operational “blind spot” existed.  It seems that the generally held belief was that once 
water enters the distribution system, it would be delivered to the consumer with 
approximately the same quality it possessed when it left the treatment facility unless 
there was a structural break in the lines or some form of accidental intrusion occurred.  
Therefore, the operational and institutional focus of the water utilities tended to address 
construction monitoring, backflow and cross-connection programs, and customer 
complaint tracking. 
Then in 1988 the issuance of the proposed Lead and Copper Rule required water 
system operators to test water “at the consumer tap” for compliance (40 CFR 141).  As 
operators began to deal analytically with water quality issues within the distribution 
system itself an evolving view of water quality drivers began to occur.  The subsequent 
Total Coliform Rule and Surface Water Treatment Rule reinforced the need to begin to 
address the fact that the distribution system itself may impact water quality. 
This is not to say that the effects of the distribution system on water quality had gone 
completely unnoticed.  In fact some researchers have described the distribution system 
more in terms of a living individual with its own dynamic characteristics than a network of 
pipes (Larson, 1966; Rossie, 1975).   They use analogies in which the systems respond 
to stresses placed on them, just as a functioning entity would, resulting in changes in 
water quality and delivery capabilities.  Also, epidemiological studies have provided 
ample documentation that finished water quality can deteriorate as a result of distribution 
system activities resulting in water-borne disease outbreaks (Besner, Gauthier, Servais, 
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& Camper, 2002; Clark et al., 1993; Craun & Calderon, 2001; Geldreich, 1996; Herwaldt 
et al., 1992; Logsdon, Schneider, & Budd, 2004).  Thus, it is not the case that the 
literature had not documented the fact that the distribution system affects water quality.  
The distribution system has even been described as “the final barrier for the 
maintenance of water quality” (Clark et al., 1993).  
However, over the past century the major battles in providing safe water have been 
associated with developing safe water supplies and providing adequate water treatment.  
If the distribution system was properly constructed and adequately maintained history 
generally confirmed that water quality in the distribution system remains similar to that 
which left the plant.  Therefore, intensive monitoring for non-specific purposes tended to 
consistently prove negative and therefore has not been viewed as a prudent use of 
manpower and financial resources. 
Even trying to determine what “current monitoring practice” entails is difficult.  A recent 
AWWA Research Foundation report, commissioned to study distribution system 
monitoring practices noted, “Current guidelines on water quality monitoring are scattered 
throughout many sources and references and often are not specific to distribution 
systems.  Written guidelines may be difficult to retrieve from utility archives and 
guidelines handed down verbally from past utility staff may be outdated or incomplete” 
(Kirmeyer et al., 2002).  Thus coherent, structured distribution system monitoring plans 
are the exception rather than the norm in the water industry, especially in small to mid-
sized systems. 
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This also highlights an interesting feature of water supplies.  Unlike electric utilities, 
water systems are not connected in a global grid.  Therefore, each water system has its 
own set of strengths and vulnerabilities.  That is, not all systems are equally vulnerable.  
In a related fashion not all water systems have the same impact as “targets” to a terrorist 
group.  For example, contamination of a water system serving a small mobile home park 
may not have the same “value” as an act that affects a major municipal system.  
However, one can’t rule out an attack on a smaller system, because there may be 
localized motivations or possibly the intent to impose a psychological impact on other 
small system.  In any event the point to be observed is that a multitude of independent 
water systems exist which serve the vast majority of the population.  A coordinated 
attack on even a small proportion of the community systems could have widespread 
societal implications. 
Although water distribution monitoring objectives have been classified in many different 
ways, ultimately they fall into one of two types of sampling programs, Compliance 
Monitoring and Special Purpose Sampling.  These will be approaches will be outlined in 
the sections below with the intent of addressing the question posed at the outset - can 
monitoring systems that are established to deal with minute contaminant levels deal with 
massive contamination on an acute time scale? 
Compliance Monitoring 
Because waterborne disease posed the primary health risk during the formative years of 
large centralized water systems in this country, the most common monitoring activity, 
compliance monitoring, focused on managing that risk.  Historically, that approach has 
been based upon the use of “indicator species” as a surrogate for overall water quality.  
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Indicator species have been used for that purpose for over 100 years in order to 
minimize the analyses required to confirm microbial contamination.  The most common 
microorganisms used for this purpose are heterotrophic bacteria, total coliform and fecal 
coliform. 
Over time there has been a subtle shift in emphasis from acute manifestations (ex. 
pathogenic organisms/diseases) to longer term or chronic outcomes (ex. carcinogens, 
Pb/Cu, etc).   No doubt this has resulted from the marked success of improvements in 
water treatment and disinfection technology which dramatically reduced or eliminated 
waterborne disease outbreaks arising from CWSs.  The implicit assumption underlying a 
compliance monitoring program is that the water is clean unless proven otherwise by 
sampling.   Table 1 provides an overview of the primary regulations and requirements for 
sampling within the distribution system. 
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Table 1 Water Quality Parameters and Associated Regulations for Water Distribution Systems  
Parameter Sample Location Regulatory Limit Reference Comments
Disinfectant residual* Entry point to 
distribution system
Minimum 0.2 mg/L on a 
continuous basis
U.S. SWTR Only applies to systems using 
surface water supplies.  In U.S., 
Legionella is also regulated by a 
treatment technique.
Disinfectant residual Distribution system MRDL chlorine 4.0 mg/L 
MRDL chloramine 4.0 
mg/L, running annual 
average
U.S. D/DBP 
Rule Stage 1
Surface water systems serving 
>10,000 people.
Disinfectant residual or 
HPC bacteria count*
Throughout 
distribution system
Detectable level of 
disinfectant residual or 
HPC bacteria count of 500 
or less cfu/mL in 95 
percent of samples 
collected each month for 
any two consecutive 
months
U.S. SWTR Only applies to systems using 
surface water supplies.
Total trihalomethanes Throughout 
distribution system
80 µg/L, running annual 
average based on 
quarterly samples
U.S. D/DBP 
Rule Stage 1
Surface water systems serving 
>10,000 people.
Haloacetic acids (HAA5) Throughout 
distribution system
60 µg/L, running annual 
average based on 
quarterly samples
U.S. D/DBP 
Rule Stage 1
Surface water systems serving 
>10,000 people.
Total coliform bacteria Throughout 
distribution system
5% positive U.S. Total 
Coliform Rule
Number of samples determined by 
population served.
Lead and copper At customer's taps Action levels:
Lead 0.015 mg/L at 90%
Copper 1.3 mg/L at 90%
U.S. Lead and 
Copper Rule
Number of samples determined by 
population served.
pH Representative points 
in distribution system
Minimum of 7.0 U.S. Lead and 
Copper Rule
State primacy agency may waive 
requirement if the agency 
determines that it is not feasible or 
necessary to achieve pH 7.0
*Disinfectant residual may be regulated for some systems using groundwater supplies under the forthcoming Groundwater Rule.
Source:  Kirmeyer et al, 2002.  
 
Table 2 indicates the regulatory testing requirements for Coliform monitoring which is the 
test to be performed with the highest frequency (40 CFR 141.21; Chapter 62.550.518(2) 
FAC).  The minimum number of samples required in the distribution system is typically 
established by state or federal regulatory standards.  By and large it is left to the utility’s 
discretion to locate the sampling points in areas which suitably characterize the system.  
Generally, sample points are selected in areas of reported or historical problems, 
different pressure zones, high risk areas or near interconnection points with adjacent 
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utilities.  Some of the monitoring points might be permanent and some might be 
relocated from month to month (Geldreich, 1996; VonHuben, 1999).  
Table 2 EPA Coliform Monitoring Frequency Requirements 
POPULATION SERVED 
Minimum 
number of 
samples per 
month 
Population / Sample  
       Lowest Population Highest Population 
        
25 to 1,000 1 25 1,000 
1,001 to 2,500 2 501 1,250 
2,501 to 3,300 3 834 1,100 
3,301 to 4,100 4 825 1,025 
4,101 to 4,900 5 820 980 
4,901 to 5,800 6 817 967 
5,801 to 6,700 7 829 957 
6,701 to 7,600 8 838 950 
7,601 to 8,500 9 845 944 
8,501 to 12,900 10 850 1,290 
12,901 to 17,200 15 860 1,147 
17,201 to 21,500 20 860 1,075 
21,501 to 25,000 25 860 1,000 
25,001 to 33,000 30 833 1,100 
33,001 to 41,000 40 825 1,025 
41,001 to 50,000 50 820 1,000 
50,001 to 59,000 60 833 983 
59,001 to 70,000 70 843 1,000 
70,001 to 83,000 80 875 1,038 
83,001 to 96,000 90 922 1,067 
96,001 to 130,000 100 960 1,300 
130,001 to 220,000 120 1,083 1,833 
220,001 to 320,000 150 1,467 2,133 
320,001 to 450,000 180 1,778 2,500 
450,001 to 600,000 210 2,143 2,857 
600,001 to 780,000 240 2,500 3,250 
780,001 to 970,000 270 2,889 3,593 
970,001 to 1,230,000 300 3,233 4,100 
1,230,001 to 1,520,000 330 3,727 4,606 
1,520,001 to 1,850,000 360 4,222 5,139 
1,850,001 to 2,270,000 390 4,744 5,821 
2,270,001 to 3,020,000 420 5,405 7,190 
3,020,001 to 3,960,000 450 6,711 8,800 
3,960,001 or more 480 8,250  
Source: 40CFR141.21 (Sampling table)    
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By examining Table 2 and dividing the population served by the required samples, one 
develops an insight into the coverage each test provides.  For all intents and purposes 
this ranges from 500 people covered per sample to 8800 people per sample.  Recalling 
that these are monthly sampling requirements, it is easy to see that coverage for acute 
events is lacking in compliance monitoring.  Most utilities will monitor in excess of the 
minimum number of samples required, but the essential pattern remains unchanged. 
A slightly different way of looking at the monitoring practice is to examine the number of 
service connections covered by each biological test.  This statistic is more reliable than 
population because water meters or connections are more easily and accurately 
determined by utility staff than population.  Although some aspects of permit records are 
not available publicly subsequent to Homeland Security rules, a dataset was secured 
from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) during the early 
research for this paper in August, 2000.  This data set lists all 2030 CWSs permitted in 
the state of Florida at that time.  It addition it identified the population and service 
connections associated with the system along with the number of bacteriological tests 
required and the number actually performed.  The number of bacteriological samples 
was correlated with the number of connections served.  The bacteriological samples 
were chosen because they are the most frequently run tests. Examining water systems 
that serve at least 100 connections, the median number of connections covered by a 
bacteriological test is 99 connections per month.  As the system size increases the unit 
coverage also increases.  This is characteristic is indicated in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Average Number of Connections per Monthly Coliform Test Correlated to CWS Size 
CWS with Connections Greater 
Than 
Connections Covered per 
Monthly Bacteriological Test 
100 99 
500 194 
1,000 212 
2,000 228 
5,000 253 
10,000 261 
20,000 303 
Source: FDEP (Aug., 2000)  
 
The point to notice is that both the spatial and temporal coverage of this testing is 
nominal.  As one examines this data, however, it should become clear that the ability to 
detect an intentional, but unknown, contamination event within the distribution system 
would be limited.  Since the laboratory turnaround time for coliform will be at least three 
days, even if the sample did detect the contamination the system managers wouldn't 
know in time to respond (assuming that the appropriate tests were being performed in 
the first place). 
It should be noted that other more exhaustive distribution system compliance tests may 
be take once every one to three years depending on the parameter.  For example, lead 
and copper are monitored at random consumer sites to verify compliance with 
regulations.  However, compared with the sampling which is required for water plant 
operation (which varies from continuous to daily), the distribution system sampling scale 
is normally monthly.  Obviously, any sort of acute event would not be picked up within 
the monitoring framework and would only serve as a confirmation test. 
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Special Purpose Sampling 
The other type of distribution sampling can be classified as special purpose sampling.  
This type of monitoring is usually associated with a short-term intense sampling program 
to address a specific issue.  This might include investigations related to water quality 
issues such as taste/odor complaints, compliance monitoring failure, or Pb/Cu studies.  
Upon recognition of an initiating event, a special purpose sampling program will be 
authorized to isolate the source, extent and magnitude of the contamination (Geldreich, 
1996).   Generally, the underlying assumption in this mode of sampling is that some level 
of contamination may exist in a specific area or region of the system, but the overall 
integrity of the system is intact. 
Special purpose sampling is also used to meet operational needs which may not 
explicitly deal with public health issues.  Monitoring for this purpose would include 
operational studies (ex. optimize pumping sequences or configuration), maintenance 
functions (identify pipeline replacement or flushing programs), or support for capital 
improvement programs (Kirmeyer et al., 2002). 
For their purposes the foregoing methodologies have been adequate.  However, when 
faced with detecting acute, fast-moving incidents, they are unsatisfactory.   The 
feedback mechanism is much too slow (on the order of weeks or months) and in most 
cases the coverage of the system is severely limited.  This paper proposes a change in 
sampling philosophy is now necessary.  Using this paradigm the underlying assumption 
presumes that contamination exists somewhere in the system and must be detected.  
Accordingly, deployment of a set of continuous reading monitors within the network 
would be required.  This, of course, assumes that instrumentation exists which can 
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detect contaminants of interest with sufficient speed and sensitivity to reliably assess the 
water status.  Although such instrumentation for most contaminants does not exist or is 
prohibitively expensive, significant progress is being made in developing this capability. 
This is not to imply that there is a wholesale decline in America’s water supply 
capabilities, but rather it is a recognition of the need for a change in management culture 
which recognizes the multifaceted nature and the new vulnerability of the distribution 
system.  On this basis, selection of the “best” set of monitoring points would be chosen 
with a slightly different set of criteria in mind.  Water systems are designed and operated 
with an inherent level of trust that people will not intentionally contaminate a public water 
system resulting in harm to innocent people.  However, once it is acknowledged that 
someone might be motivated to do such a thing, scenario development can quickly 
identify the weaknesses in the infrastructure, especially the distribution system, because 
there is no routine short term, much less continuous, means of measuring water quality 
activity throughout the distribution system . 
If adopted, it is acknowledged that this approach will be expensive both in terms of 
capital and operating costs.  Thus, the need to be able to strategically locate a limited 
number of effective stations is critical.  It is further noted that small to mid-sized systems 
have even more pressure on them to allocate their limited resources in the best manner 
practicable, due to their limited financial and technical capacity.  This is, in fact, the 
reason why the EPA has staggered implementation schedules for most rules, so that the 
smaller systems have more time to make the adjustments.   
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Summary 
Utility designers and managers must concede that a new paradigm for network water 
quality surveillance now exists.  Systems that have served well for over 100 years are 
now insufficient when one considers the possibility of direct and intentional 
contamination.   Currently, water distribution system monitoring is generally categorized 
as “compliance monitoring” or “special purpose sampling”.  Compliance monitoring is a 
routine process of sampling at various sites through the distribution system to confirm 
that water at those points meets specified regulatory standards.  The time scale on this 
sampling approach (including analytical turnaround time) is generally on the order of 
weekly to monthly.  Guidance on sampling location is limited.  A summary of the major 
regulations driving compliance monitoring was presented in Table 1.    
Special Purpose Sampling is associated with a short-term intense sampling program to 
address a specific issue.  This is typically associated with a violation that occurs during 
the compliance monitoring or in response to complaints from system customers.  This 
monitoring approach will be more thorough and have a shorter data turnaround time, 
however, it generally occurs only for a limited duration.   
To establish a monitoring scheme that efficiently protects the network from all the 
potential levels of contamination is neither simple nor inexpensive…and probably, in an 
absolute sense, impossible.  The burden on small to mid-sized water systems is 
especially burdensome due to their limited staff and budget constraints.  A means of 
identifying and prioritizing a set of monitoring points that addresses this need would be a 
great help to utilities searching for a way to deal with the potential threat.  That is the 
purpose of the remainder of this study. 
44 
Chapter 4 Potential Contamination Agents 
Introduction 
Because this study is focusing on the possibility of individuals or groups attempting to 
intentionally contaminate a public water supply, one of the first questions that might be 
asked is, ‘what contaminants might be used to cause mass contamination of a water 
distribution system?’  In other words if the utility is trying to monitor to detect something, 
what would that be?  This is not a trivial matter in that, at first glance, it would seem that 
thousands of potential contaminants exist.  That being the case it is appropriate to 
establish a framework for examining potential agents and then attempt to evaluate their 
potential for effective contamination on a public health basis. 
Parenthetically, it is noted that while assembling the data gathered for this paper, it 
became evident that the documented effects of various treatment processes from this 
perspective are not well developed.  In fact, it is not uncommon to find diverging, if not 
conflicting, data.  This is probably not surprising in that (fortunately) these agents are 
rarely found in water supplies, so few have ever had to be concerned with them.  
However, given the new world realities, we can expect that future research will 
accelerate in this area. 
In organizing the research and presentation of results, some framework needed to be 
set.  A pattern of analysis has been established for analyzing environmental 
contamination which has applicability to this problem, i.e. the Risk Assessment process.  
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The challenge with intentional contamination events is that they do not follow traditional 
probability distributions and tend to be extreme (low probability) events.  However, the 
assessment of risk can still follow the same general procedure. 
The format of a Risk Assessment, generally used for chemical exposures, is broken into 
four basic steps which are to be rooted in and focused on the scientific aspects of the 
process.  This has been defined (NRC, 1983) to include: 
1. Hazard identification, i.e. what agent is present that will cause adverse effects? 
2. Toxicity (dose-response) assessment, i.e. what is the relationship between an 
exposure dose and an adverse health effect in humans? 
3. Exposure assessment, i.e. what exposures are currently experienced or likely to 
occur under different conditions? 
4. Risk characterization, i.e. what is the estimated incidence of health impairment to 
a given population? 
Augmenting this process Haas, Rose and Gerba (1999) demonstrate that microbial 
exposures can be examined in a quantitative or semi-quantitative manner by adapting 
the NRC methodology.  By the nature of infectious microbial agents, the process 
invariably has data quality and management issues.  However, research is proceeding to 
attempt to enhance traditional epidemiological tools in managing this type of risk.  
Routes of Exposure 
Exposures occur primarily through three routes: inhalation, ingestion and dermal contact.  
Dermal contact is sometimes further divided to distinguish between percutaneous 
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absorption and percutaneous (puncture) wounds.  The latter is not normally a significant 
route in environmental assessments and is many times ignored.  However, it is a major 
concern in medical settings where “needle sticks” can transfer microbial agents.  It is 
important to note that chemical toxicity is greatly influenced by the route and method of 
exposure, so the dose-response relationships used in an analysis must be related to the 
appropriate route.  To illustrate this intuitively, Figure 3 outlines schematically the 
interrelationships between the major physiological systems. 
Because the focus of this study is drinking water, the primary route of interest is 
ingestion.  It is possible that inhalation or dermal exposures can occur from activities 
such as one showering, cooking, irrigating the lawn, but these are deemed to be 
secondary routes.  While these routes exist and should not be completely ignored, their 
effect should be minor. 
Clear definition of routes of exposure and exposure protocols is important because the 
agent will impact the body in different ways and at different rates depending on the 
method of absorption.  Toxicity tests and development of uptake rates must, therefore, 
differentiate between exposure mechanisms.  This is even more difficult, because the 
body has defense mechanisms that try to neutralize xenobiotic (foreign) substances 
before they damage internal organs.  Therefore, an applied dose is not the same as an 
absorbed dose.  Even the absorbed dose (which enters the blood stream) is not the 
same as the “delivered” dose to a target organ.  From the delivered dose, the 
information truly desired is the “biologically effective” dose, which is the quantity of 
chemical that the organ incorporates into the organ function (Chastain, 1998; Klaasen, 
2001; USEPA, 1990). 
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From the standpoint of planning for a bioterrorism emergency, event planners typically 
assume that the primary method of agent dissemination for mass casualties will be 
through the inhalation route.  It has been shown that aerosol dispersion of appropriate 
substances in highly populated areas is more effective than other means of application.  
This, among other reasons, is why many of the substances deemed critical were 
developed for aerosol dispersion or are focused on adapting the substance for exposure 
via the inhalation route.  Accordingly, most of the toxicological data is listed for inhalation 
instead of ingestion.  As mentioned earlier, the body’s reaction to an agent can be 
greatly different depending on how the material is presented to the victim. 
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Figure 3 Key Routes of Chemical Absorption, Distribution, and Excretion in Humans 
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Because critical doses/exposures to biological agents and chemical agents occur on 
different scales, a brief note about the measures of morbidity and mortality is 
appropriate.  When examining the toxicity or virulence of a given substance/organism, 
there are a number of ways in which the effect can be measured or reported (Klaasen, 
2001). 
LD50: This is an abbreviation for Lethal Dose which results in the death of 50% 
(median) of the subject population.  This is a statistically derived measure of the 
single dose of substance that can be expected to cause death in 50% of the test 
animals.  Although it is treated as a biological constant, it is not.  It is subject to 
many variables. 
LCt50: Because the actual applied dose is a function of both the concentration (C) of the 
agent and the length of time (t) exposed, many toxicologists are moving to a 
weighted scale that shows the interaction of the effects.  The result is the LCt50 
which is the Lethal Concentration-time dose in which 50% of the population dies.  
This measure is primarily seen in inhalation studies, but is also being recognized 
in other route exposures. 
NOAEL:  No Observable Adverse Effect Level.  This is the highest dosage of a given 
test which does not result in a measurable or observed adverse effect on the test 
animals (population). 
RfD: The Reference Dose is the dose that estimates the level of a substance that can 
be safely consumed by the general population.  It is calculated by dividing the 
NOAEL by Uncertainty factors and Modifying factors.  It is essentially equivalent 
to the Average Daily Intake (ADI) factor which has become outmoded.  In 
general, the lower the RfD, the higher the toxicity. 
Infectious dose:  The dose at which an infectious agent (microorganism) enters the 
body and begins to multiply.  It may or may not result in a clinical manifestation of 
the disease.  The period between the exposure and the first shedding or 
excretion of the agent, i.e., manifestation is called the Latent period.  The period 
of time which may exist between the time the infectious agent enters the body 
and the time it begins to multiply is called the Lag period. 
Other measures of toxicity exist; however, these are among the most common and can 
provide at least a qualitative means of comparing risks between various agents.  Also, 
having some quantification of the toxicity values allows one to begin to estimate that 
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amount of a specific agent that must be present to contaminate a water system to 
produce a lethal effect. 
Assumptions Regarding System Contamination 
There are many contaminants that can pollute a water supply.  Of specific interest to this 
study are those contaminants that are not readily detectable by the consumer and which 
can cause some degree of morbidity or mortality upon exposure.  It is also assumed that 
the agent is capable of mass contamination, otherwise known as “weapons of mass 
destruction”.  In other words, the intent would be to corrupt a large volume of water as 
opposed to service to a few houses or a small isolated subdivision.   
Focus is also limited to those agents that cause a major acute response contra a chronic 
response.  In other words, carcinogenic agents are not considered in the screening 
process, because the time of action is too long.  This is not to say that they might not 
have serious consequences, but they don’t typically fit within a terrorist agenda and thus 
present poor agent choices from that perspective. 
For a contaminant to effectively harm a population by contaminating the water, it would 
need, at a minimum, to have the following qualities: 
1. Highly soluble or finely divided and suspended in water 
2. Colorless 
3. Odorless  
4. Tasteless  
5. Highly toxic 
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In other words, to achieve the goals of the offending entity, the water would need to be 
contaminated in such a way as to be undetectable when consumed, so that exposure to 
the contaminant would be unrestrained.  Given these criteria, one is able to then begin to 
sort through a list of potential candidates to identify possible contaminants for use in 
situations as posed here.  Additional pragmatic concerns also come into play, such as 
the ease of acquiring and the cost of the material as well as the ability to transport and 
disperse the contaminant. 
The contaminant can be drawn from several different categories: Chemical, Microbial or 
Physical (Radiation).  A number of studies have sought to screen various databases to 
select likely candidates that fit the specified profile.  As an example, Burrows and 
Renner (1999) did a careful study of biological agents and their potential as threats to 
potable water.  That work examined 27 organisms or biotoxins that are likely to be used 
as contamination agents.  While the work was prepared by the U.S. Army with a focus 
on field water treatment units, it has applicability to this study. 
Assuming chemicals formed the primary threat, the University of Michigan’s Studies in 
Urban Security Group (1997) prepared a report for the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency that examined 79,000 potential contaminants taken from the Registry of Toxic 
Effects of Chemical Substances.  They identified 35 chemicals that met the criteria of 
being tasteless, odorless, colorless and had an LD50 of 10 mg/kg.  Another study 
prepared at the University of Michigan (Deininger, 2000) conceptually widened the 
scope to consider biological agents and “designer drugs” as a threat, although no 
specific analysis was provided.  The authors did note, however, that the use of “designer 
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drugs” could be particularly difficult to identify because of the ability of a terrorist to 
develop an agent that does not exist in any tracking database. 
An interesting feature of each of these reports is that they all assume contamination 
ahead of the treatment plant, thus allowing the treatment process to reduce the efficacy 
of the agent.  While this is valid if the contamination of the supply occurs, it leaves many 
questions unanswered if the application occurred downstream.  Although that 
perspective will be changing as utilities begin to analyze their systems from a true 
vulnerability perspective, it demonstrates the potential blind spot that has existed in the 
past. 
Another scenario that does not seem to be considered is the mixture of contaminants.  
Should several different contaminants be combined into one injection incidence, it could 
cause a more serious response in the population.  The individual immune system could 
be challenged on several fronts resulting in a weakening of the body’s ability to resist.  
For example, if Cryptosporidium and Giardia were mixed, the resulting incident could 
cause an epidemic of severe gastric distress that could result in additional secondary 
infections. 
Classes of Contamination Agents 
Given the preceding discussion, a number of military, academic and public health 
institutions have developed lists of agents to be considered as “weapons of mass 
destruction”.  There are a number of different ways to classify them but generally, they 
can be organized as follows.  (More expansive lists also include radioactive materials, 
but those are not considered sufficiently viable to include in this analysis.) 
52 
1. Biological Agents 
· Bacteria/Rickettsiae 
· Protozoa 
· Toxins 
· Viruses 
2. Chemical Agents 
· Warfare Agents (Casualty agents) 
· Nerve Agents 
· Blood Agents 
· Choking Agents 
· Vesicants (Blister Agents) 
· Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
Biological Agents 
In many ways, the biological agents possess the most potential for system 
contamination.  Conceptually, any of the waterborne pathogens could be used as an 
agent.  The difference between the pathogens would be their virulence, ability to survive 
in the distribution system environment and the ultimate effect.  Many waterborne 
diseases cause gastric illnesses, but have no long term effect, while others can result in 
protracted illness or death.  The key to selection lies in the intent of the perpetrator (i.e. 
morbidity/mortality, disruption, psychological trauma, etc. ), ease of access to the 
materials and ability to deliver the agent.  While the issue is new to this generation of 
water system designers and managers, it is certainly not the first time that it has been 
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considered.  Berger and Stevenson (1955), in fact, presented an analysis of biological 
contamination following the initiation of the Cold War.  Although the equipment and 
technology have changed significantly, that article still contains pertinent information. 
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has attempted to prioritize 
different biological agents by classifying them as Class A, B, or C.  The class codes 
relate to their virulence and likelihood of use with Class A being the most damaging.  
The listing for the bio-agents is as follows (CDC, 2000; Kahn, Morse, & Lillibridge, 2000; 
Rotz, Kahn, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002).   It should be noted that most of the 
agents are established using the inhalational exposure route because that is deemed to 
present the most vulnerable scenario. 
Category A. 
High-priority agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because they: 
· can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;  
· cause high mortality, and have the potential for major public health impact;  
· might cause public panic and social disruption; and 
· require special action for public health preparedness. 
Agents currently classified as Category A Disease/Agents 
· Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis)  
· Botulism (Clostridium botulinum toxin) 
· Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
· Smallpox (Variola major) 
· Tularemia (Francisella tularensis) 
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· Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Arenaviruses, Filoviruses, Bunyaviruses, and 
Flaviviruses) 
Category B. 
Second highest priority agents include those that: 
· are moderately easy to disseminate;  
· cause moderate morbidity and low mortality; and 
· require specific enhancements of CDC's diagnostic capacity and enhanced 
disease surveillance. 
Agents currently classified as Category B Disease/Agents 
· Brucellosis (Brucella species) 
· Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens 
· Food safety threats (Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella) 
· Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) 
· Melioidosis (Burkholderia pseudomallei) 
· Psittacosis (Chlamydia psittaci) 
· Q fever (Coxiella burnetti) 
· Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans) 
· Staphylococcus enterotoxin B 
· Typhus fever (Rickettsia prowazekii) 
· Viral encephalitis 
· Water Safety Threats (Cryptosporidium parvum, Vibrio Cholerae) 
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Category C. 
Third highest priority agents include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for 
mass dissemination in the future because of: 
· availability;  
· ease of production and dissemination; and 
· potential for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact. 
Agents currently classified as Category C Disease/Agents 
· Hantaviruses 
· Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis 
· Nipah virus 
· Tickborne encephalitis viruses 
· Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses 
· Yellow fever 
In this context Biological agents can be conveniently classified into four different 
categories: Bacteria/Rickettsiae, Protozoa, Toxins and Viruses.  For the purpose of this 
analysis, an attempt to summarize the findings of numerous reports has been listed in 
Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6.  Because of the differences in the modes of operation of 
the different organisms (as well as information available), each table is arranged a little 
differently.  The primary intent of the tables is to list in a compact fashion the nature of 
the threat, the number of organisms necessary to cause an infection and whether or not 
the organism is sensitive to inactivation by chlorine.  Obviously, the fewer organisms 
required to infect, i.e., the more virulent the agent, the more effective it could be in 
meeting a terrorist objective. 
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From a public health perspective, it is important to know if these agents are replicating 
(able to reproduce themselves) and what their environmental (extra-host) survivability is 
likely to be.  The danger of certain pathogenic organisms can be magnified because, 
given appropriate growing conditions, they can continue to increase in concentration 
after the initial contamination event.  Other substances such as toxins are derivative 
substances, i.e. poisonous substances of plant or animal origin.  A toxin is dependent on 
a predecessor organism (plant or animal) producing it; therefore, it is not able to 
replicate itself.  This is important in that the concentration of the substance once in place 
will not increase as is possible with replicating agents.  Accordingly, an attempt has been 
made to segregate the agents in terms of their ability to reproduce. 
Table 4 Replicating Agents 
 
Source:  Burrows and Renner, 1999 
 
Toxins have been proven to be potent poisons in a number of settings.  The range of 
plant and animal based toxins is very large and the use of these substances to 
contaminate water supplies is somewhat unconventional.  To provide an indication of the 
relative potency of the biotoxins, the following table is provided.   (A few warfare agents 
Disease Agent Agent Type Weaponized Water threat Infective dosea Stable in water Chlorine toleranceb
Anthrax Bacillus anthracis Bacteria Yes Yes 6,000 spores (inh) 2 years (spores) Spores resistant
Brucellosis Brucella melitensis Bacteria Yes Probable 10,000 organisms (uns) 20-72 days Unknown
Cholera Vibrio cholerae Bacteria Unknown Yes 1,000 organisms (ing) Survives well Easily killed
Gas Gangrene Clostridium perfringens Bacteria Probable Probable 108 organisms (ing) Common in sewage Resistant
Glanders Burkholderia mallei Bacteria Probable Unlikely 3.2 x 106  organisms (uns) Up to 30 days Unknown
Melioidosis Pseudomonas pseudomallei Bacteria Possible Unlikely Unknown Unknown Unknown
Plague (Bubonic) Yersinia pestis Bacteria Probable Yes 500 organisms (inh) 16 days Unknown
Psittacosis Clamydia psitacci Parasite Possible Possible Unknown 18-24 hr, seawater Unknown
Q fever Coxiella burnetti Rickettsia Yes Possible 25 organisms (uns) Unknown Unknown
Salmonellosis Salmonella sp. Bacteria Unknown Yes 104 organisms (ing) 8 days, fresh water Inactivated
Shigellosis Shigella sp. Bacteria Unknown Yes 104 organisms (ing) 2-3 days Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10 min
Tularemia Francisella tularensis Bacteria Yes Yes 108 organisms (ing) Up to 90 days Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min
Typhus Rickettsia prowazekii Rickettsia Probable Unlikely 10 organisms (uns) Unknown Unknown
Encephalomyelitis VEE Virus Probable Unlikely 25 particles (aer) Unknown Unknown
Enteric viruses Virus Unknown Yes 6 particles (ing) 8-32 days Readily inactivated (rotavirus)
Hemorrhagic fever
VHF, Rotavirus, Norwalk & 
Ebola virus Virus Probable Unlikely 105 particles (ing) Unknown Unknown
Smallpox Variola major Virus Possible Possible 10 particles (uns) Unknown Unknown
Cryptosporidiosis Cryptosporidum parvum Protozoa Unknown Yes 132 oocysts (ing) Stable days or more Resistant
Abbreviations:  aer-aerosol; ing-ingestion; inh-inhalation; uns-unspecified.
a Total infective dose used to calculate water values.  bAmbient temperature, < 1 ppm free available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated.
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are also listed below because they are, in essence, toxins.  Note that the data is based 
on the effects on laboratory mice.) 
Table 5 Comparative Lethality of Selected  Biotoxins and Chemical Agents in Laboratory Mice 
AGENT LD50 (µ G/KG) 
MOLECULAR 
WEIGHT SOURCE 
Botulinum toxin 0.001 150,000 Bacterium 
Shiga toxin 0.002 55,000 Bacterium 
Tetanus toxin 0.002 150,000 Bacterium 
Abrin 0.04 65,000 Plant (Rosary Pea) 
Diphtheria toxin 0.10 62,000 Bacterium 
Mainotoxin 0.10 3,400 Marine Dinoflagellate 
Palytoxin 0.15 2,700 Maine Soft Coral 
Ciguatoxin 0.40 1,000 Marine Dinoflagellate 
Textilotoxin 0.60 80,000 Elapid Snake 
C. perfringens toxins 0.1 – 5.0 35-40,000 Bacterium 
Batrachotoxin 2.0 539 Arrow -Poison Frog 
Ricin 3.0 64,000 Plant (Castor Bean) 
alpha-Conotoxin 5.0 1,500 Cone Snail 
Taipoxin 5.0 46,000 Elapid Snake 
Tetrodotoxin 8.0 319 Puffer Fish 
alpha-Tityustoxin 9.0 8,000 Scorpion 
Saxitoxin 10.0 (Inhal 2.0) 299 Marine Dinoflagellate 
VX 15.0 267 Chemical Agent 
SEB (Rhesus/Aerosol) 27.0 (ED50~pg) 28,494 Bacterium 
Anatoxin-A(s) 50.0 500 Blue-Green Algae 
Microcystin 50.0 994 Blue-Green Algae 
Soman (GD) 64.0 182 Chemical Agent 
Sarin (GB) 100.0 140 Chemical Agent 
Aconitine 100.0 647 Plant (Monkshood) 
T-2 Toxin 1,210.0 466 Fungal Mycotoxin 
From:  Medical Management of Biological Casualties, U.S. AMRIID, July 1998, Appendix C 
 
Table 5 clearly shows that the Botulinum toxin is a thousand times more effective than 
Ricin, and many of the other agents.  However, Botulinum will be deactivated by chlorine 
if a water system has reasonable CT, whereas many of the others are insensitive to 
chlorine. 
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Other routes of exposure are typically more efficient methods of delivery, but some can 
be adapted to a water based delivery method.  Table 6 was developed by Burrows and 
Renner (1999) to show the biotoxins that are most likely to be used in a water 
contamination event.  (Notice that, in general, the toxins are relatively resistant to 
chlorine at the levels commonly found in potable water systems.) 
Table 6 Selected Biotoxins 
Biotoxin Weaponized Water threat NOAEL, 2 L/daya Stable in water Chlorine tolerance
b 
Aflatoxin Yes  Yes  75 µg/L Probably stable Probably tolerant 
Anatoxin A Unknown Probable Unknown Inactivated in 
days 
Probably tolerant 
Botulinum toxins Yes  Yes  0.0004 µg/L Stable Inactivated, 6 ppm, 20 min 
Microcystins Possible Yes  1.0 µg/Lc Probably stable Resistant at 100 ppm 
Ricin Yes  Yes  15 µg/L Stable Resistant at 10 ppm 
Saxitoxin Possible Yes  0.4 µg/L Stable Resistant at 10 ppm 
Staphylococcal 
enterotoxins Probable Yes  0.1 µg/L Probably stable Unknown 
T-2 mycotoxin Probable Yes  65 µg/Ld Stable Resistant 
Tetrodotoxin Possible Yes  1 µg/L Probably stable Inactivated, 50 ppm 
NOAEL, no-observed-adverse-effect level. 
aEstimated as 7.5 times the NOAEL calculated for consumption of 15 L/day.  bAmbient temperature, < 1 ppm free 
available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated.   cWorld Health Organization drinking water standard.  dDerived from short-
term U.S. Department of Defense Tri-Service standard (77). 
Source:  Burrows and Renner, 1999 
 
It should be noted that a number of these agents have not been thoroughly evaluated in 
terms of removal or disinfection efficacy, because they are not of routine concern to 
water utilities.  Therefore, they have not had the level of research associated with them 
that the more common indicator species have had.  In light of that fact, it is not surprising 
that there is disagreement in the literature about the characteristics of the organisms 
(infective dose, survivability and efficacious chlorine dose).  This is no doubt due to the 
different conditions under which the studies in the literature were performed. 
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Variables Affecting Disinfection 
Disinfection processes are typically viewed as being the primary treatment barrier for 
reducing or eliminating the threat of biological pathogens.  Chlorine (HOCl and OCl- 
species) has been the primary agent of disinfection for roughly 100 years.  However, in 
recent years alternative disinfectants/oxidants are being used in specific situations.  
Examples would include ozone, ultraviolet light, chlorine dioxide and gamma radiation. 
The effectiveness of the disinfection or neutralization process is governed by more 
variables than merely the mass of disinfectant/oxidant applied.  One thing noted while 
reviewing the literature was the fact that many of the key variables were not listed in the 
articles.  Therefore, it is possible that the dosages or effectiveness ratings of disinfectant 
(chlorine specifically) may not be exactly as listed.  Generally speaking, in order to fairly 
estimate the efficacy of a disinfectant, the temperature, pH, contact time (assuming 
adequate mixing), dosage, and presence of interfering chemicals/turbidity must be 
known.  Then, given the initial concentrations of the microorganisms, a reasonable 
estimate of the disinfection process can be made. 
Portions of the Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) were promulgated by the USEPA 
to account for variations in temperature, pH, dosage and contact time for various 
disinfectants when designing disinfection systems.  The SWTR established what are 
known as the CT tables for a given organism and a given disinfectant at specific pH and 
temperatures.  CT is shorthand notation for (disinfectant) Concentration (C) times 
Contact time (T).  The concentration is measured in mg/L and the time is measured in 
minutes. 
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It is reasonable to assume that the higher the disinfectant concentration, the higher the 
rate of destruction.  Again, the actual CT values depend on the microorganism, the pH of 
the water, the temperature, and the turbidity of the water.  The turbidity is a 
measurement of the amount of material suspended in the water that influences the 
transmission of light.  While turbidity itself is not a significant variable, studies have 
shown that bacteria attach themselves to the surface of particles.  If the material is 
organic, bacteria may hide inside the particle and may be protected from the disinfectant 
(White, 1999). 
Generally speaking, chemical reactions proceed faster at higher temperatures.  Chlorine 
reacting with an organic compound will be faster at higher temperatures.  Thus, the 
inactivation (destruction) of viruses and protozoa is slower at lower temperatures than at 
higher ones.  For example, tables in the SWTR show that the required CT times for 
inactivation at low temperatures (5° Celsius) are about 4 times higher than at 25° 
Celsius.  This phenomenon holds for all disinfectants, except for UV radiation.  Thus, the 
higher the CT value, the more disinfectant needed and/or the longer the detention time 
required.  This is clearly shown in Table 7 and Table 8 (AWWA, 1991). 
The guidance manual does not list any CT values for bacteria since they are so much 
lower than the CT values for viruses and protozoa.  Since chlorine is the most prevalent 
disinfectant used in the water industry (80%), a comparison is instructive.  At a 
temperature of 15° C and an inactivation by 3 logs (99.9%), the CT value for a 
representative protozoa is 75 and for viruses 3 (see the Tables 7 and 8).  By contrast, 
the CT value for coliforms is about 0.5.  Deininger (2000) notes that the CT values for 
protozoa are an order of magnitude higher than the CT values for viruses, and the CT for 
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viruses are an order of magnitude higher than those for bacteria.  One exception was 
noted.  Spores of Bacillus anthracis are very resistant to chlorine and will not be 
inactivated by chlorine at the normal concentrations and contact times used in water 
treatment plants.  While most attention is focused on anthrax as an inhalational agent, its 
use through the ingestion route can likewise be a potent agent (Berger & Stevenson, 
1955; Inglesby et al., 1999).  Other microorganisms are resistant to chlorine (ex. giardia 
and cryptosporidium), but none has presented themselves to date that have the 
virulence of B. anthracis. 
Table 7 CT Tables for Inactivation of Giardia Cysts (at pH 7) 
  Temperature ºC  Disinfectant 
Inactivation* 5 15 25 
1 .63 .32 .16 
2 1.3 .63 .32  
3 1.9 .95 .48 
     
1 50 25 12 
2 99 50 25 Chlorine 
3 169 75 37 
     
1 8.7 6.3 3.7 
2 17 13 7.3 Chlorine Dioxide 
3 26 19 11 
     
1 735 500 250 
2 1,470 1,000 500 Chloramine 
3 2,200 1,500 750 
*Inactivation is in log units.  A 2 means a 100 fold reduction, or a 99% inactivation. 
The numbers are CT values (mg/L * minutes) 
Source:  AWWA, 1991 
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Table 8 CT Tables for Inactivation of Viruses (pH 6-9) 
  Temperature ºC  Disinfectant 
Inactivation* 5 15 25 
2 .6 .3 .15 
3 .9 .5 .25 Ozone 
4 1.2 .6 .3 
     
2 4 2 1 
3 6 3 1 Chlorine 
4 8 4 2 
     
2 5.6 2.8 1.4 
3 17.1 8.6 4.3 Chlorine Dioxide 
4 33 16.7 8.4 
     
2 857 428 214 
3 1,423 712 356 Chloramine 
4 1,988 994 497 
     
2 21 21 21 
UV Irradiation 
3 36 36 36 
The numbers are CT values – (mg/L * minutes) 
UV Irradiation:  Numbers are in mWsec/cm 
Source:  AWWA, 1991 
 
Chemical Agents 
Advances in chemistry have driven many of the technological, economic and social 
changes in developed society.  While much of this advancement has been for the good, 
the large number of new chemicals with dangerous characteristics has caused much 
environmental damage and now threatens to be used in more sinister ways.  Although 
chemical warfare has been used at various times throughout history, it was first utilized 
on a large scale during World War I.  Although banned by various conventions, research 
and development within the military has continued and development of chemicals 
specifically as warfare agents has occurred. 
As mentioned, these agents are classified by their physiological effect.  Chemicals which 
were developed to have high mortality (death) levels are called Casualty Agents.  They 
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are sub-classified as Blood Agents, Choking Agents, Nerve Agents and Vesicants 
(Munro et al., 1999; Reutter, 1999).  Other agents have been developed whose purpose 
is not necessarily to cause death, but rather to incapacitate the target in some manner.  
These are called Harassing Agents.  Among this classification are the Lachrymators 
(Tear agents), Sternutators (Vomiting agents), Depressants, Psychedelic agents, and 
Stimulants.  
With regard to the specific warfare agents, they have been developed almost exclusively 
as inhalational or dermal agents.  The toxicity of ingesting the material is less well 
documented but, in most cases, the agents are impractical because of solubility 
limitations.  If there were to be a threat, it would most likely be caused by volatilization of 
the agent out of the water and inhaled. 
Most of the critical agents from an ingestion standpoint are likely to be some form of 
Organophosphate (Nerve agents), Arsenic (Vesicant) or Cyanide (Blood).  The 
organophosphates (OP) are related to the OP pesticides but have much higher 
mammalian acute toxicity (particularly through the percutaneous route).  Therefore, 
some toxicity extrapolation may be inferred from that.  These agents attack the central 
nervous system in one way or another and generally are related to the interruption of 
acetylcholinesterase activity.  The OP agents are generally divided into the G-group and 
V-group.  The G agents are more volatile than the V agents, but all exist as colorless 
and, for the most part, odorless liquids. 
A brief description of the primary unclassified warfare agents listed in the public domain 
follows in Table 9 (Marrs, Maynard, & Sidell, 1996).  A more detailed discussion of the 
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toxicology and fate is provided in Munro et al. (1999), which also includes some data on 
environmental fate issues.  It is also interesting to note that much of the development of 
chemical warfare agents centered on causing maximum casualties for the least sensitive 
male soldier.  When considering the general population, lethal dosages may be need to 
be adjusted given the fact that women, children, elderly and other sub-populations can 
be affected.  Apart from the acute event there is also the issue of the potential for longer 
term low dose effects (Reutter, 1999). 
Other agents that fall into the narcotic or drug classification probably should be 
considered too, but it is difficult at this point to screen them.  For example, certain 
hormone, heart stimulants/depressants, or psychedelic drugs could effect different 
populations in different ways.  These agent classes would not be likely to show up on 
most of the search routines reflected in these results.  Accordingly, additional research 
may be required to cover pharmaceutical class substances.  Many of these chemicals 
are sensitive to the disinfectants in common use, so if they were added to the water 
upstream of treatment, their effectiveness is assumed to be significantly reduced. 
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Table 9 Chemical Warfare Agents 
Agent 
Type Agent Solubility
Water 
threat
RfD 
(mg/L)
LD50
(µ G/KG)
Molecular
Weight
Stable in 
water
Chlorine 
toleranceb
CAS No.
Arsine Sparingly sol. Unlikely 77.9 7784-42-1
Cyanogen Chloride (CK) Soluble Possible 750 61.5 506-77-4
Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) Miscible Yes 750 27.0 74-90-8
Chlorine No 70.9 yes 7782-50-5
Diphosgene
PFIB
Phosgene Reactive Unlikely 98.9 75-44-5
Sulfur mustard (HT) Insoluable Unlikely 140 degrades 6392-89-8
Distilled mustard (HD) Sparingly sol. Unlikely 7 degrades 505-60-2
Ethyldichoroarsine 80
Lewisite 1 80
Lewisite 2
Lewisite 3
Methyldichloroarsine
Mustard-Lewisite mixture (HL) Insoluable Unlikely 186.4
Mustard-T mixture
Nitrogen Mustard 1 (HN-1) Sparingly sol. Unlikely 170.1 538-07-8
Nitrogen Mustard 2 (HN-2) Sparingly sol. Unlikely 156.1 51-75-2
Nitrogen Mustard 3 (HN-3) Insoluable No 204.5 555-77-1
Phenyldichloroarsine
Phosgene oxime (CX) Insoluable No 113.9 1794-86-1
Sesqui mustard
GA (Tabun) Miscible Unlikely 70 162.3 77-81-6
GB (Sarin) Miscible Unlikely 13.8 100 140.1 107-44-8
GD (Soman) Slightly sol. Unlikely 6 64 182.2 96-64-0
GE
GF 180.1
VE
VG
VM
VX Moderate Unlikely 7.5 15 267.0 50782-69-9
a Total infective dose used to calculate water values.  b Ambient temperature, < 1 ppm free available chlorine, 30 min or as indicated.
Nerve 
Agents
Blood 
Agents
Choking 
Agents
Vesciants
Source:  Marrs, Maynard, & Sidell (1997) 
 
In addition to warfare agents, Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs) could represent a threat 
for use in a contamination event.  Again, if one assumes that an aesthetic change (taste, 
odor, color) will deter individuals from consuming the product, the number of toxic 
chemicals can be significantly reduced.  Deininger (2000) reports that the EPA provided 
a list of chemicals for analysis that was produced by a screening on some unknown 
basis.  The list included methyl mercaptan, arsine, dimethyl sulfate, acrolein, toluene 2, 
4-diisocyanate, bromine, fluorine, methyl hydrazine, phosgene, stibine, chlorine, nickel 
carbonyl, hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen chloride, hydrogen fluoride, triethylamine, 
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gluteraldehyde, nitric acid vapors, furan, methylethyl ketone, methylvinylketone, osmium 
tetroxide aerosol and chromic acid aerosol. 
Although most of the chemicals are certainly toxic, a review of this list reveals that none 
of these chemicals presents a credible threat in this context.  For example, chlorine is 
listed as one of the TICs.  Chlorine is without a doubt toxic and must be monitored for an 
aerosol release.  In fact, chlorine is listed in the Clean Air Act Amendments as a 
chemical to be modeled in Risk Management Plans (RMP).  However, in order to be 
toxic from an ingestion standpoint, the taste and odor would be so pungent that the 
palatability of the water would render it undrinkable by most people.  Therefore, it is not 
considered a credible threat, because it could be too easily detected.  Many of the other 
chemicals on the list have a similar weakness from the standpoint of a lethal 
contaminant via the ingestion route. 
Additional research is necessary to more fully develop a viable list of candidate agents in 
the TIC category.  At this point, it would appear that the primary TICs would be related to 
some of the warfare agents, such as cyanides, orthophosphate pesticides and 
arsenicals.  Again, this issue of viability of the toxic agents via the ingestion route (as 
opposed to inhalational or dermal) while being undetectable by the senses is the major 
problem. 
Survival and Deactivation Rates of Agents 
If a contamination event were to occur, a question of critical importance relates to the 
persistence of the agent.  With regard to bacteria, few have been studied in detail (in this 
context), except the die-off of coliform organisms.  The EPA Qual II model has a 
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provision for the modeling of these organisms which occur in sewage effluents and 
surface runoff.  They are normally believed to follow the common exponential decay 
form: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )-k*ty t =y 0 *e  (Equation 1) 
The quoted rates for decay constant, k, vary between 0.5 and 4.0   (Deininger, 2000; 
USEPA, 1985). 
A textbook on water microbiology (McFeters, 1990) discusses a number of infectious 
microorganisms.  In the absence of more detailed studies, it may be prudent to assume 
a worst case scenario, i.e. neglect the die-off and assume that there would be no 
decrease in the agent concentration.  As an indication of relative survivability, however, 
McFeters quotes half-lives of 7 to 16 hours for Vibrio cholerae, Shigella spp., 
Enterotoxigenic E.coli, and Salmonella.  Campylobacter jejuni has a half-life of 3 days, 
and Yersinia enterocolitica has a half-life of more than a year.  B. anthracis has a half-life 
of several years.  Viruses are reported to survive well in river settings; they die-off faster 
at warm temperatures than at cold ones.  Survival times for Echo 7 virus, Echo 12 virus, 
Cocksackie A9 virus and Poliomyelitis virus at 4° C are: 99.9% are dead after 20 days, 
99% are dead after 14 days, and 90% are dead after 7 days (Deininger, 2000). 
Information on this aspect of toxins was difficult to find, but they are probably very stable 
in water.  Burrows and Renner (1999) speculate on the most likely biotoxins to be used 
for water contamination and conclude that for the most part they seem to be stable in 
water and more or less resistant to chlorine levels typically found in water systems.  
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Therefore, the default assumption would be that they would remain potent in whatever 
concentration they were applied. 
Microbiological organisms require nominal food sources and nutrients to survive.  
Therefore, many biological agents may not survive as well as the literature values 
indicate, because it is noted that the data are taken from stream or wastewater effluent 
sources.  However, at specific stages of the life cycle (ex. Cysts), certain organisms are 
well protected from environmental factors and remain dormant.  This fact makes those 
organisms attractive for use in surreptitious attacks. 
The Toxic Industrial Chemicals will most likely be persistent and will leave the water 
based on their partial pressures or fugacity.  In turbulent situations (ex. pouring or 
shaking), there will be a higher transfer to the atmosphere than in tranquil situations 
(storage).  Obviously, there would need to be exposure to the atmosphere for this to 
occur. 
General Discussion of the Effect of Treatment Processes on Contamination 
The 1990 edition of Water Quality and Treatment (4th ed.) provides a table that shows 
the effectiveness of treatment processes in terms of poor, fair, good, and excellent.  This 
table was developed by summarizing forty-five research reports in existence at that time 
and is reproduced as Table 10 below (AWWA, 1990).  Taking midpoints of the 
sometimes wide ranges, leads to Table 11 below with numeric fractions.  This table 
should be used with extreme caution.  The data need to be verified in a pilot treatment 
plant.  It is interesting to note that the 5th edition of Water Quality and Treatment (1999) 
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has dropped this estimate of efficiency for each process, and has replaced it by only a 
table with an “X” when the process is deemed to be effective (AWWA, 1999). 
Table 10 Effectiveness of Processes for Contaminant Removal 
 Bacteria Viruses Protozoa VOC SOC TOC Taste/Odor 
Aeration, Air Stripping P P P G-E P-F F F-E 
Coagulation 
Sediment/Filtration G-E G-E G-E G-E P P-G P-G 
Lime Softening G-E G-E G-E P-F P-F G P-F 
Ion Exchange P P P P P G-E - 
Reverse Osmosis E E E F-E F-E G - 
Ultra Filtration E E E F-E F-E G - 
Disinfection E E E P-G P-G G-E P-E 
Granular Activ. Carbon F F F F-E F-E F G-E 
Powdered Activ. Carb. P P P P-G P-E F-G G-E 
UV Irradiation E E E G G G G 
P–Poor (0-20% removal); F–Fair (20-60%); G–Good (60-90%); E–Excellent (90-100%); NA –Insufficient Data 
Source: Water Quality & Treatment, 4th edition, 1990 
 
 
If one takes the midpoints of the categories of the above table, it is possible to generate 
the following table.  Obviously, each source water is different, so actual removals will 
show a significant variance, but this table provides a relative indication of the results. 
Table 11 Percentage Removal of Contaminants 
 Bacteria Viruses Protozoa VOC SOC TOC Taste/Odor 
Aeration, Air Stripping 10 10 10 85 25 40 70 
Coagulation Sedimentation 85 85 85 10 40 25 25 
Lime Softening 85 85 85 25 25 75 25 
Ion Exchange 10 10 10 10 10 85 - 
Reverse Osmosis 95 95 95 70 70 75 - 
Ultra Filtration 95 95 95 40 40 85 - 
Disinfection 95 95 95 40 40 85 22 
Granular Activ. Carbon 40 40 40 70 70 40 85 
Powdered Activ. Carb. 10 10 10 40 50 55 75 
UV Irradiation 95 95 95 75 75 75 75 
Adapted from: Water Quality & Treatment, 4th edition, 1990 
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Summary 
In the post-September 11 world, all utilities are examining their vulnerability to attack.  
This especially includes bio-chemical contamination, although other facets of operation 
are being considered too (cyber/control, disabling critical structures, critical personnel 
backup, etc).  An enormous number of microbiological and chemical substances exist 
which could cause harm if consumed.  However, the list of probable candidates can be 
screened by looking at the virulence or toxicity of a substance and its ability to be 
undetected (ex. no taste, odor, color).  This reduces the number of viable candidates to 
a more manageable number. 
With regard to bacterial agents, Shigella, Salmonella, Vibrio cholerae are viable threats; 
however, a reasonable chlorine residual will destroy them.  The greatest threat seems to 
be the spores of B. anthracis. They are not affected by the normal disinfectant 
concentrations used in water treatment.  For the same reason, Cryptosporidium or 
Giardia are also worrisome due to its low LD50 and its resistance to disinfectants. 
Further examination of toxins is probably in order.  Tables 2 and 3 are helpful as guides.  
It appears that Botulinum, Aflatoxin and Ricin are the most likely to have been 
weaponized. 
Chemical agents need additional examination for viable candidates.  The current 
thinking in many venues is that some form of cyanide, arsenic or orthophosphates holds 
the most potential as a contamination agent.  The issue of detectability for some of these 
agents could reduce their utility, however, these certainly can have a significant effect 
and should be placed on a priority list.  It seems highly likely that other chemicals 
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(including pharmaceuticals or TIC) will expand the list, so periodic review of potential 
candidates is warranted. 
It should be noted that no judgment has been made as to the logistics of feeding an 
adequate dose of toxicant into the water.  Further screening could be accomplished by 
looking at the quantity of the agent required to result in a toxic dosage in the water.  As 
additional LD50 or other dose-response data becomes available on an ingestion basis, 
this computation may be helpful. 
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Chapter 5 Computer Simulation of Distribution System Water Quality 
Because it is impracticable to physically test a wide range of contamination events, it 
becomes immediately apparent that any reasonable approach seeking to address the 
problem must rely upon a workable extended period simulation of the distribution 
network in question.   Although there are certainly many factors, assumptions and 
sources of errors in developing an extended period water quality model (see Appendix 
2), with time and effort the network simulations can be refined and calibrated to yield a 
reasonably accurate representation of reality.   With this in place it is possible to 
investigate various system events and observe the results. 
Because the computer simulations generate the data to be analyzed in this study, it may 
be useful to survey the basic features of the mathematical models that replicate the 
physical system.  The modeling of a water distribution system is difficult because it is 
governed by complex, nonlinear, non-convex and discontinuous hydraulic and water 
quality equations.  To realistically simulate the operation of a water system one must 
consider the effects of pipes, valves, pumps (and their controls), storage tanks, spatial 
and temporal variations in water demand, and variations in water quality.  Fortunately, a 
number of computer packages have been developed to handle the technical 
mathematical aspects of network modeling.  A few of the network solvers available 
include the EPA’s freeware EPANET, Haestad Methods WaterCAD®/WaterGEMS®, 
University of Kentucky’s KYPIPE, MWH’s H2ONET®, and Advantica’s Stoner SynerGEE® 
Water to name a few.  These packages are more affordable and accessible now than in 
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the past and for many reasons every community water system should have a working 
simulation of their distribution network. 
Hydraulic Analysis 
The first set of physical relationships that must be understood and converted to 
mathematical constructs relate to basic fluid flow.  Pipe flow and especially networked 
pipe flow, is complex because of its nonlinearity which arises primarily because of pipe 
friction.  In addition, the effects of water storage facilities and pump systems create a 
discontinuous set of boundary conditions that must be managed.  The primary 
components of a distribution system network are links which represent pipes, pumps, 
valves and nodes which correspond to junctions, tanks and reservoirs.  The pipes and 
junction nodes are connected in loops which provide a means of distributing water 
efficiently with reduced energy requirements and improved operational redundancy.  
This section will discuss the fundamental fluid relationships that form the foundation of 
network simulation. 
Characteristics of Water 
Water from a hydraulic standpoint has a number of features that must be considered in 
any simulation effort.  For example, it is essentially, although not absolutely, 
incompressible.  It has a specific weight (g) of 62.4 pounds per cubic foot.  The specific 
gravity is usually defined as 1.000 at 60oF, however, some references list it as 1.000 at 
39.2oF, which is the point of maximum water density.  The kinematic viscosity (n) is 
0.00001216 f2/sec at 60oF.  Like all materials its viscosity varies with temperature and so 
may be a factor in computing flow characteristics.  It is considered the “universal acid” 
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and as such can be reactive to piping and other material in the system which over time 
can change the flow characteristics of the conduits (Camp & Meserve, 1974; Westaway 
& Loomis, 1977). 
Basic Fluid Equations 
The hydraulic analysis of pipe systems rest primarily upon two basic laws of physics: the 
law of conservation of mass and the law of conservation of energy.  Thus, when 
examining any control volume of water or any change of state, equations must be written 
which conserve mass and energy.  This is the starting point for network models. 
The law of conservation of mass is understood to mean that storage is equal to inflow 
minus outflow.  In pressure pipe networks there is no storage within the pipe system 
although tank storage may change over time.  Thus, in a pipe or junction node, the 
inflow must equal the outflow.  Mathematically, then: 
  i eQ = Q  (Equation 2) 
or  i eQ = Qå å  (Equation 3) 
 where: Qi = inflow (cfs) 
 Qe = outflow (cfs) 
When considering pressure flow (no free water surface) in a conduit, the flow is also 
related to the velocity of the water in accordance with the wetted cross-sectional area of 
the conduit.  Thus,  
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  Q=V*A  (Equation 4) 
 where: V = velocity (f/s) 
 A = cross-sectional area (f2) 
and  1 1 2 2V*A = V * A  (Equation 5) 
When a storage tank is considered, it is possible to accumulate or expel water during a 
time increment and thus the equation becomes: 
  i e sQ - Q =qå å  (Equation 6) 
 where: qs = external demand or supply (cfs) 
If the elevation and configuration of the storage tank is known (ex. tank diameter and 
minimum and maximum pool elevations), an equation for head and storage can be 
written.  This, in conjunction with the conservation equation above, can provide an 
estimate of the effect of the tank on the water system.  As mentioned, distribution 
storage is essential to provide flow and head equalization during demand stress periods.  
Therefore, it is critical to have the ability to estimate analytically the response of the tank 
on the system. 
Likewise, the law of conservation of energy asserts that the energy state (potential and 
kinetic energy) between two points is constant.  Of course, useful energy is converted or 
“lost” due to a number of factors including friction and momentum.  Thus, the term 
“friction loss”, which will be estimated in following sections, refers to the energy that is 
associated with water movement and converted to energy that is no longer available for 
system use. 
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Water system energy is commonly referred to as pressure or head.  In an ideal state 
head is the sum of three components: 
1. Elevation head (potential energy) 
2. Pressure head (potential energy) 
3. Velocity head  (kinetic energy) 
The Bernoulli equation relates the total head at a point as: 
  
2p V
H=z+ +
? 2g
 (Equation 7) 
 where: H = total head (f) 
 z = elevation above datum (f) 
 p = pressure (lb/f2) 
 V = pipe velocity (f2/s) 
 g = gravitational constant (32.2 f/s2) 
 g = water specific weight (62.4 lb/f3) 
Also, from the conservation of energy for two points in a frictionless environment: 
  H1 = H2 (Equation 8) 
thus,  
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
p V p V
z + + = z + +
? 2g ? 2g
 (Equation 9) 
When friction loss is considered: 
  H1 = H2 + hf  (Equation 10) 
 where: hf  = friction loss (f) 
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so  
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2 f
p V p V
z + + = z + + +h
? 2g ? 2g
 (Equation 11) 
Now given the fundamental framework for flow and energy related to pressure pipe flow, 
the next task is to sketch the equations which are commonly used to estimate flow, 
velocity and headloss.  These equations will form the basis for describing the mass and 
energy effects as water moves through the distribution system (Mays, 1999; Mays, 
2000). 
Friction (Energy) Loss Equations 
The study of fluid movement has produced a number of categories for classifying flow.  
At low flows (velocities) there is relatively little wall interaction relative to the bulk flow 
and so the regime is deemed to be in laminar mode.  This occurs when the Reynold’s 
number (Re) is less than 2000; the Reynold’s number, of course, being: 
  e
V D?
R =
µ
 (Equation 12) 
 where: V = mean velocity 
 D = Diameter 
 r = fluid density 
 m = dynamic viscosity 
As the flow increases the regime moves through a transition phase before becoming 
fully turbulent.  Turbulent flow is generally defined as a flow that occurs with a Reynold’s 
number greater than 4000 (Westaway & Loomis, 1977). 
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In addition flow systems can be further classified as steady or unsteady.  Most typical 
computations assume steady flow.  Steady flow is defined as the condition where the 
flow rate at a specific point is constant with respect to time.  Otherwise the flow is 
classified as unsteady or transient.  By this definition most engineered systems, 
technically speaking, are unsteady.  However, computation of flow properties under 
unsteady conditions is extremely difficult, if not intractable, so steady flow is assumed in 
most cases.  This assumption appears to be acceptable so long as the temporal mean 
velocity does not change over brief periods.  Unsteady flow then, for engineering design, 
is associated with rapidly varying velocity or pressure gradients over a short period of 
time (Mays, 2000). 
Because water systems are just designed to convey water that is fit for human 
consumption, certain assumptions can be reasonably made.  These assumptions 
include modeling a single phase, Newtonian fluid (i.e. water) flowing in a full pipe.  This 
means that the computations will assume pressure flow as opposed to open channel 
flow.  The only place a free water surface should occur in a water distribution system is a 
storage tank or reservoir.   
Darcy-Weisbach Equation 
In 1845 Julius Weisbach published his three volume set on engineering mechanics 
which included his theory of pressure loss through pipe.  Over the next 10 to 15 years he 
refined his approach, which is still widely used today.  In fact it is still viewed as superior 
to most other systems in that it is applicable to any fluid, is dimensionally correct and 
takes into account temperature of the fluid (Brater & King, 1976; Haestaed et al., 2003).  
The common forms of his equation are: 
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 (Equation 13) 
 where: hL = Friction loss 
 f   = D-W friction factor 
 L  = Length of pipe (f)  
 D = Diameter of pipe (f) 
The Darcy-Weisbach equation can also be expressed in common units of D (in) and Q 
(gpm), in which case the head loss is: 
  
2
L 5
f L Q
h = 0.031
D
 (Equation 14) 
The friction factor, f, is approximated by the following relationship in turbulent flow (Re > 
4000): 
  1 e=1.14-2log
Df
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
 (Equation 15) 
 where:  e = pipe wall uniform roughness (f) 
For flow regimes in the transition zone (2000 > Re > 4000) the friction factor is 
approximated by the Colebrook-White equation: 
  
e
1 e/D 2.51
=-2log +
3.7f R f
æ ö
ç ÷ç ÷è ø
 (Equation 16) 
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A key aspect to notice with the Darcy-Weisbach friction factor in the transition zone is 
that it is not constant for a given pipe.  It will change in relationship to the Reynold’s 
number over the range of flows encountered in the field (Brater & King, 1976). 
Computer power has improved the convenience of using the Darcy-Weisbach equation 
in large scale hydraulic computations, but most of the friction loss computations in water 
systems rely on the following equation set. 
Hazen-Williams Equation 
Although the Darcy-Weisbach equation offers a rational approach to friction loss 
analysis, over the years it has been avoided in complex computations because the 
friction factor, f, cannot be directly computed.  Rather, an iterative approach is necessary 
and, until recent advances in computer power, the time and effort required to perform all 
of the computations made it undesirable. 
The Hazen-Williams equation has been widely used in the water industry especially in 
America.  It is valid only for water with a turbulent flow regime and a fluid temperature of 
60°F.  Because there is an implicit kinematic viscosity assumption of n = 0.00001216 
f2/sec, as the temperature approaches the freezing or boiling point, the equation can 
yield results with variances of as much as 40% (Westaway & Loomis, 1977).  However, 
water distribution systems tend to stay within the valid range in all but the coldest 
climates.  The mathematical representation of pipe friction loss according to the Hazen-
Williams equation is as follows: 
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 (Equation 17) 
 where: L = Length (f) 
 D = Diameter (f) 
 Q = Flow (f3/s) 
 C = HW Coefficient 
The equation, expressed in common units of L (f), D (f) and Q (gpm), V (f/s) is: 
  
1.852 1.8521.852
L 4.8655 1.167
Q 100 L V
h =0.00208L = 3.0226
D C D C
æ ö æ ö
ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø
 (Equation 18) 
Although the formula is incorrect from a theoretical point of view, it still yields acceptable 
results in practice.  This is probably due to the built-in uncertainty implicit in the C 
coefficient.  The HW coefficient is generally obtained by using published tables for pipes 
and appurtenances, although it is occasionally checked in the field by measuring flow 
and pressure drop between hydrants (known pipe length) and back-computing the C-
value. 
Minor Losses 
In addition to energy consumed as the water traverses the pipe route, it is also 
consumed when the flow line changes.  This typically occurs in flow through valves, 
reducers, tees, bends, and other appurtenances in the piping system.  The losses, 
generally called minor or local losses, are due to the turbulence in the bulk flow as it 
moves through the fittings.  Thus, the energy loss tends to be proportional to the velocity 
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of the water flowing through the fittings.  The headloss through these appurtenances is 
generally estimated by the following equation: 
  
2
L
V
h =K
2g
 (Equation 19) 
 where: K = minor loss coefficient 
The minor loss coefficient is usually determined experimentally by the manufacturer of 
the equipment or material in question and is provided in tabular form. 
Energy Inputs: Pumps 
Much of the discussion thus far has dealt with energy loss during delivery of water from 
source to use.  The supply of water and energy imparted to the system is due primarily 
to pumping systems.  While there are many types of pumps, the vast majority of pumps 
used in the water industry are centrifugal pumps.  Centrifugal pumps impart energy to 
the water volume by a rotating impeller located in an eccentric casing.  The pump inlet 
characteristics (impeller design and rotational speed, outlet features and power applied) 
form the specifics of each pump and its efficiency.  Because of the physics of the pump, 
the pressure (head) and outlet volume are inversely related so that as the flow increases 
the pressure decreases and vice versa.  This can correspond nicely with varying water 
system demands in that pump combinations can be selected that naturally adjust to the 
demand changes by moving up and down the demand curves (Karassik, Krutzsch, 
Fraser, & Messina, 1976). 
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The output of each pump design is different so manufacturers publish the pumping 
characteristics of each of their particular pumps in Head-Capacity or H-Q curves.  
Horizontal split-case centrifugal pumps are used in most applications because the split 
case allows removal of the impeller without disturbing the inlet or outlet piping plus the 
operating efficiency of this type of pump is quite high.  Figure 4 illustrates a typical split 
case centrifugal pump curve showing operating curves for five different impeller options 
that can be used in the 5x6x11 pump operating at 1750 rpm (Aurora Pump, 1989).  The 
operating head (Y-axis) and the pump discharge (X-axis) stipulates the pump response 
to different demand requirements.  The point at which the impeller curve intersects the 
Y-axis is called the cutoff head.  This represents the pressure at which the pump is 
unable to pump water (Q = 0) into the system.  Thus, if this condition is reached the 
pump impeller can spin but is unable to overcome the pressure imposed upon it. 
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Figure 4 Typical Centrifugal Pump Curve (Source: Aurora Pump, 1989) 
Pump design is complex, but fortunately most single speed centrifugal pump curves (H-
Q curves) can be approximated by a quadratic equation of the form: 
  2p ch =AQ +BQ+h  (Equation 20) 
 where: hp  = pump head (f) 
 A, B = pump coefficients 
 Q = pump discharge (gpm) 
 hc = pump cutoff head (f) 
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Data points are picked off the manufacturer’s published curves and fit to the equation by 
regression methods.  This allows a mathematical expression for pump activity that can 
be programmed when solving network problems. 
Over the past 15 to 20 years improvement in equipment has led to increased use of 
variable speed centrifugal pumps instead of constant (single) speed pumps.  The pumps 
provide more flexibility to an operating system, but are more difficult to incorporate in 
design and modeling efforts.  Variable speed operations can be predicted from single 
speed data by using pump affinity laws.  They are: 
  1 1
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 (Equation 21) 
  
2
1 1
2 2
H n
=
H n
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
 (Equation 22) 
  
3
1 1
2 2
P n
=
P n
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
 (Equation 23) 
 where: Q = pump discharge (gpm) 
 H = pump head (f) 
 P = pump power (hp) 
 n = impeller rotational speed (rpm) 
With these equations and the concept of a Fixed Grade Node (FGN), the energy inputs 
to the water distribution system can be described mathematically.  This will be necessary 
for solving the simultaneous equations describing the system.  An FGN is a reservoir of 
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assumed infinite volume operating at a fixed head (Boulos, Lansey, & Karney, 2004; 
Haestaed et al., 2003; Mays, 2000). 
Network Simulation 
The preceding sections have described the major relationships that must be considered 
when developing an overall model of the hydraulic aspects of a distribution system.  The 
law of conservation of mass states that at every node within the system, the flow 
entering that node must equal the flow leaving it.  Storage does not exist within the 
system except for storage tanks and reservoirs where there is a free water surface and 
sufficient freeboard to accommodate the changes in water elevation. 
The conservation of energy principle states that the energy between any two nodes must 
balance regardless of the path taken.  This brings into play the concept of friction loss 
through pipes, valves and other appurtenances within the system.  The headloss 
equations listed above are used to estimate the energy loss as a function of flow and 
system characteristics (pipe materials and configuration, elevation, control valves, etc).  
In addition, energy inputs into the system are considered by modeling pumping systems 
or FGN. 
As a matter in passing, because distribution networks can become unwieldy if all small 
diameter pipes are included in the model, many times the modeler will consolidate small 
elements of the network into hydraulically equivalent pipe configurations.  This process, 
called skeletonization, is a means simplifying or removing elements with small or 
inconsequential effects.  The data associated with removed elements is not typically 
discarded, but is included with adjacent larger features, using conservation of mass and 
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energy principles.  A frequently used technique of converting flow and headloss for small 
pipes, valves, bends and other appurtenances into the larger components is the 
equivalent pipe method. 
Steady State Model 
Once the distribution system has been configured it will have N nodes (junctions) and L 
links (pipes).  Thus, there will be N conservation of mass equations and L non-linear 
conservation of energy equations that must be solved simultaneously.  These are 
configured according to the physical layout of the pipe network and its loops or topology. 
Accordingly, the system cannot be addressed by analytical (closed form) methods. 
Rather, the problem must be solved iteratively (numerically).  A number of approaches 
have been proposed as computer power and mathematical sophistication has increased. 
The simplest model to develop is the static or steady state model.  In this configuration 
all the input values are set and the computer iteratively steps to the solution that would 
exist if the system were allowed to exist in equilibrium.  In other words the dynamic 
features of the system (ex. tank levels, nodal demands, pump output (curve)) are 
specified and the computer iteratively solves the descriptive equations (Boulos et al., 
2004; Haestaed et al., 2003; Mays, 2000). 
Extended Period Model 
Developmentally, once system programmers had developed the ability to simulate 
steady state conditions, the opportunity to move forward to a more dynamic 
representation of a system was possible.  This was conceptualized as being a time 
variation problem, in that engineers had the ability to create steady state configurations 
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of the network and, if a means of updating the model with new system status could be 
developed, the model would begin to predict actual system changes.  In essence an 
extended period simulation may be envisioned as a string of steady state models 
incrementing forward by an arbitrary time step, while updating tank levels, system 
demands and operational changes. 
In order to accomplish this effectively, additional criteria and relationships must be 
defined to instruct the model how these factors will change from step to step.  Of 
fundamental importance is the ability to reliably define or predict: 
· Change in demand both spatially and temporally 
· Change in control mechanisms (pumps, control valves and system 
constraints) 
· Change in tank storage volumes and levels 
Although demands can theoretically change in almost an infinite number of ways in 
space and time, for each particular water system certain patterns tend to emerge after 
study of daily and seasonal water trends.  From that information diurnal relationships can 
be structured by using an assumed baseline flow.  If it is assumed that these 
relationships apply uniformly across the network (spatial variance), one is able to 
establish a procedure for modifying system demands over time that are imposed on the 
pumping system. 
Given new demand levels, the supply system must respond by either increasing or 
decreasing the pumping rate or utilizing storage capacity or both.  This involves some 
means of simulating the control system governing the network.  Most current software 
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incorporates some type of scripting or rule-based logic that allows an analyst to describe 
the conditions under which a pump will switch on or off, PRV’s to operate, check valves 
to open or close, etc.  As the new demands are imposed, the control system along with 
branching logic relating tank storage to the new demands defines how the system 
adjusts to the new demands. 
Since the storage tanks have predefined configurations the water levels can be updated 
by the conservation of mass and energy relationships.  Given the updated demand data 
the adjustment in water level can be estimated by (Mays, 2000): 
  t tt
T T
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 (Equation 24) 
 where: DHt = Change in tank water level at time t 
 Vt = Volume of water in tank at time t 
 AT = Cross sectional area of tank 
 Dt = Time increment 
AT generally assumes a constant section, but the same concept can be used to predict 
changing tank levels and volumes on more complex tank shapes. 
Dynamic Water Quality Models 
The next step in computer simulation of distribution systems is the development of 
mechanisms to compute concentrations and movement of water quality parameters 
though the network.  At the outset it important to understand the nature of the 
contaminant of interest.  Generally, contaminants may be classified in one of two ways.  
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They are either conservative or non-conservative.  Conservative constituents are those 
that do not degrade.  Constituents in this category tend to be inorganic ionic species like 
chlorides, fluorides, nitrates, etc.  Their concentration is attenuated only by dilution 
effects.  Non-conservative or reactive constituents are those whose concentration are a 
function of concentration and time and would be represented by microbiological 
contaminants, THMs, chlorine and the like.  A water quality model, then, must factor 
these concepts into an analysis that can be divided into the following considerations: 
· Hydraulics 
· Transport Mechanisms 
· Bulk Reactions 
· Wall Reactions 
· Tank Hydrodynamics 
Hydraulics. 
A dynamic water quality model is dependant upon an extended period hydraulic 
simulation in order to provide the basic “input” of flow, velocities, direction of movement 
and storage tank levels as well as fundamental network descriptive data (ex. pipe 
diameter and length).  In essence then, the overall water quality model is actually 
composed of two component models: the extended period hydraulic simulation and the 
associated water quality solution algorithm.  The extended period hydraulic simulation 
has been discussed above and will not be repeated here other than to emphasize the 
importance of developing and maintaining a calibrated simulation of the distribution 
system in question.  Because the water quality model depends on the hydraulic 
simulation to make its projections, poorly developed hydraulic models will result in 
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propagation of errors through to the water quality output.  This can result in a faulty 
analysis and improper conclusions. 
Transport mechanisms. 
Conceptually, water contaminants can be modeled by three mechanisms as they move 
along a pipe route.  These transport models are generally denominated as being 
advective, dispersive or diffusive (actually, radiation is a fourth mechanism, but it doesn’t 
have applicability in this context).  Advective transport assumes that the constituent 
moves down the pipe axis at a velocity equivalent to the mean velocity of the bulk water 
column.  Dispersive transport in this context is generally defined as radial movement, i.e. 
from the axis to pipe wall.  Diffusion is descriptive of interface transport which occurs at a 
molecular level and in this context would occur at the leading or trailing edge of a 
concentration gradient.  Because of the increased complexity associated with a multi-
dimensional analysis, most popular current analytical schemes uniformly assume that 
only advective transport is significant.  Most packages use a mathematical 
representation similar to EPANET (Clark & Grayman, 1998; Rossman, 1994), which is: 
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 where: Cij = concentration at position x at time t in the link between nodes i and j 
 vij = velocity in link between nodes i and j 
 kij = substance reaction rate in link between nodes i and j 
It is also important to note the means by which the concentration changes occur as 
various pipes converge on a junction node.  At any given node, multiple pipes can enter 
92 
the node and multiple pipes can exit the node.  In addition, it is possible for an external 
demand or supply to exist at the node.  Because nodes are a fundamental feature of the 
pipe network, the computation of the situation should be rational and consistent.  
Computational models uniformly assume that mixing of flows in a node is instantaneous 
and complete and that no storage occurs within a node.  It is further assumed that 
conservation of mass principles apply.  This leads to the following relationship to define 
mixing at pipe junctions (Rossman, 1994): 
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 where: 
ix=0
C
½
 = Concentration at start of node i 
 i = Link with flow leaving node k 
 Ik  = Set of pipes with flow into node k 
 Qj = Flow in link j 
 Lj = Length of link j 
 Qk,ext = External source flow entering network at k 
 Ck,ext = Concentration of external flow entering at k 
Bulk reactions. 
As the water moves through the pipe network it is subject to reactive changes.  Bulk 
reactions refer to the changes that occur in the water column itself.  The nature of the 
changes is a function of the contaminant in question.  In reality chemical components 
may change oxidation state or react with other chemicals in the water to form new 
species or compounds.  This is especially prevalent when a community supplies water to 
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the distribution system from several different sources.  These waters mix in the 
distribution system and can change the character of both waters as a new chemical 
equilibrium is established.  At this point network analysis software only handles 
biological or chemical reactions as a single species decay (or growth) function.  In other 
words multi-species decay or interaction processes cannot be directly processed.  
Accordingly, there is no direct way, for instance, for the software to estimate the effect of 
a specified chlorine level in the water on a specified or computed concentration of a 
contaminant.  Work is being performed on developing toolkits for that purpose but as of 
this point they do not exist in production form (Uber, Shang, & Rossman, 2004). 
Biological contaminants on the other hand may grow or decay depending on the nature 
of the biological species and the availability of sustaining nutrients in the water.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, from a monitoring standpoint it is important to know if a 
monitored microorganism can replicate outside a host and what its environmental 
survivability characteristics are.  Water systems themselves can impact the 
environmental survivability.  For instance, it is not uncommon in systems that have 
multiple water sources to create zones within the system that are conducive to growth of 
microbiological colonies as the waters mix. 
Under the assumptions of this paper, the focus is upon contaminants that are specifically 
injected into the water column and the resultant fate of those contaminants.  Certainly 
there are dilution effects but, in addition, other changes may occur as the water moves 
through the system.  The simulation software must have a means of approximating 
these changes. 
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The means used to accomplish this draws from fundamental biological and chemical 
relationships and the kinetic transformation models used in chemical engineering.  
These models can become quite sophisticated but generally are unwarranted because 
of the uncertainty associated with reaction factors in highly dilute and spatially variable 
environments such as water systems. 
Reaction rates are generally classified by reaction order.  In simple reactions the order is 
equal to the sum of the exponents in the rate equation.  A rate equation states the 
relationship between the reactants and the products and is determined experimentally.  
The general form is patterned as follows: 
  [ ] nRate=k A  (Equation 27) 
 where: k = equilibrium constant 
 A = reactant 
 n = reaction order 
   
Simple reaction relationships used in water quality modeling include zero order, first 
order and second order equations.  Accordingly, then a zero order reaction would 
indicate that the reaction is independent of constituent concentration, and a second 
order equation would be proportional to the product or square of the concentration 
(Williams & Williams, 1967). 
The most commonly used model is the first order single species decay model which 
states that the constituent decays at a rate proportional to initial concentration.  Chlorine 
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is commonly assumed to decay within a distribution system following this pattern unless 
consumed by an unexpected demand within the system.  Powell, West, Hallam, 
Forester, and Simms (2000) explore this simplifying assumption and the variability 
possible by using it. This can be represented mathematically by the following 
expression: 
  -ktt 0C =C exp  (Equation 28) 
 where Ct = Concentration at time t 
 Co = Original concentration 
 k = decay (growth) constant 
 t = time 
Note that growth of a constituent can also be represented by this relationship if the 
growth constant is expressed as a negative.  The growth indicated would be 
unconstrained and increase at a rate determined by k.   
Biologicals on the other hand may exhibit growth potential up to some maximum or 
limiting concentration due to limitation of critical nutrients in a potable water system.  
This can be modeled by a first order growth to equilibrium.  This has the same form as 
that above except that it must consider the constraint posed by the limiting 
concentration.  This is represented by: 
  ( )-ktt max max 0C =C - C - C e  (Equation 29) 
 where: Cmax = Maximum concentration 
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Other reaction relationships can be modeled but this is only productive if information 
regarding the fundamental reaction mechanisms is known along with the boundary 
conditions in which they operate.  Even the most straightforward modeling efforts require 
a number of assumptions so, unless specific data is available upon which to base the 
effort, a more complex analysis may be misguided (Weber & DiGiano, 1996; Williams & 
Williams, 1967). 
Wall reactions. 
Wall reactions historically have been deemed to be secondary or tertiary effects with 
respect to water quality except in cases where corrosion or physical damage occurs.  
More recently however the implications of wall effects are being reconsidered especially 
in pipes with high surface area to volume ratios.  For example, it has been discovered 
that the interior of water distribution systems can have thin but significant colonies of 
microbiological species called biofilms.  These colonies have existed inside the networks 
for years but the impact on water quality (if any) is not well understood or documented.  
Dissolved species flowing in the water column can contact and react with pipe wall 
materials or these biofilms attached to the pipe wall and may contribute to changes in 
the water quality (Camper et al., 2003; Camper, Warnecke, Jones, & McFeters, 1998; 
Donlan, 2002; Geldreich, 1996). 
The following relationship has been proposed as a means of quantifying wall effects on 
water quality (Rossman, 1994).  Assuming a first order reaction, the key unknown is the 
decay or rate coefficient.  This is computed as: 
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 where: r = pipe wall reaction rate 
 kw = pipe wall reaction rate constant 
 kf  = mass transfer coefficient 
 RH = Hydraulic radius 
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 where Sh = Sherwood number 
 d = molecular diffusivity of transported species 
 D = pipe diameter 
This is then combined with the bulk reaction rate constant (kb) to yield an overall decay 
or growth response as water moves through the pipes.  The bulk flow coefficient, kb, 
representing the reaction in the water column is normally found experimentally for the 
particular constituent under consideration. 
Thus, the complete rate constant will be computed as: 
  
( )
w f
b
H w f
k k
K=k +
R k + k
 (Equation 32) 
It then follows that the overall concentration impact can be computed as: 
  -Ktt 0C =C exp  (Equation 33) 
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Tank hydrodynamics. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, storage tanks are important elements in a properly 
functioning distribution system.  They provide the buffering capacity within the system to 
cope with variations in supply and demand, which reduces stress on the treatment, 
pump and piping components.  Accordingly, the volume of these tanks or reservoirs can 
have an impact on the movement of a contaminant through the distribution system. 
In its most simple form the tank behavior is approached assuming its contents are 
homogeneous and completely mixed.  Thus, incremental changes in incoming water 
quality are blended with existing tank water in using a simple conservation of mass 
approach.  Also, since these tanks can have significant volume, it is recognized that 
some level of constituent growth or decay can occur given the detention time afforded.  
This is represented as follows (Clark & Grayman, 1998): 
  
( ) ( )s s ks sj s ij sksx=L
k i
d V C
= Q C - Q C + k C
dt ½å å  (Equation 34) 
 where: Cs = Concentration for tank s 
 Vs = Volume in tank at node s 
 dt = Change in time 
 Qks = Flow from node k to s 
 Qsj = Flow from node s to j 
 Cks = Concentration at end of links 
 kij = Decay coefficient between node i and j 
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Under field conditions, however, it is not unusual to find that the water in a tank is not of 
homogeneous quality.  Short-circuiting and temperature stratification can create 
significant concentration gradients that clearly impact water quality.  These tanks can 
manifest “dead” zones in which there is very little water movement or exchange.  This 
can result in microbial growth, chlorine destruction, chemical precipitation and other 
adverse consequences.  Current software updates are using research into these issues 
to refine the simulation capabilities to more closely match field results.  This is currently 
being done by the two and three compartment models that are beginning to be 
incorporated into the software.  Use of these features though requires additional base 
data to accurately define the functional description and boundary conditions under which 
the tank operates (Grayman et al., 2000). 
Dynamic Water Quality Solution Algorithms 
Now that the descriptive components of the network are available, an algorithm can be 
defined to solve the contaminant propagation equations.  There are, in fact, four different 
algorithms that have evolved over recent years and have come to provide the primary 
“accounting” options for keeping track of the disparate components in water quality 
simulation.  These are classified by the numerical method used to segment the links and 
then the manner by which these segments are tracked through the time steps.   
Before proceeding with this discussion, it is important to point out the distinction between 
the “hydraulic time step” used in computation of bulk flow movement and the “water 
quality time step” that is associated with the segmentation of the links.  Generally, the 
hydraulic time step is measured in hours and is associated with the extended period 
hydraulic simulation that computes the macro-scale parameters of the system operation.  
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The “water quality time step” is established by the computational schemes below and 
typically is measured in hundredths of an hour.  This allows the algorithms to establish 
small completely mixed segments that then move down the pipe and decay (or increase) 
in accordance with the equations mentioned in the sections above.  The means by which 
this segmentation and tracking occurs is at the heart of the four solution methods below. 
The first two methods may be classified as Eulerian after the Swiss mathematician, 
Leonard Euler, who pioneered the basic numerical approach to solving differential 
equations.  The second two methods are Lagrangian following Joseph-Louis Lagrange’s 
approach to solving large systems of simultaneous equations.  These solution algorithms 
are briefly described below (Boulos, Altman, Jarrige, & Collevati, 1995; Clark & 
Grayman, 1998; Mays, 2000; Rossman & Boulos, 1996):    
Eulerian Finite-Difference Method (FDM). 
This approach seeks to solve the advective transport model (Eq.25) by using variations 
of Eulerian numerical methods to approximate the derivatives with their finite difference 
equivalents along a fixed grid of point in time and space (Islam, Chaudhry, & Clark, 
1997).    The end result is a series of algebraic equations for the entire network that are 
solved by marching forward in time and down the length of each pipe.   At the start of 
each new hydraulic time step a new grid spacing is chosen in each link so that the 
number of intervals is as large as possible while staying less than a scaling ratio (L/VDt).  
The process is then repeated until the specified time steps have been completed. 
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Eulerian Discrete Volume Method (DVM). 
In this method each link is divided into a series of equally spaced, completely mixed 
segment volumes.  At the end of each successive water quality time step, concentration 
within each volume is “reacted” (using the relative equations above) and then transferred 
to the adjacent downstream segment.  When the adjacent segment is a junction node, 
the resultant (outgoing) concentration for this and all segments entering that node is 
computed using Eq. 26.  This sequence is repeated until a new hydraulic condition is 
encountered.  At that point the network is resegmented to reflect changes in link travel 
time and the contaminant mass are reassigned to the new segments, at which time the 
computations continue.  The number of volume segments in a pipe is the same as the 
FDM method, i.e. largest integer less than or equal to the travel time divided by the 
water quality time step. 
Lagrangian Time-Driven Method (TDM). 
Instead of dividing each link into equally sized segments and react and transport the 
water between segments at fixed time intervals as the Eulerian methods do, the 
Lagrangian methods track the position of variably-sized segments in each link.  The 
difference between the two Lagrangian methods has to do with when the segment 
conditions are updated.  In the TDM method the conditions are at fixed time intervals.  
The segment so determined is then reacted and the results reestablished as the 
segment moves on through the link and/or node. 
This method uses the water quality timestep (as opposed to the hydraulic timestep) to 
organize each segment reaction, keeping a cumulative account of the total mass and 
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flow entering each node.  The water quality timestep is normally much shorter than the 
hydraulic timestep to accommodate the short travel times that can occur within pipes. 
Because this is the system algorithm incorporated by the software used in Chapter 7, a 
more detailed description of the sequence is listed below.  The description is taken from 
the WaterCAD User’s Manual: 
The following steps occur at the end of each water quality time step. 
1. “The water quality in each segment is updated to reflect any reaction that may 
have occurred over the time step. 
2. The water from the leading segments of pipes with flow into each junction is 
blended together to compute a new water quality value at the junction.  The 
volume contributed from each segment equals the product of its pipe’s flow rate 
and the time step.  If this volume exceeds that of the segment, then the segment 
is destroyed and the next one in line behind it begins to contribute its volume.   
3. Contributions from outside sources are added to the quality values at the 
junctions.  The quality in storage tanks is updated depending on the method used 
to model mixing in the tank. 
4. New segments are created in pipes with flow out of each junction, reservoir, and 
tank.  The segment volume equals the product of the pipe flow and the time step.  
The segment’s water quality equals the new quality value computed for the node. 
5. To cut down on the number of segments, this step is only carried out if the new 
node quality differs by a user-specified tolerance from that of the last segment in 
the outflow pipe.  If the difference in quality is below the tolerance, then the size 
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of the current last segment in the outflow pipe is increased by the volume flowing 
into the pipe over the time step.”  (Haestaed Methods, 2002) 
The segment positions are also updated at each timestep.  New nodal concentrations 
are computed and new segments are created when the downstream segment is outside 
the concentration tolerance.  The process is repeated for each water quality timestep.  At 
the start of the next hydraulic timestep, the order of the segments is reversed for any link 
experiencing a flow reversal.  Otherwise no ordering adjustment is necessary. 
Lagrangian Event-Driven Method (EDM). 
As mentioned above this Lagrangian method establishes variably-sized segments based 
on pipe volume that has the same concentration (within a stated tolerance).  In the EDM 
approach the update computations occur only at times when the leading segment in a 
link completely disappears through its downstream node.  This requires that the program 
keep an ordered list of the projected “lifetime” of the leading edge of each link.  The next 
“event” occurs for the segment at the head of the list as it intersects and exists through 
the next node.  When the “event” occurs, the following actions occur: 1) the “event” 
segment is destroyed and the simulation clock is updated, 2) a new concentration is 
recorded at the node receiving the “event” in accordance with Eq 26 as it mixes with 
other water entering the node, 3) if the concentration at the “event” node is above a 
specified tolerance,  a new segment is generated at the start of all links leaving the node 
(with the concentration of each of those links being equal to the updated concentration), 
and 4) the projected lifetimes of all the leading segments are adjusted and the event is 
reordered accordingly. 
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The process continues until the end of the current hydraulic time step.  At that time all 
the segments’ positions and concentrations are updated.  As new hydraulic time steps 
increment, directions of flow are recorded, a new ordered event list is generated, and the 
event processing is continued through the system. 
Rossman and Boulos (1996) provide a description and comparison of each of these 
methods and conclude that all of them are capable of adequately representing observed 
water quality behavior in actual water distribution systems.  They did observe, however, 
that the Lagrangian time-driven method (TDM) was the most versatile of the methods 
tested, but did require more computer memory when water age was being computed.  If 
computer memory is at a premium given the size of the system in question the Eulerian 
methods might be better suited when trying to model water age. 
Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the fundamental factors associated with developing 
a computer simulation of an operating water distribution system.  Water distribution 
systems can be described in terms of links (pipes), nodes (interconnection junctions), 
and pipe loops.  The movement within water systems is simulated by application of the 
laws of conservation of mass and conservation of energy.  The hydraulic movement of 
water is inherently non-linear because friction (energy) loss within the pipes is highly 
variable based on flow rate and other physical factors.  Fluid formulas exist (Darcy-
Weisbach and Hazen-Williams) which can reasonably predict the flow and energy levels 
(pressure or head) associated with the water at any particular point in a pipeline. 
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Because of the interconnection of pipes in loops, the analysis of fluid movement 
becomes quite complex as the water seeks to supply demand through the system with 
minimum energy.  The resulting flow and energy results are again highly non-linear and 
in many cases non-intuitive.  Equations balancing mass at each node and energy along 
each link must all be solved simultaneously.  A number of numerical processes have 
been developed to solve these equations. 
A steady state analysis is the most fundamental investigation of a system as it 
addresses the response at a single point in time while all external forces are constant 
and the system is in equilibrium.  From that extended period simulation, processes have 
been developed that define changes in external forces (included description of pump, 
valve and tank control sequences) that allow a series of steady state models to step 
through time (hydraulic time step) and simulate actual hydraulic response to the changes 
imposed.  By calibrating the hydraulic model to actual field data and making appropriate 
adjustments in the model assumptions the computer simulation can provide a reliable 
proxy for the physical reality. 
After the calibrated extended period simulation for the distribution network has been 
developed, it is possible to expand the computer model to form a representation of water 
quality movement and fate in the system.  This is accomplished by using the extended 
period hydraulic simulation to compute the bulk movement components of the water, 
define the advective transport features, bulk and wall decay reactions as well as tank 
hydrodynamic characteristics.  As these parameters and their associated relationships 
are defined, the water quality simulation takes the hydraulic model output data and using 
one of four solution algorithms, computes the changes in water quality resulting from the 
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external forces applied.  While the water quality simulations need to be subjected to 
calibration exercises also, they have been found to provide a reasonable surrogate for 
actual field studies.  In fact they allow exploration of system response to atypical events 
that otherwise would not be subject to analysis.  That is the sense in which the computer 
simulations will be used in later sections of this study. 
For reference, a list of assumptions and potential error sources associated with 
extended period dynamic water quality simulations is presented in Appendix 2.  The 
purpose of the list is to provide a sober assessment of the data needs necessary to 
develop a reliable and workable model.  Fortunately, computer simulations seem to be 
fairly robust and can provide valuable insights into system operation if a conscientious 
effort is made to calibrate the initial model.  As George Box, the statistician, once stated 
so well, “all models are wrong, but some models are useful.”  That is precisely the view 
that should be maintained with water network simulations.  They are incredibly powerful 
and useful tools that can provide system designers and operators a richness of system 
understanding that could not be gained by any other means.  
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Chapter 6 An Algorithm to Identify Efficient Monitoring Station Locations 
As this study moves forward, it might be helpful to recap the ground that has been 
covered.  Up to this point the primary effort has been to develop the context and major 
factors of the research effort.  A statement of the research objective was presented and 
an overview of current water system design and distribution system monitoring practice 
was discussed to establish the framework within which the research will be conducted. 
Then a discussion of potential contaminants followed to illustrate the range of 
characteristics, effects and fate they present in water systems.  Finally, a discussion of 
the major features of water quality simulation was presented, to identify the source and 
basis of the data to be used to analyze a specific system.  At this point the study will 
proceed with developing the approach and algorithm used to decompose the distribution 
system and organize the data to reach the stated objectives. 
Algorithm Setting 
As mentioned earlier, because the nature of the contamination event and the operational 
state of the subject distribution system has an infinite number of configurations, there is 
in an absolute sense no one true optimum set of sampling locations, and variation in the 
“optimum” set is to be expected given different base assumptions.  However, it is posited 
that there does exist a cluster of points that can serve as robust sentinels for detection of 
a wide range of events. 
For a methodology to be productive, the procedure must define a feasible contamination 
event and make realistic assumptions regarding its occurrence and characteristics.  This 
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assumption set will be applied to a computer simulation of the physical system to 
produce an assessment of the system's response to the critical event. 
These assumptions may be considered to exist at two primary levels.  The first involves 
the physical reality of the event followed by a definition of the simplifying assumptions 
related to the modeling endeavor.  A reasonable set of physical assumptions would 
include the following: 
1. Contamination can occur at any point in the distribution system at any time and 
for any duration.   
2. The contaminant can be injected in either a continuous or discrete mode.   
3. The contaminant can be chemical, biological or physical.    
4. The contamination event can consist of a single agent or multiple agents injected 
simultaneously at single or multiple points. 
5. The contaminant is assumed to be sufficiently toxic to adversely affect 
consumers at some arbitrary threshold concentration and is undetectable by the 
consumer’s senses.  The adverse endpoint can be defined in terms of morbidity, 
mortality, psychological trauma or economic effects. 
6. A distribution system monitoring point is assumed to continuously monitor for the 
presence and concentration of the contaminant of interest with real-time 
feedback. 
7. Economic and/or technical factors constrain the number of sampling points to a 
small number relative to the total nodes in the system. 
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Beginning with these assumptions, the following sections develop a methodology to 
identify, in a heuristic manner, a set of monitoring points that efficiently ranks and covers 
the distribution system from contamination at any point within the system.  At this point 
the approach is presented in a “proof of concept” form which will be subject to 
refinements and open areas of future research identified in the final chapter.  As a final 
note it is again mentioned that the methodology should be within the reach of its target 
audience, small to med-sized water systems.  Heuristic approaches have historically 
been more effective in that practice segment. 
Develop a Computer Simulation of the Distribution System 
Because it is impracticable to physically test a wide range of contamination events, it 
becomes immediately apparent that any reasonable approach seeking to address the 
problem must rely upon a workable, extended period of computer simulation of the 
distribution network in question.  Thus, the first step in the process is to develop an 
extended period water quality model that simulates the normally functioning water 
system.  This process was discussed in Chapter 5.  In that chapter, there are certainly 
many assumptions and sources of errors associated with an extended period water 
quality model.  However, a network simulation can be refined and calibrated to yield a 
sufficiently accurate representation of reality.  The simulation packages are more 
affordable and accessible now than in the past and for many reasons every community 
water system should have a working simulation of their distribution network. 
Develop a Contamination Scenario 
Once the basic extended period model describing the distribution system is in place, the 
next step in the process is to define a contamination incident description or scenario.  
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Vulnerability analysis training identifies this as the Design Basis Threat (DBT).  The DBT 
should be reflective of a realistic scenario that could be feasibly imposed upon the 
system resulting in a defined adverse effect. 
The first issue in developing the DBT is selecting the contaminating agent.  Many 
contaminants can pollute a water supply but, for this purpose, the agent is assumed 
capable of mass contamination.  In other words, the intent of contamination would be to 
corrupt a large volume of water as opposed to a few connections.  To achieve the goals 
of the offending entity, the water would need to be contaminated in such a way as to be 
undetectable when consumed, so that exposure to the contaminant would be 
unconstrained.  Given these criteria, Chapter 4 outlines a list of potential candidates 
which can be considered for use in situations proposed here.  Additional pragmatic 
concerns also come into play, such as the ease of acquiring and the cost of the material 
as well as the ability to transport and disperse the contaminant. 
At a minimum the following information should be delineated to properly model the 
event: 
1. Identification of the contaminant: biological, chemical or physical, along with 
toxicological properties, and detection methods or characteristics.   
2. The mass of the contaminant to be injected into the system. 
3. The duration or injection rate that the contaminant will be introduced into the 
distribution system. 
4. Time-of-day that the injection begins. 
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General Modeling Assumptions and Analysis Concepts  
Once the basic distribution system simulation has been developed and the DBT has 
been delineated, it is possible to predict the impact of the contamination event on the 
distribution system.  Given the fundamental set of physical assumptions presented 
above, a corresponding set of primary modeling assumptions must be stated.  Most 
distribution system software provides a wide range of customizable attributes (with 
associated assumptions) which allows simulation of complex and compounded events 
that can approximate the physical assumptions.  For purposes of this paper the following 
represents the general modeling assumptions used in the development of the 
contamination event data. 
1. Contamination can occur at any point in the distribution system at any time and 
for any duration.   
2. The contamination event is assumed to occur at only one location in the 
distribution system at a time;  
3. Contamination is assumed to occur only at the junction nodes. 
4. All nodes are equally important. 
5. The contamination event will consist of a single agent. 
6. The contamination event will be assumed to occur in a single discrete event as 
opposed to continuous injection.  (Continuous injection is permitted by the 
algorithm, but is not as realistic for terrorist activity.) 
7. Monitoring points are assumed to be located at the junction nodes. 
8. The contaminant is carried with the bulk flow of water.  The contaminant can be 
treated as observing conservative or non-conservative particle assumptions 
depending on the parameter and capability of the modeling software. 
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9. Biological measurement assumes that count (i.e. cfu, oocysts, etc.) per million is 
equivalent to parts per million (ppm).  Strictly speaking this is incorrect because 
ppm is a weight/weight relationship, but this assumption is sufficiently accurate 
for simulation purposes.  
10. A monitoring point that detects, above a given threshold, contamination 
originated from multiple points is considered superior to a monitoring point that 
detects contamination from fewer points.  
11. Given a fixed number of monitoring points, M, the “best” location set shall be 
those M points that detect contamination from the largest number of unique 
origination nodes with the greatest redundancy. 
The procedure proposed here differs from others cited in that, rather than utilizing a 
representative hydraulic analysis and/or water quality simulation and then identifying a 
monitoring set using various optimization techniques based on that one actualization, a 
separate extended period water quality analysis is performed with each node in turn 
being used as the contamination injection node all of which are then used to find the 
optimum set.  Thus if there are n nodes in the system there will be n extended period 
simulations performed.  In this way any combination of injection events conceptually can 
be assumed for consideration. Using the DBT, the n extended period simulations will be 
run for a duration necessary for the entire contamination mass to be consumed.  Noting 
that the concentration of contamination will be computed for each node along the 
selected timestep, t, it is observed that all other nodes in the system can be considered 
monitoring nodes.  Recall that the principal of superposition is a useful tool in handling 
problems of this type (Boccelli et al., 1998; Tryby, Boccelli, Uber, & Rossman, 2002).  By 
combining all n analyses for all t-timesteps it is possible by linear superposition to 
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examine and rank each node for its efficiency in detecting contamination occurring at 
any point in the system.   
Until recently such an approach would be prohibitively burdensome computationally 
except for systems that had been dramatically skeletonized.  However the power, 
efficiency and cost of computers and analysis software have improved to the point that 
this procedure is in fact feasible for small to mid-sized water systems. 
It is now possible to develop an analysis methodology which heuristically identifies a 
ranked set of monitoring points to guide the establishment of a monitoring network.  In a 
generic sense the process proceeds as follows: 
1. Develop a calibrated extended period hydraulic model of the system in question. 
2. Develop a prototype contamination event. 
3. Develop a contamination event database as follows. 
4. Beginning with the first node in the distribution system, assume that the 
contamination event occurs at that node, run the extended period water quality 
model and record the computed concentrations for each node at each timestep 
of the analysis. 
5. Repeat step (4) for each node in the system in turn, applying the contamination 
criteria to that node.   
6. Analyze the resulting dataset for patterns which identify the nodes that have a 
higher probability of detecting contamination events occurring in the system than 
other nodes according to the criteria outlined in modeling assumption 10 above.  
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The following sections of this paper will outline issues that arise when implementing this 
strategy and provide a means of organizing the data to identify the desired monitoring 
points. 
Scenario Development and Analysis Issues 
Water Distribution System Model and Development of Contamination Database 
Time-of-day that injection begins. 
The DBT should stipulate at what time of the day the injection begins and how long it 
occurs.  While a time-of-day can be arbitrarily selected, it may be prudent to run a 
sensitivity analysis by starting the injection at several different times during the day.  
Depending on the size of the system, this can create a significant amount of additional 
work because it means that the entire modeling and analysis effort must be rerun for 
each new starting time.  It may be worth the additional effort, however, because the 
selected monitoring locations may shift somewhat depending on the time that the 
injection began.  For example, the shift in water patterns between a contamination event 
that begins at midnight and one that begins at noon may be sufficient to cause a re-
weighting of the monitoring nodes.  Examination of several analysis sets using different 
injection initiation times can help to create a more realistic portrayal of the range of 
contamination events resulting in a more robust network of monitoring points. 
Duration of analysis. 
An extended period simulation requires selection of a hydraulic time step.  This is the 
time between each quasi-steady state analysis through the model duration which is the 
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total time that the analysis runs.  In other words the analysis will begin at t=0 and 
proceed incrementally by the hydraulic time step (Dt) until the duration specified (td) has 
been reached.  Because a contaminant will move through (and exit) the system at 
differing rates depending on when and where the injection occurs, one cannot 
necessarily select an arbitrary duration of analysis, such as 24 hours.  In order to avoid 
comparing scenarios that may have different levels of total contaminant consumption, it 
is necessary to estimate the time it takes for all of the contaminant to clear the system.  
For example, injection of a contaminant near a highly active node may result in a short 
duration uptake of the total mass whereas injection near a storage reservoir may cause 
a lower concentration, longer duration feed.  One convenient way to estimate the 
appropriate duration of analysis is to select a number of diverse nodes and run 
simulations at varying durations to see how long it takes for the contaminant to be 
consumed at each.  The intent is to set a duration that is long enough to provide a 
comparable mass consumption for all permutations and yet as short as possible to 
minimize the data to be processed. 
Functionally, some level of judgment may be required.  In situations with long 
concentration tails, it may be necessary to set the duration at a level shorter than 
required to completely clear the system.  This entails a judgment call considering the 
amount of extraneous data collected in the overall analysis along with the reduced 
health implications at those low tail-levels. 
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Development of contamination database. 
Once the DBT scenario has been defined and the distribution system modeled and 
calibrated, the contamination database is then created.  As mentioned above an 
injection “pattern” corresponding to the DBT is defined to include a contamination 
initiation time and duration.  The basic network model parameters have been set which 
will include the selected hydraulic time step (Dt) and duration of the analysis (td).  Apply 
the DBT pattern to the first junction node and run the extended period water quality 
simulation.  The simulation data for all nodes is generated and stored, taking care to 
note which node was the contamination node.  The process is then repeated for all 
nodes in turn.  The resulting data set represents the response of the distribution system 
to all nodes serving as the contamination source, for the assumptions associated with 
the DBT pattern. 
Manipulation and analysis of contamination database. 
Once the full set of junction nodes have been simulated with each node serving as the 
injection node, the resulting database provides a wealth of information about the system 
and its response.  In order to mine the data effectively, several factors need to be 
addressed to improve the flexibility necessary to define the dominant patterns along with 
their stability. 
Threshold of concentration. 
In one sense any node with a positive computed contaminant value should be 
considered worthy of note and counted in the assessment process.  However, 
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pragmatically there is a difference between a computed simulation value and a 
measured lab value, not to mention an actual infectious dose or NOAEL.  It is not 
unusual, for example, to observe a computed value that may have a magnitude of 0.001 
mg/L.  Depending upon on the agent, this may be neither significant nor detectable in a 
field setting and thus is more of a computational artifact than a useful detection point.  
Thus, when devising a ranking system, establishing a threshold of concentration 
provides the analyst flexibility in exploring whether small computational values skew the 
result.  Also, allowing for a concentration threshold can demonstrate the sensitivity of the 
monitoring points to changes in detection levels in the field. 
Time since injection versus consumption volume. 
There are two fundamental approaches to establishing the criteria for evaluating the 
most desirable set of monitoring points.  These approaches are related but can yield 
results that may differ.  One approach seeks to optimize the set of monitoring points by 
minimizing the time to detection while the other approach focuses on establishing a 
system that minimizes consumption of contaminated water.  Both approaches have merit 
depending on the emphasis of the program.  It would seem intuitive that the basic 
objective of a monitoring system would be to detect contamination as quickly as possible 
after it occurs; however, the ultimate goal of monitoring is to minimize exposure of 
customers to contamination.  A brief discussion of these perspectives is given in Kumar, 
Kansal and Arora (1999).   
The method proposed here presents a methodology which seeks to utilize the time since 
injection as a major variable, but is balanced against the stability of the monitoring set 
118 
over time.  By extension the proposed approach can also be used to estimate the 
“volume consumed” and compare that with monitoring set stability.  The basic thought 
under consideration in this paper, is that for any given system, the “optimum” monitoring 
set may vary for a given elapsed time or volume consumed and it is instructive to 
develop a sense of the magnitude of the set variation prior to forming a conclusion.   
Detection count versus average contaminant concentration. 
Once the database is populated with concentration values for all contamination injection 
possibilities over all time steps, it is necessary to provide a criterion for evaluation and 
ranking.  For a given concentration threshold, two straightforward means of 
accomplishing this are (1) averaging the computed concentrations at each monitoring 
node over time t or (2) summing the number of injection nodes that the response node 
detects along with the frequency of detection.  These statistics (means or totals) will be 
cumulatively computed for each timestep at each response node. 
This process (successive cumulative computations from t=0) tends to have more impact 
on the evaluation of nodes by averages than by totals/frequency, so the counts tend to 
be more stable, if not informative, than the averages.  This follows from the fact that the 
range of values encountered during a contamination event will be large and the use of 
averages may overwhelm small but significant signals at some nodes.  The counts will 
not be as sensitive to extreme values, and, if a concentration threshold is considered, 
counts will provide a reliable indication of the frequency at which each response node 
can detect contamination from other nodes in the system. 
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Ranking algorithm. 
At this point it is possible to present a step by step summary of a proposed algorithm 
that can be used to isolate nodes within the distribution system that are more efficient 
than others in detecting external contamination. 
1. Apply the injection pattern to each node in turn and record all computed 
concentrations for all nodes for all timesteps through the modeled duration (td).  
This generates a matrix populated with 
sm,i,t
C , the detected concentration at the 
monitoring node m measured at time ts since injection at node i.  
2. Proceed through the data matrix generated above and, for each injection node, 
compare all computed timesteps with a preselected threshold concentration (C*).  
In a parallel Evaluation matrix, if the computed concentration is greater than the 
threshold concentration, place “1” in the cell; otherwise insert “0” in the cell.  In 
other words the matrix will be populated by values computed as follows: 
s s sm,i,t m,i,t m,i,t
f = 1 if C > C* or 0 if C C*£ .  This indicates whether the 
monitoring node m detects injection at node i at timestep ts. 
3. Using the Evaluation matrix, increment through the data and record in a 
Summary matrix the number of times that Monitoring node, m, detects injection 
by node i for all timesteps for 0 = t = ts.  This sum will be recorded by timestep ts. 
  
st
m,i,ts m,i,t
t=0
s = få   
4. For simplification of presentation steps 4 through 9 assume a stipulated C* and 
ts. Using the stated C* and ts, compute the efficacy (em,i) of each Monitoring  node 
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m for injection at node i by noting if it detects any contamination for all timesteps 
from t=0 to ts . In other words s sm,i m,i,t m,i,te = 1 if s > 0 or 0 if s = 0 .   
5. Compute the efficiency with which each monitoring node detects contamination 
(em) by summing the number of injection nodes for which Monitoring node m has 
an em,i value equal to 1.  Hence,  
  
n
m m,i
i=1
e = eå  
6. From the Summary matrix find the most efficient monitoring node (mb).  This is 
the monitoring node that detects the most injection nodes for 0 =  t =  ts and with 
C > C*.  Select node mb such that ( )
bm m
e =max e .  Thus, by ranking all 
monitoring nodes by em in descending order, the monitoring nodes are ranked by 
the number of injection nodes they detect.  If there is a tie for mb (i.e. several 
monitoring nodes have the same max(em)), rank the tied monitoring nodes by the 
number of monitoring events that each node detects.  This corresponds to a 
secondary sort of values based on total detection events by the monitoring node 
over ts.  Symbolically then, chose from the set of tied nodes, the one node with 
the largest
s
n
m,i,t
i=1
så .  This says that, in the event that several monitoring nodes 
detect the same number of injection nodes, the most efficient node is the one 
that has the most individual detection events through ts. 
7. Selection of the most efficient node based on mb, however, does not assure 
complete coverage of the system as injection at some nodes may not be 
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detected by the selected node. Additional monitoring nodes, then, are required 
by selecting all injection nodes i not detected by mb (i.e. mb with  
b sm, i , t
s = 0 ).  
8. For each injection node, i, that is not detected by mb (i.e. 
b sm, i , t
s = 0 ), select other 
monitoring nodes, m, for that injection node i for which 
b sm ,i,t
s > 0 .  Record the  
sm,i , t
s  counts for each of those nodes.  Select the m with maximum counts, i.e. 
sm,i,t
max (s ) .  If there is a tie, select the m that has the greatest redundancy for 
that ts, i.e.  the node with the largest em among the remaining nodes.  This 
identifies the monitoring node that provides the best opportunity to detect the 
injection node under consideration along with the greatest redundancy for 
detecting other injection nodes that are covered by other monitoring nodes. 
9. To prioritize additional monitoring nodes not covered by mb, analyze and sort in 
the same manner as above. 
10. Perform sensitivity analysis by varying “time since injection” (ts) and “threshold 
concentration level” (C*).  Typically, this task is accomplished by systematically 
varying ts from some minimum value to td, observing the stability of the selected 
monitoring set(s).  Likewise C* should be varied through a reasonable range to 
observe the effect that C* has on the selection of the monitoring set.   
11. Using the information from step 10, develop contingency tables and charts to 
assist in decision making.  This can take a number of forms depending on the 
technical ability of the analyst and degree of sophistication required.  At a 
minimum, one should plot and/or tabulate the selected monitoring sets with ts and 
C* and note the magnitude of change in selected nodes.  Decision rules for 
acceptable stability will be system specific. 
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The data set developed above has an explicit assumption regarding the time-of-day that 
the DBT pattern was applied.  To validate the selected monitoring points, consideration 
should be given to repeating this process after setting the DBT pattern to initiate 
contamination at a different time-of-day.  This allows the examination of effects caused 
by variable water demand experienced over the modeling duration.   A separate set of 
data will result reflecting the different initiation time of contamination.  Additional sets 
may be run reflecting other initiation times if there are discrepancies in the optimal 
sampling points. 
Summary 
This chapter provides the context and assumptions used to develop an algorithm that 
can be applied to locate a robust set of monitoring stations within a potable water 
distribution system.  First, a database is developed by computing concentration values 
assuming all nodes are potential injection points for a stipulated Design Basis Threat.  
This database is analyzed using the algorithm presented to select in ranked order the 
nodes that are robust and effective in detecting the contamination event when 
considering the time since injection and a threshold concentration level.  The next 
chapter will seek to illustrate the process on a small test water distribution system that is 
frequently used in the literature. 
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Chapter 7 An Illustrative Example Using the Ranking Algorithm 
As a means of demonstrating the procedure described above, it will be applied to the 
Anytown, USA model (Kessler et al., 1998; Walski et al., 1987).  This test set is 
frequently used in the literature and should provide a convenient means of setting up the 
program and experimenting with results.  The system consists of 34 pipes, 16 nodes and 
17 loops.  It also has two elevated storage tanks, a single well and pumping station.  A 
schematic drawing of the system is provided in Figure 5.  The specific characteristics of 
the system are delineated in Table 12 through Table 15.  The assumed demand flow 
pattern is listed on Table 16.   
 
Figure 5 Schematic Drawing of the System 
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Table 12 Pipe Characteristics 
Pipe 
Number 
Length 
(ft) 
Diameter 
(in.) C-factor 
2 12,000 16 120 
4 12,000 12 120 
6 12,000 12 120 
8 9,000 12 120 
10 6,000 12 120 
12 6,000 10 120 
14 6,000 12 120 
16 6,000 10 120 
18 6,000 12 120 
20 6,000 10 120 
22 6,000 10 120 
24 6,000 10 120 
26 6,000 12 120 
28 6,000 10 120 
30 6,000 10 120 
32 6,000 10 120 
34 9,000 10 120 
36 6,000 10 120 
38 6,000 10 120 
40 6,000 10 120 
42 6,000 8 120 
44 6,000 8 120 
46 6,000 8 120 
48 6,000 8 120 
50 6,000 10 120 
52 6,000 8 120 
56 6,000 8 120 
58 6,000 10 120 
60 6,000 8 120 
62 6,000 8 120 
64 12,000 8 120 
66 12,000 8 120 
78 100 12 120 
80 100 12 120 
 
Table 13 Node Characteristics 
Node 
Number 
Elevation 
(ft) 
Average Demand 
(gal./min.) 
20 20 500 
30 50 200 
40 50 200 
50 50 200 
60 50 500 
70 50 500 
80 50 500 
90 50 1,000 
100 50 500 
110 50 500 
120 120 200 
130 120 200 
140 80 200 
150 120 200 
160 120 800 
170 120 200 
 
 
 
Table 14 Tank Characteristics 
Tank 
Number 
Elevation 
(ft) 
Initial 
level 
(ft) 
Minimum 
level 
(ft) 
Maximum 
level 
(ft) 
Diameter 
(ft) 
65 215 35 10 35 53.8 
165 215 35 10 35 53.8 
 
 
 
Table 15 Pump Characteristics 
Discharge  
(gal./min) 
Head  
(ft)                 
0 358 
12,000 270 
24,000 190 
33,000 0 
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Table 16 Demand Characteristics 
Time of  
Day              
Multiplier of  
average demand                  
06-09 1.2 
09-12 1.3 
12-15 1.2 
15-18 1.1 
18-21 1.0 
21-24 0.9 
24-03 0.7 
03-06 0.6 
 
Water Distribution System Simulation 
An extended period water quality simulation for Anytown was prepared using Haestad 
Methods WaterCAD® v. 6.01.  After configuring the model using the components as 
listed above, the simulation was run several times under different initial hydraulic 
conditions (ex. elevated tank water levels, pump control settings, etc) with a one week 
duration.  This helped to establish stable values for the pump controls to match the water 
levels stipulated in the Anytown problem statement.  These were then used to set the 
initial conditions for the simulation used in this example.  A one hour hydraulic time step 
was used as the default increment between simulations. 
Design Basis Threat Definition 
For analysis purposes it will be assumed that the distribution system will be subject to a 
biological contamination event.  The agent chosen will be the parasite Cryptosporidium 
parvum, which is the same organism involved in the accidental contamination of the 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin water system in 1993.  This agent, while typically having a low 
mortality rate, has many characteristics of an ideal contaminant.  It has a low infective 
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dose, is highly resistant to normal disinfection procedures, can be significantly 
concentrated and is easily handled (Burrows & Renner, 1999; Teunis, Chappell, & 
Okhuysen, 2002).  It can also give rise to subsequent secondary infections.  Using this 
agent the contamination scenario is assumed to unfold as follows. 
It is noticed that large road or construction projects use water tankers as a means of 
dust control.  These tankers are frequently observed connecting to fire hydrants to 
replenish the water in the tanker.  The terrorists reason that it would be a fairly 
straightforward task to fit the tanker with a pump such that rather than receiving water 
the tanker could overcome the backpressure and pump water back into the distribution 
system.  Cryptosporidium oocysts can be cultivated and concentrated (Teunis et al., 
2002)  to the point that a 3000 gallon tanker can be brought to a concentration of 
300,000 oocysts/L.  For planning purposes it is assumed that the tanker is fitted with a 
50 gpm pump which would allow a full discharge of the tanker in 60 minutes.  As a 
simplifying assumption it is assumed that each node in the distribution system computer 
model represents a fire hydrant (i.e. injection node).  Thus, the DBT envisions an event 
that discharges 3000 gallons of contaminant into the distribution system at a rate of 50 
gpm for one hour with a concentration of 300,000 oocysts/L (assume this is equivalent to 
300,000 mg/L for modeling purposes).  Although pragmatically unlikely, for the initial 
scenario it is assumed that the injection occurs at midnight. 
Development of Contamination Database 
The DBT scenario summary information is now developed into an injection pattern which 
will be applied to each node of the distribution system.  First, however, a few of the 
nodes are sampled to establish the duration of the extended period water quality 
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simulation of the contamination event.  For this project, it is determined that a 24 hour 
duration from the time of the injection should be sufficient for the majority of the 
contamination to exit the system.  The short duration is probably due to the fact that the 
elevated storage tanks are small relative to the system demands which results in high 
turnover rates.  This in turn reduces the dampening effects of the storage tank.  In any 
event this step provides guidance on how to set the simulation parameters for the 
extended period water quality model which will generate the fundamental data set. 
Now, applying the injection pattern to each of the n nodes in turn, the simulation is run n 
times.  The time increment for the extended period model (Dt) in this example is 1 hour 
and the total duration of the run (td) is 24 hours.  Therefore, the analysis data set is 
based upon 24 time steps (td / Dt = 24 / 1 = 24) for each of the n simulations.  Since 
there are 16 nodes which can serve as monitoring points (including the contamination 
node), this yields 384 data points for each contamination scenario.  The simulation is 
then repeated for each of the 16 contamination nodes, which yields a total of 6144 points 
populating the database for consideration.  A concentration matrix results with 
Monitoring Nodes (m = 1, 2,…, 16) forming an X-axis, Injection Nodes (j = 1, 2,…,16) 
defining the Y-axis and the Time-steps (t0 through td) as the Z-axis.  By examining each 
slice through the Y-axis (injection at that node), a record of contaminant movement 
through the system over time is observed (in the X-Z plane) and the nodes which 
detected that movement over the course of the event may be identified. 
Analysis of Contamination Database 
Now that the contamination matrix is defined it is possible to develop different queries to 
test the efficiency of different nodes with respect to detecting contamination over a range 
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of contamination injection points.  For purposes of this analysis, the efficiency of the 
monitoring nodes will be based upon the total counts (observations) recorded for each 
monitoring node over the different scenarios.  Because an objective of this study is to 
use tools that are commonly available to operational personnel, Microsoft Excel® is used 
for this illustration to process the data.  As the distribution system increases in size it is 
necessary to use a relational database, however by using Excel for this example the 
process is more transparent. 
Preprocess Raw Data 
One of the limitations of Excel is that it can only accept 256 columns of data.  Because 
there are 256 node points (16 nodes * 16 nodes) to consider plus the need for some 
labeling and computational columns, the first task is to import the database and 
transpose the time and node axes.  Once this is accomplished the analysis can proceed 
for projects in which the timesteps under consideration are less than 256, which is 
typically the case.  However, as will been seen in the tasks to follow, this column 
constraint will limit the use of Excel alone to systems with no more than 250 modeled 
nodes.    
Another comment on setting up the analysis database is to note that a simulation will 
likely have many intermediate or fractional timesteps.  This results from “change of state” 
operations in the system (e.g. a pump turns on or off, a tank switches from filling to 
discharging, etc.)  These timesteps may or may not have concentration data associated 
with the operations, but to keep from “oversampling” during fractional timesteps it is 
normally best to eliminate these points from the analysis and just consider status at each 
standard hydraulic timestep.  This essentially forms a systematic sampling of the data 
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and prevents the database from expanding unnecessarily.  The initial state (t = 0) is also 
included in the event that an initial or background concentration needed to be 
considered (which in this case it did not). 
Having imported and transposed the simulation results, a two dimensional spreadsheet 
exists with evenly incremented timesteps across the top and monitoring-injection nodes 
down the side.  Table 17 provides a partial view of this information.  Reading this chart 
for example, 9 hours after the contamination event, monitoring node 80 detects a 
contaminant level of 2313.849 mg/L (oocysts/L) for contamination that originated at node 
60. 
Table 17 Transposed Simulation Results (Partial) 
Time (hr) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
80 J20 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 216.6066 1181.621 267.7076 170.9058 341.2332 565.2613 425.2074
80 J30 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 43796.71 11069.39 154.569 297.9569 478.0985 783.9133 724.057
80 J40 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 J50 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 J60 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 112787 10982.69 1200.131 2313.849 3713.53 6088.093 5623.952
80 J70 Inj. Conc. (mg/l) 469.0788 1539.53 191.9643 370.0469 593.7739 973.5806 899.2426  
Develop a Count Evaluation Matrix 
Next, construct a parallel spreadsheet with the same headings as above.  Using a 
Threshold Concentration (C*) established by the analyst, compare the value in each cell 
of the raw data database with that threshold concentration.  If the cell value is greater 
than to the threshold concentration, a “1” is placed in the cell of the parallel spreadsheet.  
Otherwise a “0” is placed in the cell.   Upon completion this spreadsheet constitutes a 
count evaluation matrix that is populated with a record of the number of times a 
particular (monitoring) node detected contamination greater than C* from any injection 
point in the system measured from the stated time. 
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Prepare Count Summary Table 
Using the parallel spreadsheet (Count Evaluation Matrix), develop a Count Summary 
Table.  This table has the Injection nodes listed across the top and the Monitoring nodes 
listed down the side.  Select a timestep value, then sum the number of "1"s in each 
Monitoring node cell associated with each Injection node from the Counts worksheet.  
Sum only through the time step indicated in the timestep cell. 
Now it is possible to count across the table to determine the number of Injection nodes 
that each monitoring node detects through the time period indicated in the timestep cell.  
Note that this count is independent of the number of times that the monitoring point 
detected contamination for an Injection node – only that it detected contamination at 
least once during the period indicated.  However, along with that count, another column 
will be inserted that sums the total number of times that the monitoring node recorded a 
detection over all nodes during the period indicated.  With this summary information in 
hand it is now possible to refine the search for the most robust set of monitoring points.  
A partial view of the Count Summary Table is presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18 Count Summary Table (Partial) – At 12 Hours With 100 Mg/L Threshold 
 
Develop a Count Sorting Table 
Using the same configuration as the Count Summary Table, a parallel table is 
constructed.  See Table 19.  Using the data from the Count Summary Table, this new 
table is sorted using the Count column as the primary key and the Count Total as the 
secondary sort key.  The top ranked node is the monitoring node that is the most 
efficient in detecting contamination over the time and concentration criteria that have 
been stipulated.  In other words this node detects contamination from more Injection 
nodes than any other Monitoring node in the system and, in the event that several 
monitoring nodes detect the same number of Injection nodes, the top ranked node has 
the largest number of total detection events.  This will be called the Primary Monitoring 
Node.  In most cases though, this monitoring node will not detect contamination at all 
nodes.  In order to identify the additional monitoring points necessary to cover these 
undetected nodes, an additional table is required. 
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Table 19 Sorted Summary Table (Partial) – At 12 Hours  With 100 Mg/L Threshold 
 
Develop Supplemental Node Search Table 
To identify and rank the additional monitoring nodes necessary to cover undetected 
nodes in the distribution system, set up a table with headings as shown Table 20.  This 
table will list the nodes not covered by the Primary Monitoring Node identified in the 
Count Sorting Table above.  A computer search populates this table as follows.   
Using the Count Sorting Table, proceed across the top row (the Primary Monitoring 
Node) and identify any injection node that has no detections noted.  Then drop down 
that Injection node column to locate the maximum number of detections.  From that 
row, record the monitoring node along with the total number of injection nodes that the 
monitoring node detected as well as the total number (i.e. sum) of detections.  See Table 
20. Record in the "Nodes Not Covered" Table along with the number of other Injection 
nodes detected and also the total number of times that node detected. 
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Table 20 Nodes Not Covered 
 
 
In order to identify other undetected nodes, return to the Primary Monitoring Node and 
continue across the top row and repeat the column lookup process described above for 
any remaining injection nodes that had no detections.  This is repeated across the top 
row until no Injection node is left undetected.  An Injection node will detect itself so there 
will always be at least one monitoring node to detect every Injection node.  At the 
completion of this effort a table will be populated that has all Injection nodes not covered 
by the Primary Monitoring Node identified along with the Monitoring nodes that do detect 
them. 
At this point the table searches for the monitoring node that most effectively detects 
each Injection node.  This is accomplished by sorting and ranking the nodes.  It will be 
recalled that one of the decision criteria for determining the most efficient set of 
monitoring nodes will be those nodes that detect the most injection nodes over the 
system and with the greatest redundancy.  Since the Monitoring Nodes listed in the 
“Nodes Not Covered” Table represent the largest (highest) number of detections for 
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each Injection node not detected by the Primary Monitoring Node, the table can be used 
to identify the nodes that have the greatest redundancy for detecting other Injection 
nodes.  Thus, as the nodes in this table are sorted, the resulting monitoring node ranking 
will be the one that detects an Injection node not covered by the Primary Monitoring 
Node, and the most other Injection nodes.  If there is a tie at this level, the node is 
selected which has the highest total number of total detects during the period. 
At this point the process has identified and ranked all of the monitoring nodes necessary 
to detect the DBT for the time and concentration threshold specified.  It is quite possible 
that a number of Injection nodes only detect themselves which of course means that the 
contamination stays localized and does not spread to other parts of the system.  At this 
point the water system managers must make a value judgment as to how many 
monitoring stations to deploy and what portions of the system are covered and which 
sections are still vulnerable. 
Sensitivity Analysis Based on Time Since Injection and Concentration Threshold 
While the process above identifies the set of monitoring points which covers the system 
for the event duration, it is intuitively obvious that at earlier points in the contamination 
event the dispersion will not be as extensive as at later times and thus may have an 
effect on the monitoring set.  Also, if different threshold contamination levels are 
selected, what impact would that have on the best set of monitoring nodes?   It is 
reasonable then to explore the effects of changes in time and threshold concentration on 
the location of the best set of monitoring nodes. 
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In order to accomplish this, a system must be devised to repeat the process above in a 
systematic way while varying the “Time Since Injection” (ts) and the threshold 
concentration.  This summarizing and sorting of data, based on the new threshold, can 
be accomplished with Excel by using the Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) scripting 
language which is a part of the Excel package.   
After writing the appropriate script, the Anytown database was queried using Threshold 
Concentrations of 0, 100, 200, 300 and 400 mg/L.  Since some reports (Rose, 1988; 
Teunis et al., 2002) show that the doses between 10 and 500 oocyst will provide 
infection of the majority of subjects and if the population drinks 1 to 2 liters per day, this 
range presents the approximate coverage of a minimum infective zone.  Also, the “time 
since injection” factor was considered by examining the data in 2 hour increments from 6 
to 24 hours.  It was observed that durations less than 6 hours after injection were not 
useful because the movement of the contaminant through the system was too limited.  
This procedure along with the VBA code is listed in Appendix 3. 
Interpretation of Results 
The analyst now has a means of organizing and ranking monitoring systems that provide 
coverage of the entire network with varying levels of efficiency.  At this point it is now 
possible to develop additional procedures to assist in the selection of the set of 
monitoring stations that provide the most robust coverage for the range of assumptions 
that the analyst believes to be most appropriate. 
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Number of Monitoring Stations Required 
Probably the first question that an operations manager would want to know is ’how many 
monitoring stations are required to cover the entire system?’  As the sensitivity analysis 
under the varying ts and C* assumptions indicates, the answer to this question is 
dependent on both variables.  Therefore, the analyst must frame the response by 
organizing the data into a form that incorporates the impacts of each function.  This may 
be accomplished by counting the number of stations determined in the ts and C* 
sensitivity analysis.  In other words as the ts is iterated from t=0 to t=td for each C* value, 
a defined number of monitoring stations is counted to cover the system.  By listing the 
number of stations required for each combination of ts and C*, a table can be developed 
to summarize data.  This data can then be plotted for convenient comparison of the 
impact of each variable.   
For the Anytown example, Figure 6 is plotted which illustrates the outcome.  It shows 
that as time increases and threshold concentration decreases, the number of monitoring 
stations decreases from 8 stations to 4 stations with a zero concentration threshold.  On 
the other hand with C* equal to 0, 100, 200 or 300 mg/L, the number of monitoring 
stations decreases from 9 to 5 stations necessary to cover all nodes.  With a 400 mg/L 
threshold the number of stations required does not fall below 6 stations. 
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Figure 6 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at Midnight 
With this information one can develop a sense of the resources required to develop a 
system that will detect contamination introduced at any point in the system.  In most real 
water systems the number of stations required will greatly exceed the capital and human 
resources available to cover the whole network.  Factors such as dead-end lines, 
pressure zones, lines with high water age and the like, will create areas that have low 
efficacy from a system monitoring perspective and, thus, will require their own sampling 
station to detect contamination for that small area.  This issue will become more 
apparent as the methodology seeks to identify and rank the effectiveness of various 
monitoring nodes. 
So, having developed an understanding of the number of nodes required to cover the 
system, the core issues are now ready to be addressed, i.e. 
1. Where are those nodes to be located? 
138 
2. If all of the nodes necessary to cover the system cannot be implemented (ex. 
resource constraints), what nodes should be selected for that smaller subset? 
3. If a smaller subset is chosen, what portion of the system is covered; and 
conversely, what portion will not be covered?   
The next section develops the strategy for locating and ranking monitoring nodes in 
terms of their suitability to detect contamination at other nodes within the pipe network. 
Location of Monitoring Stations 
Using the information from the sensitivity iterations, it is possible to construct 
contingency tables to summarize the data and put it into a useful form to aid in 
evaluation of the options.  Excel has an internal “pivot table” function which 
accomplishes this task and allows convenient plotting of the results.  The contingency 
table allows one to view the ranking of the Primary Monitoring Node and the associated 
secondary monitoring nodes over time and at varying threshold concentration levels.  In 
this way the stability of the monitoring node set may be observed as the conditions vary.  
This allows a realistic assessment of the functionality of a particular location sequence 
which is invaluable when making risk tradeoffs or economic judgments. A few examples 
illustrating the use of these tables and charts are shown below. 
Suppose that the utility operating budget will allow no more than four monitoring stations 
to cover Anytown.  First, it is necessary to determine how many monitoring stations are 
necessary to cover Anytown and then to locate those stations within the distribution 
system.  Using the sorting and supplemental node search tables it is also possible to 
determine what sections of town are vulnerable if four monitoring stations are not 
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sufficient.  Recalling that the data is organized using cumulative time (i.e. time since the 
contamination event), the best set of monitoring stations is determined for the time and 
threshold concentration selected.  For example, the chart above indicates that four 
monitoring stations will be sufficient to cover the entire town if it is believed that no 
threshold concentration is applicable.  It also shows that five stations will be required if 
100 mg/L must be observed before a detection is counted. 
An interesting note here is that it is commonly assumed that using a zero threshold for 
detection is the most conservative assumption in establishing the monitoring network.  
Actually this is not the case because, from the network design perspective, the 
contamination “signal” must be strong enough to be confirmed (threshold) and should 
reject spurious events.  Thus, this tends to require more monitoring stations, which 
yields a more conservative design.  Once the system is in place, of course, any 
detection will be conservatively treated as an event, but that assumption should be used 
on the operations side, not necessarily on the optimization side. 
One way to develop a good overview of the optimum station locations is to look at all 
times and all thresholds at once.  For the midnight time of injection the monitoring 
combinations are shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7 Monitoring Station Configuration: Midnight Contamination Event (Permutation Order) 
Node Ranking in Permutation Order 
Again remembering that time is cumulative (t=0 to t=ts) and therefore longer time periods 
overlap shorter periods, this gives a first cut ordering of the ranked monitoring station 
locations.  The numbers along the X-axis, of course, being the Monitoring Nodes in 
permutation order (Primary node first followed by ranked nodes).  The Y-axis represents 
the number of injection nodes that the indicated monitoring node combination detects for 
the given ts and C*.   
The purpose of this graph is to quickly scan the range of data to observe patterns that 
may exist or to identify any dominant combinations that may exist.  For the DBT with a 
midnight injection at some point within the distribution system, the node sequence of 
170/90/50/40 seems to provide the best coverage over all the range of data 
assumptions. 
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Node Ranking in Combination Order 
It is noticed that the data presentation above has a “permutation” characteristic in that 
each monitoring set is based on the Primary Monitoring Node holding the key position 
and other nodes listed in ranked order.  This is important when developing the node list, 
however, when evaluating the efficacy of different monitoring node sets, the internal 
order doesn’t matter.  In other words once a node set is selected for consideration, it is 
the efficacy of the group that matters since at that point there is no value to the order.  
So in the example above if monitoring equipment was deployed at nodes 170/90/50/40, 
it inconsequential whether the computed priority order is 170/90/50/40, 90/50/40/170, 
50/40/170/90 or the like.  Once those four nodes are selected it is the overall efficiency 
of the group that matters.  For that reason the node sets should be evaluated in 
“combination” order, as opposed to “permutation” order, when selecting the most robust 
set of monitoring nodes. 
The same information viewed in combination order (equivalent node sets regardless of 
ranking) is shown in Figure 8.  It is noted that the number of columns is reduced from 14 
to 11 as some of the nodes sets were combined when priority order was not considered.  
This sorting operation is done through Excel using the VBA script indicated in Appendix 
3. 
From this chart it is seen that the node set 40/50/90/170 provides the most robust 
coverage under all conditions.  By incrementing through the time scale it is seen that this 
sequence stabilizes as the dominant set 12 hours after the contamination event is 
initiated.  Also by observing the supplemental node tables at threshold concentrations 
above 100 mg/L, it is observed that the area around node 120 will not be covered by this 
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sequence (see Table 21).  Table 21 is also useful in observing the time variance (or 
stability) of the monitoring sets through the analysis period. 
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Figure 8 Monitoring Station Configuration: Midnight Contamination Event (Combination Order) 
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Table 21 Node Ranking for Midnight Injection Scenario 
Threshold Hour 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
0 6 160 80 90 50 140 170 40 120
0 8 140 90 170 40 12
0 10 140 170 90 40 120
0 12 170 90 50 40 120
0 14 170 90 50 40 120
0 16 170 90 50 40 120
0 18 170 90 40 120
0 20 170 90 40 120
0 22 170 90 40 120
0 24 170 90 40 120
100 6 160 80 90 50 140 150 170 40
100 8 140 90 160 150 170 40 120
100 10 140 170 90 160 40 120
100 12 170 150 90 50 40 120
100 14 170 90 50 40 120
100 16 170 90 50 40 120
100 18 170 90 50 40 120
100 20 170 90 50 40 120
100 22 170 90 50 40 120
100 24 170 90 50 40 120
200 6 160 80 90 50 140 150 170 40
200 8 130 90 80 150 140 50 170 40
200 10 140 170 90 160 40 120
200 12 140 170 160 90 40 120
200 14 170 90 50 40 120
200 16 170 90 50 40 120
200 18 170 90 50 40 120
200 20 170 90 50 40 120
200 22 170 90 50 40 120
200 24 170 90 50 40 120
300 6 160 80 90 50 140 150 170 40
300 8 90 160 150 80 140 50 170 40
300 10 150 140 90 170 50 40 120
300 12 140 170 160 90 40 120
300 14 170 90 50 40 120
300 16 170 90 50 40 120
300 18 170 90 50 40 120
300 20 170 90 50 40 120
300 22 170 90 50 40 120
300 24 170 90 50 40 120
400 6 160 80 90 50 140 150 170 40
400 8 90 150 80 140 160 50 170 40
400 10 150 140 170 90 50 40 120
400 12 140 170 160 90 40 120
400 14 170 150 90 50 40 120
400 16 170 150 90 50 40 120
400 18 170 150 90 50 40 120
400 20 170 150 90 50 40 120
400 22 170 150 90 50 40 120
400 24 170 150 90 50 40 120
Rank
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Sensitivity Analysis Based on Injection Time-of-Day 
Because the water demand throughout the system drives the contamination, there is 
reason to believe that monitoring node selection may be sensitive to fluctuations caused 
by the diurnal pattern.  Therefore, it would seem prudent to explore the implications of 
this factor on the stability of the monitoring node set. 
To illustrate the effect of “Time-of-Day” that the injection occurs, the entire methodology 
is performed again by setting up a new database for applying the DBT to scenarios with 
injection beginning at 6 a.m., Noon and 6 p.m.  The three new databases allow the 
development of three new monitoring networks which use the same assumptions as 
stipulated in the example problem, except that the injection time-of-day has been 
changed.  By comparing the “optimum” monitoring networks for each of the three 
additional injection “Time-of-Day” injection scenarios, one can explore the impact of the 
“Time-of-Day” variable and the stability of the midnight injection monitoring node set. 
Monitoring Locations Based Upon 6 a.m. Injection 
Using the DBT contamination event pattern, each node was modeled with a 6 a.m. 
injection.  The resulting information was used to populate a database which was then 
analyzed as described above.  The results of the analysis are interesting in that they 
affirm the fact that, as hypothesized, the time-of-day that the injection occurs does in fact 
have an impact on the monitoring set.   
Fortunately, contamination in this instance can ultimately be detected with two 
monitoring points as shown in Figure 9.  Figure 10 and Figure 11 show that Monitoring 
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nodes 170 and 90 will cover the system effectively.  Table 22 illustrates that this pattern 
stabilizes at hour 16 for all concentration thresholds.   
It should be remembered that the time scale remains the same on all “Time-of-Day” 
scenarios.  Because this scenario dataset was generated from a contamination event 
that started at 6 a.m., the pattern actually stabilized 10 hours after the event initiation.   
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Table 22 Node Ranking for 6 a.m. Injection Scenario 
Threshold Hour 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
0 12 160 140 90 130 170
0 14 170 160 90
0 16 170 90
0 18 170 90
0 20 170 90
0 22 170 90
0 24 170 90
0 26 170 90
0 28 170 90
0 30 170 90
100 12 160 140 90 130 170
100 14 170 160 90
100 16 170 90
100 18 170 90
100 20 170 90
100 22 170 90
100 24 170 90
100 26 170 90
100 28 170 90
100 30 170 90
200 12 160 140 90 130 170
200 14 170 160 90
200 16 170 90
200 18 170 90
200 20 170 90
200 22 170 90
200 24 170 90
200 26 170 90
200 28 170 90
200 30 170 90
300 12 160 140 90 130 170
300 14 170 160 90
300 16 170 90
300 18 170 90
300 20 170 90
300 22 170 90
300 24 170 90
300 26 170 90
300 28 170 90
300 30 170 90
400 12 160 140 90 130 170
400 14 170 160 90
400 16 170 90
400 18 170 90
400 20 170 90
400 22 170 90
400 24 170 90
400 26 170 90
400 28 170 90
400 30 170 90
Rank
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Figure 9 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at 6 a.m. 
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Figure 10 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 a.m. Contamination Event (Permutation Order) 
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Figure 11 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 a.m. Contamination Event (Combination Order) 
Monitoring Locations Based Upon Noon Injection 
Stepping the time of injection forward another six hours, a new database was created 
with contamination beginning at noon.  A set of exhibits similar to those above are 
developed and presented in Figure 12, Figure 13 and Figure 14 along with Table 23. 
Again, it is interesting to see the shift in the monitoring station patterns.  In this case it is 
observed that the distribution system can be covered with a single monitoring node after 
10 hours from injection.  As before this is a subset of the set selected for the midnight 
event, but indicates rather dramatically the affect that the diurnal patterns can have on 
the analysis.   
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Table 23 Node Ranking for Noon Injection Scenario 
Threshold Hour 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
0 18 160 130 170
0 20 130 170
0 22 170
0 24 170
0 26 170
0 28 170
0 30 170
0 32 170
0 34 170
0 36 170
100 18 160 130 170
100 20 170 160
100 22 170
100 24 170
100 26 170
100 28 170
100 30 170
100 32 170
100 34 170
100 36 170
200 18 160 130 170
200 20 170 160
200 22 170
200 24 170
200 26 170
200 28 170
200 30 170
200 32 170
200 34 170
200 36 170
300 18 160 130 170
300 20 170 160
300 22 170
300 24 170
300 26 170
300 28 170
300 30 170
300 32 170
300 34 170
300 36 170
400 18 160 130 170
400 20 170 160
400 22 170
400 24 170
400 26 170
400 28 170
400 30 170
400 32 170
400 34 170
400 36 170
Rank
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Figure 12 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at Noon 
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Figure 13 Monitoring Station Configuration: Noon Contamination Event (Permutation Order) 
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Figure 14 Monitoring Station Configuration: Noon Contamination Event (Combination Order) 
Monitoring Locations Based Upon 6 p.m. Injection 
Finally, the initiation time is moved forward another six hours and the full set of injection 
nodes replicated sequentially beginning at 6 p.m.  The new database is generated and 
the sorting analysis recompiled.  As with the 6 a.m. and noon analyses the optimum 
monitoring set differs from the midnight contamination scenario.  However, as with the 
other initiation times, the selected set for the 6 p.m. event remains subsumed within the 
midnight set.  The ranking results for the scenario are present in Table 24. 
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Table 24 Node Ranking for 6 p.m. Injection Scenario 
Threshold Hour 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
0 24 160 130 80 170
0 26 160 130 170
0 28 170 160
0 30 170
0 32 170
0 34 170
0 36 170
0 38 170
0 40 170
0 42 170
100 24 160 140 130 80 170
100 26 160 130 170
100 28 170 160
100 30 170
100 32 170
100 34 170
100 36 170
100 38 170
100 40 170
100 42 170
200 24 160 140 130 80 170
200 26 160 130 170
200 28 170 160
200 30 170
200 32 170
200 34 170
200 36 170
200 38 170
200 40 170
200 42 170
300 24 160 140 130 80 170
300 26 160 130 170
300 28 170 160
300 30 170
300 32 170
300 34 170
300 36 170
300 38 170
300 40 170
300 42 170
400 24 160 140 130 80 170
400 26 160 130 170
400 28 170 160
400 30 170
400 32 170
400 34 170
400 36 170
400 38 170
400 40 170
400 42 170
Rank
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Figure 15 Number of Monitoring Stations Required vs. Time to Detect: Injection at 6 p.m. 
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Figure 16 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 p.m. Contamination Event (Permutation Order) 
154 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
13
0 
16
0 
17
0 
16
0 
17
0 
 
17
0 
  
80
 1
30
 1
60
 1
70
80
 1
30
 1
40
 1
60
Monitoring Station Set
C
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 S
ta
ti
o
n
 S
et
400
300
200
100
0
C* (mg/L)
 
Figure 17 Monitoring Station Configuration: 6 p.m. Contamination Event (Combination Order) 
Discussion 
Examination of Figure 8, Figure 11, Figure 14 and Figure 17 shows that the time-of-day 
at which injection occurs can be a significant factor in the monitoring set analysis.  
Diurnal hydraulic patterns cause changes in flow velocity and direction which can result 
in differences in timing and extent of contaminant plumes.   However, in this system the 
vulnerability is not quite as severe as might have been indicated by just an analysis of 
the midnight injection alone.  Accordingly, the vulnerability of a system should be 
measured not only in a space dimension, but also in a time dimension.  The implication 
here being that the level of monitoring resources required may not be the same through 
time.  
It is also observed that some nodes may predominate in detection efficiency during the 
day.  In this illustration Node 170 is clearly the most important node in the monitoring 
network.  Aside from being the primary node for the Midnight injection, Node 170 
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stabilizes as the only node necessary to detect contamination for the whole system 10 
hours after a noon injection with approximately the same results for injection occurring at 
6 am and 6 pm.  
An application of this result would be that particular care should be taken to protect this 
node and keep it operating at peak performance.  While it is highly unlikely that this level 
of dominance will be evident in larger networks, certain nodes will be more efficient, and 
therefore, more critical than others in managing risks. 
While this small illustration will not necessarily characterize every system in that all 
monitoring sets will be subsumed in the “worst case” or master cluster of monitoring 
points, it is hypothesized that there will be a tendency for this to occur in systems that 
have stable operation and regular diurnal patterns.  Systems with more substantial 
temporal discontinuities such as significant seasonal or tourist impacts, large industrial 
demands with varying production schedules, etc. are more likely to result in varying 
focus points.   
The analysis also shows when the water system is the most vulnerable.  Because more 
nodes are required for detection during the midnight event and because it takes longer 
for the selected monitoring set to detect the range of events, the utility manager is given 
an indication of the time of day and areas that are most vulnerable.  This information can 
be used to inform police or other security services of necessary patrol patterns which will 
provide additional protection for their system.  
156 
Summary 
An illustrative example has been developed which constructs an analysis of a small 
water system.  The example uses commercially available off-the-shelf software 
(WaterCAD and Microsoft Excel) to perform the analysis.  The process is not dependant 
on any proprietary software and can be adapted to any small system.   
The sample problem steps through a heuristic process that organizes the extended 
period water quality model data into a form that can be manipulated to tease out sets of 
monitoring stations that outperform others in terms of detecting potential contamination 
occurring at any node in the system.   
The process demonstrates and provides a means of dealing with the variables of 
Concentration threshold (C*), Time Since Injection (ts), and Time of Day of Injection.  
Each of these variables should be explored in any analysis to determine the magnitude 
of its influence on the monitoring set.  While in some cases the selected monitoring set 
may fluctuate given the weight assigned to each variable, this should not necessarily be 
viewed as a negative consequence. 
Recall that the overall objective is, given a fixed number of monitoring stations, to select 
a set of monitoring nodes that most efficiently detects contamination which can occur 
anywhere in the distribution system at any time.  In most real situations it is not likely that 
the selected set will provide complete coverage of the distributions system.  This 
analysis also provides direction to utility managers regarding susceptible zones and 
times of day that the system has higher risk than others.  This information can in turn be 
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used to implement institutional or operational control which can further reduce overall 
system vulnerability. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research 
Summary and Conclusions 
Water is a fundamental resource, not only for life, but for a community’s social and 
economic structure.  Therefore, protection of a community’s water system is crucial to its 
well-being.  Over the years regulations, design procedures and operational practices 
have evolved in this country to safeguard the water delivered to each customer.  By and 
large this effort has been successful given the reduction in waterborne diseases and 
reliability of delivery and overall water quality.  However, representative sampling of 
water systems to ensure adequate water quality has always been complex and 
technically challenging.  With the paradigm shift that occurred subsequent to the events 
of September 11, 2001, it is necessary to reevaluate the processes and procedures 
used to detect contamination in our public water systems. 
It is the thesis of this study that the distribution system itself is particularly vulnerable to 
contamination, especially intentional contamination, which has not generally been 
recognized in the water industry.  The procedures that have been sufficient to monitor 
systems in the past are not adequate to detect, respond and recover from significant 
mass contamination events that can occur within the distribution system itself.   This 
results primarily from the following general beliefs prevalent in the water industry. 
First, the long term experience in the water industry has generally proven that if the 
structural integrity of the pipe grid is maintained, drastic changes in plant effluent water 
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quality would not occur.  Consequently, regulatory and operations management primarily 
has been focused on cross-connection, backflow prevention and corrosion control, as 
well as strict standards for disinfecting and testing new pipe connections.  This belief 
was founded on the facts that the pipe network (1) by and large is buried and difficult to 
access, (2) it has a positive backpressure (20 psig minimum) which makes it difficult for 
contaminants to enter the system and (3) with backflow and cross-contamination 
regulations and programs in place have been effective in protecting network integrity. 
In addition, a chlorine residual is maintained within the distribution system which 
provides nominal disinfectant capability throughout the pipe network.  The residual also 
serves as a sentinel for detecting contaminant intrusion.  Finally, monitoring in 
accordance with regulatory and “professional practice” guidelines was felt to provide 
adequate quantification of water quality within the system. 
The documented epidemiological record of waterborne illnesses in the United States has 
shown a high level of progress and success over the past century.  While periodic 
events will occur, the overall record speaks for itself.  This applies to both chemical and 
biological etiologies. 
However, as this study has probed the regulatory requirements and general technical 
literature which provides the guidance by which distribution system sampling is 
structured, a void is identified relative to intentional contamination.  This study has 
illustrated that the programs that can function acceptably when considering normal 
system failures or even significant naturally occurring disasters, are ill-equipped to deal 
with intentional mass contamination events. This results from several factors: 
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1. Most routine monitoring is accomplished primarily through indicator or surrogate 
parameters and cannot detect specific contaminants in real time, and in most 
cases the results will not be known for at least three to five days. 
2. If the technology does exist to detect a set of contaminants within one hour or 
less, the financial and operational ability to deploy that technology makes it 
impracticable, especially in small to mid-sized systems. 
3. Guidance on location of monitoring stations is not focused on searching for 
optimum locations based on flow and water quality patterns. 
Recognizing the deficiency of current monitoring practice to quickly detect an acute, 
massive contamination event, water system managers need assistance in developing an 
approach to identify a robust, if not optimized, set of monitoring stations.  When one 
examines the regulations and literature there is little, if any, explicit guidance instructing 
water system managers on where to locate water quality monitoring stations to detect 
mass contamination within a distribution system. 
Locating a robust set of monitoring locations is important because monitoring stations 
are expensive to purchase and operate.  Plus, a large number of stations generating 
streams of real-time information can produce a massive volume of data that could create 
data management and interpretation problems. Thus, the objective of this study is to 
maximize coverage of the network with the minimum number of stations, again 
remembering that sampling for this purpose has a different focus than for the TCR. 
The characteristics of an ideal contaminant were defined as those that are essentially 
undetectable by the senses (e.g. colorless, tasteless, and odorless), highly soluble or 
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finely divided and highly toxic.  The contaminant can be either biological or chemical.  A 
review of pertinent literature has been performed to identify agents that have a 
reasonable likelihood of being used to contaminate a public water supply.  Logistical, 
toxicity and/or infectivity considerations reduce the number of potential candidates to a 
more or less manageable number, if the purpose of the contamination event is to impose 
a health risk to a large number of people.  However, it should be pointed out that the 
literature does not explicitly address fate of most agents under conditions found in a 
potable water distribution system.  Considerable research is necessary to address the 
paucity of data along those lines.  Having said that, it would seem that Shigella, 
Salmonella, and Vibrio cholerae are viable bacterial threats although they do have 
susceptibility to reasonable chlorine levels.   
It also appears that B. anthracis could be a very potent and difficult agent to eradicate 
within a water system.  While the vast majority of attention is focused on its inhalational 
risk, the threat from ingestion may also present a worrisome risk.  Additional research on 
this agent and this route of exposure is encouraged. 
Cryptosporidium or Giardia should also be considered because of their chlorine 
resistance and low LD50 levels.  Additional research with toxins in water systems is 
warranted, but it appears that Botulinum, Aflatoxin and Ricin are the most likely to be 
weaponized at this point. 
Likewise, chemical agents have considerable gaps with regard to the ingestion route.  
The current thinking in many venues is that some form of cyanide, arsenic or 
orthophosphates holds the most potential as viable contamination agents.  The issue of 
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detectability for some of these agents could reduce their utility.  However, these certainly 
have characteristics that can manifest adverse health effects and should be considered 
for monitoring. 
A few caveats are worthy of note.  First, the literature sources used in this study are in 
the public domain.  Other classified agents that are not searchable are likely to exist.  
Also, this study does not consider pharmaceuticals or explicit hallucinogenic drugs which 
may result in an effect desired by terrorists.  While this means that additional agents 
could exist, the knowledge of and accessibility to such agents, as well as their logistical 
constraints, hopefully, would significantly limit their utility. 
Due to the complexity of water distribution systems there is no practicable way to 
physically test a system to isolate the effective monitoring nodes.  However, the speed 
and power of computers and network analysis software have developed to the point that 
it is now possible to develop mathematical models of those systems.  They are also 
capable of managing the large datasets that are produced in ways that were not 
practicable in the past.  This coupled with the fact that the cost of these tools has 
dropped to the point that it is accessible to the target audience, i.e. small to mid-sized 
water systems.  Accordingly, the tools now exist to begin to address the problem in a 
more scientific fashion. 
This study has proposed a heuristic algorithm targeted for small to mid-sized water 
systems which identifies a robust set of monitoring station locations capable of detecting 
mass contamination occurring within the distribution system itself.  The algorithm is 
structured to treat every node in turn as a contaminant source and model the fate of the 
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contaminant through the system over time.   The results of these simulations are then 
organized and analyzed to search for the number of nodes required to cover the system 
and identify which node sets demonstrate stability over a range of detection times and 
concentration thresholds.  This process is then applied to a small test distribution system 
using off-the-shelf commercially available software to illustrate its applicability to small or 
mid-sized water systems. 
Following the pattern used by other studies in the literature search, initial configurations 
of the algorithm sought to optimize the monitoring node set by using a fixed analysis 
time.  Usually, this was tied to a diurnal sequence and, given the outcome of that one set 
of conditions, the monitoring locations were established.  When the early versions of this 
algorithm were developed, it solved the problem in the same way.  However, one of the 
advantages of structuring the problem in the manner discussed in this paper is that one 
is able to examine and manipulate the raw data directly.  This allows full use of all of the 
modeling software to describe an event, or combination of events, of interest to the 
analyst without being constrained by the optimization process.  While this can create 
additional work in the modeling effort, current computer power and software routines can 
manage those requirements for the size of system targeted in this study.   
Using this approach and examining the results raised the question as to whether an 
arbitrarily set time of analysis was warranted.  Although some discussion occurs in the 
literature regarding minimum time to detect contamination, none of the other papers 
have suggested an approach that explicitly considers “Time Since Injection” (ts) as a 
variable for analysis.  However, after looking at the raw data, and upon further 
consideration of the context, it seemed that expanding the algorithm to include this factor 
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would be prudent.  The results did, in fact, confirm that ts is important in developing a 
sense of the stability of the monitoring set.  Accordingly, this study recommends that 
future optimization processes consider ts when establishing the monitoring set. 
Again, analysis of the raw data set and consideration of the context suggested that it 
might be appropriate to consider a Threshold Concentration (C*) factor in the analysis.  
This resulted from two observations.  First, the mathematical computations would at 
times produce very small values for some nodes.  These values, though greater than 
zero, seemed to be more computational artifacts than significant concentrations.  Thus, if 
a selection rule was established that noted any cell with a value greater than zero, these 
cells would be selected and could bias the results with insignificant readings.  
Accordingly, the algorithm was expanded to allow the analyst to set a C* value such that 
any cell whose computed concentration was less than C* would be rejected from the 
standpoint of influencing the monitoring station set.  There could, of course, be situations 
where an analyst wished to consider all data in which case one would set C* = 0. 
Another reason for establishing a C* variable is to permit future use of a NOAEL or other 
threshold concentration effect level (See Appendix 2).  Thus, if the examination of a 
system included some assumption of an acceptable concentration level the analysis 
could accommodate such a consideration.  A cautionary note in this regard is warranted.  
While the computer simulation of water networks has developed considerably, there are 
still many assumptions and sources of error which must be recognized.  Therefore, as 
with many epidemiological studies, the C* consideration should be viewed more as an 
“indication” of effect rather than an absolute value.  In other words depending on the 
nature of the contaminant and the C* selected, a water system should not necessarily be 
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considered “clean” if all concentration values are below C*.  Rather, C* provides a 
means of examining the sensitivity of an optimum monitoring station set to small 
concentration values. 
The implications of this note are interesting.  The inability to compute and evaluate 
concentrations at absolute levels is not necessary to effectively use the process 
described in this paper to locate the monitoring stations.  While experimenting with 
different DBT scenarios during the initial phases of this study, it was realized that the 
relationships influencing node selections are relative.  The DBT selected influences the 
magnitude of the concentration spikes, and thus has an impact from a NOAEL or action 
level point of view, but the locations of the monitoring stations remain more or less 
insensitive to that variable.  Thus, the monitoring stations can be selected using any 
hypothetical event while remaining more or less insensitive to the nature of the 
contamination event itself.  Of course, the more that contaminants exhibit significant 
growth or decay characteristics relative to each other, an effect may be noticed.  
However, modeling that type of behavior is imprecise in its own right and has its own set 
of instability that must be evaluated. 
Use of C* as an analysis variable also pointed out a fact that the current literature does 
not seem to adequately consider.  Most studies use the assumption that the most 
conservative form of analysis must consider any positive concentration value at any 
node to define the optimum monitoring set.  Actually, this is not true.  When defining a 
more rigorous monitoring set, using a C* reduces the number of detection data points 
and requires a “stronger” data signal to be considered.  Consequently the analysis relies 
on fewer data points.  As one considers this implication, using a C* will tend to require 
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more sampling stations.  More sampling stations in this context are more conservative 
than fewer sampling stations.  The reason this point is overlooked is that this assumption 
(consideration of all positive concentration values) is the most conservative assumption 
when actually monitoring the distribution system, i.e. as an operational rule.  It is not, 
however, the most conservative assumption when designing the monitoring set. 
Finally, an outcome of this research emphasized the need to consider “Time of Day of 
Injection” (TDI) as a variable for consideration.  Because diurnal variations exist within all 
community water systems, the direction and magnitude of flow within the pipes will vary 
throughout the day.  The literature to this point in time has tended to assume a time of 
injection and compute a monitoring set using the approach proposed in that paper.  This 
study used the algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 and went a step farther by examining 
the effect of TDI on the proposed monitoring set.  It was determined that TDI can, in fact, 
have a significant impact on the monitoring set and should be considered in any 
methodology that seeks to truly define the rigor, if not the validity, of a specified 
monitoring location set. 
Areas of Future Research 
This dissertation has provided an approach and solution to the research questions 
identified in Chapter 1.  However, while providing a direct response to the questions, 
further research is warranted to enhance the approach to improve its utility and expand 
the theoretical basis underlying portions of the algorithm.  More specifically, these 
recommendations are as follows. 
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It is clear that additional research into the impact and fate of various contaminants within 
water systems is necessary.  As this study has indicated the discussion of fate must also 
include the conditions existent within the distribution system itself.  It is, again, the thesis 
of this dissertation that the distribution network is actually the most vulnerable 
component of the water system and must be considered as a potential point of 
contaminant injection.  The limited studies to date have focused on the contaminant 
removals or inactivation by water treatment processes.   With consideration of the nature 
of the distribution system environment, guidance relative to fate, survivability, toxicity or 
infectivity of the agent, especially via the ingestion route, is necessary. 
Related to this, continued research is necessary to develop the sensing devices that can 
detect concentration variances at acceptable cost, turnaround time, durability, and 
operational stability for the parameters in question.  Much work is proceeding in this area 
and with advances in nanotechnology, miniaturization and biotechnology instruments to 
meet the assumptions of this paper seem within reach.  Obviously, the more parameters 
that a single instrument can detect the more desirable it is.  Interestingly, many of the 
issues seem to be related as much to power (battery life) as to technical issues of 
detecting a contaminant. 
One assumption implicit in this methodology is that each node is assigned equal 
important in the screening process.  From a pragmatic standpoint this is not true.  For 
example, a node demand which is used primarily for non-potable uses (ex. irrigation) 
may not be as critical as one that is sensitive for water quality (ex. hospital, key 
government buildings, etc.)  Therefore, an expansion of this model may be to develop 
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and apply a means of weighting node sensitivity and importance in terms of stipulated 
outcomes. 
This study used Microsoft Excel® as the primary tool to manipulate the data, because it 
is more transparent than a relational database and, therefore, more suitable for 
examination in a study such as this.  However, because Excel® has inherent data size 
limitations, the next phase in developing this algorithm will be to improve the data 
handling characteristics by use of more sophisticated database structures and 
automation features. 
Associated with the improved database structure would be the extension of the algorithm 
to consider monitoring station location on the basis of “Volume Consumed” as well as 
“Time Since Injection”.   This dissertation used ts as the initial basis of location because it 
is more straightforward and is an important criterion in detection efficiency.  However, if 
the ultimate objective of monitoring is to minimize adverse health effects, then the 
volume consumed is a more critical parameter than ts.   While the two are related they 
are not necessarily equivalent and thus consideration should be given to adapting the 
algorithm to weighting the selection process to volume rather than time.  With improved 
data storage and management this task should be feasible. 
With regard to possibilities for improving the underlying theoretical basis for the 
algorithm, it seems possible to treat the outcome data as a Markov Chain process.  The 
data, especially using C* to create a binomial response, seems amenable to processing 
using that mathematical approach.  This could lead to analysis and decision processes 
that would be more efficient and rigorous than those proposed here.  Genetic algorithms 
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are being proposed in some of the more recent papers (Ostfeld & Salomons, 2003) and 
have shown some potential for searching for optimum solutions.  However, the Markov 
Chain approach has not been proposed in any of the papers viewed to date. 
Finally, research should be initiated relative to incorporating this work into a public health 
surveillance program.  The purpose of water quality monitoring is to provide warning of 
anomalous events as early as possible in order to protect public health and property.  
While this study, hopefully, makes a contribution in terms of assisting system managers 
in strategically placing the sensing devises, there is much work that needs to be done to 
set this in an operational framework. 
The SDWA has detailed requirements regarding consumer notification of MCL 
exceedances.  However, as the frequency and number of parameters monitored 
increases, the likelihood of false positives can create nuisance, in not disruptive, 
notifications.  Decision rules and processes must be developed to give guidance to 
water system operators to adequately balance these conditions. 
In the past there has been little actual operational communications between the utilities 
and the public health/medical community.  With the passage of the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, this deficiency is 
beginning to lessen through the Vulnerability Assessment process, however, there is still 
much work to be done.  Just as water system monitoring is not sufficiently responsive for 
acute massive events, the public health network is believed to suffer from the same 
deficiencies.   
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Future research directed at developing a surveillance and communications model with 
an emphasis on two-way communication would seem to be useful.  In other words the 
model would not just promote communication from the public health/medical community 
to the utility by identifying waterborne health effects, but via improved short-term 
monitoring the utility could report waterborne anomalies to the public health and medical 
communities that could be used in patient notification and care.   
This point is believed to be of importance because it is possible that the engineering 
aspects of detection may be more effective than discovery via the clinical perspective, 
especially for biological agents.  This follows from the fact that many biological agents 
have an incubation period measured in days if not weeks.  If an efficient water system 
monitoring program was established, detection could be noted in less than a day (at 
least for covered nodes).  If identified agents were communicated to the medical 
community, this information could provide valuable insight into diagnosis and treatment 
as well as provide critical response time for public notification, supplemental supplies 
and support, if necessary.  The primary issue being highlighted here is whether there 
exists a functional partnership between these important social entities that is sufficient to 
defeat or mitigate a massive contamination event. 
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Appendix 1: Selected General Distribution System Design Guidelines 
Key Water Demand Criteria: 
1. Average Day: total year’s pumpage divided by 365 (expressed in MG/day) 
2. Maximum Day: maximum 24-hour demand in one year 
3. Maximum Hour: maximum 1-hour demand in one year  
4. Fire Flow Demand: flow to provide for fire defense; generally computed by the 
Insurance Services Office (ISO) criteria in the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule. 
5. Present and Future 
a. Type:  Residential, Commercial, Industrial, Irrigation 
b. Location:  Direction/areas of growth 
Redundancy: 
1. At least two pumping units to be provided.  With any pump out of service the 
remaining pumps shall be capable of providing the maximum pumping demand 
of the system. 
2. Auxiliary Power provided from two separate feed sources or have auxiliary power 
generator capable of operating critical components to service 50% of Maximum 
Daily Flow 
Pressure: 
1. Minimum:  20 psig at ground level 
2. Normal:  40-70 psig (35-60 psig RSWW recommended) 
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Diameter: 
1. Minimum:  6” for lines providing fire service; larger if required to maintain 
minimum pressure during fire event. 
2. Smaller mains (3” recommended min.) are allowed only in special circumstances 
based on land use and hydraulic analysis.  No fire service required. 
Fire Protection: 
3. Design system (supply, storage, pumps and mains) to meet fire demands of 
State Insurance Services Office or other jurisdictional agencies. 
4. Account shall be taken for hourly and season fluctuations in water demand when 
designing for fire flow. 
Distribution Mains: 
1. Dead end mains minimized to reduce head loss and improve reliability of service. 
2. Hydrants should be placed at street intersections and at intervals of 350-600’.  
Hydrants not connected to mains that don’t support minimum fire flow (500 gpm) 
3. Valves should be placed at minimum intervals of 500’ in industrial areas, 800’ in 
residential areas and one mile in rural areas. 
(adapted from: Recommended Standards for Water Works, 1997) 
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Appendix 2: Major Variables in Modeling Water Distribution System Response to 
Terrorist Attack 
Contaminant Characterization 
1. Nature of the Contaminant  
a. Biological, chemical, or physical 
b. Infective/toxic dose characteristics (dose-response information) 
i. NOAEL 
ii. Regulatory default values 
2. Dose Characterization 
a. How much injected into system 
i. Volume injected 
ii. Initial Concentration of injection 
iii. Duration on injection  
b. Location of injection 
c. Date effects (ex. weekend/holiday/max. usage)  
d. Time of Injection 
e. Growth/Decay of contaminant in the system 
3. Analytical Techniques Available 
a. Accuracy (sensitivity, specificity) 
b. Turnaround time 
c. Sampling characteristics 
i. Volume of sample required 
ii. Time to sample 
iii. Skill/effort of sampling staff 
181 
iv. Cost (equipment/expendables) 
Distribution System Characterization 
1. Hydraulic characterization 
a. Distribution system geometry 
i. Actual vs. Skeletonized 
ii. Pipe information  
(a) Diameter 
(b) Length 
(c) Friction factor (function of Age, Material, water quality) 
iii. Valve information (type, location, settings (open/closed/fractional)) 
iv. Storage tanks 
(a) Elevated vs. Ground 
(b) Geometric configuration (Diameter/Height/Volume; feed method) 
(c) Operational Control (control equipment and setpoint/levels) 
(d) Functional characteristics 
(i) Short-circuiting 
(ii) Diurnal Turnover and implications for water age/quality  
b. Pump information  
i. Pump Curve characteristics 
(a) Impeller Characteristics (Diameter, type) 
(b) Pump Type  
(i) Constant speed vs. Variable Speed 
(ii) Turbine, Horizontal Split Case, End Suction, etc. 
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c. System Demand Patterns - note: these are statistical characterizations (i.e. 
all equivalent demand types (residential/commercial/etc) are assumed to 
have equal withdrawals rates during equivalent time periods; the actual 
demands are stochastic) 
i. Average Daily Demand 
ii. Peak Hourly Demand 
iii. Peak Instantaneous Demands 
iv. Transient System Fluctuations 
(a) Fire Flow 
(b) Line Break 
(c) Equipment/controls outage or malfunction 
v. Change in system characteristics over time (new development/industry, 
new booster station, close an old pumping station, etc.) 
2. Water Quality  
a. Water characterization from plant 
i. Normal operation 
ii. Malfunction or atypical operation 
b. Pipe effects 
i. Biofilms and its impact on contaminant 
(a) Protective matrix 
(b) Potential nutrient source 
(c) Potential reproductive/breeding area 
ii. Pipe materials (ex. CIP/DIP, PVC (internal/external leaching), copper, 
etc.) 
iii. In-pipe water quality changes (pipe as a reactor/contact basin) 
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c. Chlorine residual maintained in water column 
d. Transformations caused by chemical interactions between different water 
sources  
i. Multiple water supply sources/plants feeding the distribution system 
ii. Intersystem connections 
e. Water age (related to hydraulic characteristics above) 
f. Operational influences 
i. Line Maintenance 
(a) Flushing 
(b) Pigging 
(c) Repairs 
ii. Transient conditions 
(a) Hydraulic 
(b) Treatment fluctuations 
iii. Cross-connections 
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Appendix 3: Description of Computational Procedure Associated with Analysis of 
Anytown Water System 
1. Develop and Calibrate a hydraulic model of the water system in question.  This 
would include decisions regarding skeletonizing non-critical distribution elements 
(ex. pipe diameters below a given threshold, dead-end lines, etc.), verifying 
pump/system control sequences, and backchecking against actual operating 
records.  The base computer model used should have a water quality feature 
available (ex. EPANET, WaterCAD, KYPIPE, etc.); General calibration 
procedures should be followed (see AWWA working papers). 
2. Develop a Design Basis Threat (DBT) to describe the nature and extent of the 
hypothesized contamination event.   This would include such factors as time of 
injection, duration of injection, volume/concentration of injection, identification 
and nature of the contaminant. 
3. Convert the DBT into an injection event in the computer model.  This includes 
modeling decisions such as time step selection, integration into diurnal 
variations, decay/growth parameters, pipe wall effects, etc. 
4. One of the issues to be dealt with is ‘what duration should be used when running 
the computer simulation?’  The DBT should be test run at a number of locations 
to see how long the contaminant persists in the system.  A decision criteria 
should be established such as calculated contaminant values equal to or less 
than a given threshold.  This will establish the duration to be used as the time 
basis for the system definition runs.  
5. Develop a notation convention to keep track of the computer runs and then move 
the injection event to every node in turn, run the network model and record the 
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results.  The notation should delimit monitoring and injection nodes.  WaterCAD 
has a Scenario/Alternative feature that is useful in the regard.    
6. Take the results of all the runs and export them to Excel.  Note: the number of 
runs will equal the number of nodes in your model if you moved the injection 
point to every node in turn.  Because you are measuring the response of the 
injection at a specific node at every other node, this means that you will have N2 
node responses in one dimension.  In the other dimension, the model will list the 
response by timestep. Several things must be kept in mind when performing this 
step.  Excel is limited to 256 columns.  Because the analysis will include N2 node 
responses the data will need to be transposed in order to be imported into Excel.  
The number of timesteps required will generally be much less than 256 so the 
transposition should not be a problem.   (All formulas and VBA code in the steps 
that follow are designed to work with time steps as column labels and nodes as 
row labels so, even if N2 does not exceed 256, transpose the data.) 
a. Insert, Worksheet 
b. Return to original worksheet; select the full range of data, taking note of the 
size of the range as shown beside the cursor (or in the Name Box), ie. 46R x 
256C; Copy 
c. Go to new, blank worksheet and select a range in reverse size, ie. 46C x 
256R; Edit, Paste Special, Transpose, OK. 
d. Rename the new worksheet Transposed CSV and delete the original 
worksheet. 
i. Fractional timesteps will occur at transition points in the analysis (pump 
on/off, tank fill/drain, etc.) so if the duration is long or the system is 
unusually active, some data cleansing may be required. 
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e. In a later step, you will need to filter for unique response and injection nodes. 
i. On the Tranposed CSV worksheet, type rnode in cell AA1; enter the 
formula =LEFT(A2,FIND(" ",A2,1)-1) in cell AA2; copy the formula in cell 
AA2 to the last row containing data; filter this new list for unique values by 
clicking Data, Filter, Advanced Filter… (if you get a warning message 
about the label, just click OK); in the Advanced Filter window, select Copy 
to another location; the List range is your list of values in the rnode 
column – in this example, cells $AA$1:$AA$257; in the Copy to box, type 
$AC$1; check the Unique records only box; click OK; this provides you 
with a list of response nodes that will be used as row labels. 
ii. On the Tranposed CSV worksheet, type cnode in cell AB1; enter the 
formula =MID(A2,LEN(AA2)+2,(FIND(" ",A2,LEN(AA2)+2))-
(LEN(AA2)+2)) in cell AB2; copy the formula in cell AB2 to the last row 
containing data; filter this new list for unique values by clicking Data, 
Filter, Advanced Filter… (if you get a warning message about the label, 
just click OK); in the Advanced Filter window, select Copy to another 
location; the List range is your list of values in the cnode column – in this 
example, cells $AB$1:$AB$257; in the Copy to box, type $AD$1; check 
the Unique records only box; click OK; this provides you with a list of 
injection nodes that will be used as column labels; manually sort this list if 
necessary. 
f. Also in a later step, you will need the time steps in rows as a list range for a 
combo box. 
i. On the Transposed CSV worksheet, select the time steps in row 1; Copy 
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ii. Go to cell AE2 on the same worksheet; Edit, Paste Special, Transpose, 
OK.; type the label Time in cell AE1. 
7. Using the transposed data set, set a threshold as a basis for counting the values 
for each timestep from 0 to the end of the duration - always beginning with 
timestep 0.  For example, at timestep 5, the count would be computed by 
counting the values from timestep 0 to timestep 5.  Note: depending on how the 
network program is set up, the actual contamination will occur at a small fraction 
after point 0, say time 0.1, so the full initial timestep is used.  This produces a 
slight error but it’s certainly within reason given the overall uncertainty of the 
process.  Also, if there is a preexisting level of the contaminant at a node, this 
step will be necessary to capture it’s initial effect. It is suggested that only the 
even increment timesteps be used (typically this is the timestep used in the water 
system modeling). 
Two variable selections, five tables and a command button are required in order 
to summarize the data set.  These are created on a new, separate worksheet 
and are comprised of both formulas and code. 
a. Insert, Worksheet; name it Count Summary. 
b. Name and create the first variable setting – a threshold variable by which 
data set values are determined to be less than or equal to, or greater than, 
the variable. 
i. In cell A1, paste this text:  ENTER Threshold VARIABLE (mg/L): and format the 
row height at 21.75 
ii. In cell F1, paste this number:  0 
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c. Name and create the second variable setting – a combo box with time step 
selections. 
i. In cell L1, paste and right-align this text:  Select Time Period:  
ii. Insert a Combo Box and size it to span row 1 and columns M & N 
iii. Right-click on the combo box and select properties; on the (Name) row, 
name the button cmbCTime; on the ForeColor row, drop down to select 
red from the Palette; on the Font row, click the ellipses and select Bold 
(Arial, 10 should already be set); on the LinkedCell row, type $N$1; on 
the ListFillRange row, paste this reference:  'Transposed CSV'!AE2:AE26; 
close Properties window; click the Design Mode button on the Controls 
toolbox to exit design mode 
iv. Select a value from the combo box (to place a value into cell N1 that will 
avoid formula errors in later steps). 
d. Create the less than or equal to threshold variable table. 
i. In cell A2, paste this text:  Less than or equal to variable: and format row height 
at 30 
ii. In cell A3, type Node 
iii. Starting in cell A4, paste the unique Response nodes from the 
Transposed CSV worksheet ('Transposed CSV'!AC2:AC17) 
iv. Starting in cell B3, transpose/paste the unique Injection nodes from the 
Transposed CSV worksheet ('Transposed CSV'!AD2:AD17) 
v. In cell B4, enter (Ctrl+Shift+Enter) this array formula: 
=COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed 
CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A4&" 
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"&B$3&" Injection Concentration (mg/l)",0),'Transposed 
CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"<= "&$F$1) 
Copy the formula to the rest of the cells in the table 
vi. Format data as Number with 0 (zero) decimals; format table as desired 
e. Create the greater than threshold variable table. 
i. In cell A21, paste this text:  Greater than variable: and format the row height at 
30 
ii. Copy table 1 A3:Q19 (includes row and column labels) and paste to cell 
A22 
iii. In cell B23, enter (Ctrl+Shift+Enter) this array formula: 
=IF(COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed 
CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A23&" 
"&B$3&" Injection Concentration (mg/l)",0),'Transposed 
CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"> "&$F$1)=0,"",COUNTIF(INDEX('Transposed 
CSV'!$B$1:OFFSET('Transposed CSV'!$B$1,256,$N$1-'Transposed 
CSV'!$B$1),MATCH(TEXT($A23&" "&B$3&" Injection Concentration 
(mg/l)",0),'Transposed CSV'!$A$1:$A$257,0),0),"> "&$F$1)) 
Copy the formula to the rest of the cells in table 2. 
iv. Name table 2's data cells B23:Q38 (excludes row and column labels) 
countgreat (type countgreat in the Name Box and press Enter) 
v. In cell R22, paste COUNT; in cell S22, paste Ave; in cell T22, Total 
vi. In cell R23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows: 
=COUNT(B23:Q23) 
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vii. In cell S23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows: 
=AVERAGE(B23:Q23) 
viii. In cell T23, enter this formula and copy it down the rows: =R23*S23 
ix. Format data as Number with 0 (zero) decimals; format columns as 
desired 
f. Create a third table that will sort the values of table 2.  In a later step, code 
will be written in VBA to re-create table 3 but data must first be visually 
placed on the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be 
programmed to refer to. 
i. In cell A40, paste this text:  Sorted values:  and format the row height at 30 
ii. Select cells A22:T38 - the entire table 2 including row and column 
headings, as well as the three additional count and average columns, but 
not the cell containing the table heading Greater than variable:; Copy 
iii. Paste the values of table 2 to cell A41 (Edit, Paste Special, Values, OK) 
iv. With the pasted values still highlighted (A41:T57), type countsorttab in the 
Name Box; press Enter 
v. Select the data in the Count column of table 3 R42:R57 (excludes the 
column heading, Count) and name the range countcv 
vi. Select the data in the Total column of table 3 T42:T57 (excludes the 
column heading, Total) and name the range countcav 
vii. Select the Injection node column headings in the top row of table 3 
B41:Q41 (excludes column A and the 3 Count and Average columns) and 
name the range countcn 
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viii. Select the Response node row headings in column A of table 3 A42:A57 
(excludes the row containing the Injection node column headings) and 
name the range countrn 
ix. Select the first row of data in table 3 B42:Q42 (excludes row and column 
node headings and the 3 count and average columns) and name the 
range counter 
x. Select all of the data in table 3 B42:Q57 (excludes row and column node 
headings and the 3 count and average columns) and name the range 
countar 
g. Create a fourth table that will extract sorted data from table 3.  In a later step, 
code will be written in VBA to re-create table 4 but data must first be visually 
placed on the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be 
programmed to refer to. 
i. In cell A59, paste this text: Summary of filtered values: and format row height at 
30 
ii. In cell A60, paste Col Node, in cell B60, paste Mon Node, in cell C60, 
paste COUNT, in cell D60, paste Total 
iii. Copy the row labels that identify the Response nodes from table 3 
(A42:A57) to cells A61:B61 
iv. Name the Injection nodes in column A of table 4, A61:A76 (excludes 
headings), countcnn 
v. Name the Response nodes in column B of table 4, B61:B76 (excludes 
heading), countrnn (note that the values are not accurate now but will be 
later) 
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vi. Name the blank cells in column C of table 4, C61:C76 (excludes 
heading), countcvn 
vii. Name the blank cells in column D of table 4, D61:D76 (excludes 
heading), countcavn 
viii. Name the entire table 4, A60:D76 (excludes the table heading, Summary 
of filtered values:), countfiltval  
ix. Format table as desired 
h. Create a fifth table that will sort the values of table 4.  In a later step, code will 
be written in VBA to re-create table 5 but data must first be visually placed on 
the worksheet in order to name ranges that VBA will be programmed to refer 
to. 
i. In cell G59, paste this text: Nodes not covered by first level node: 
ii. Go to the named range countfiltval (drop down the name box and click on 
the name); Copy 
iii. Click on cell G60, Paste 
iv. With the pasted cells still selected (G60:J76), name the new range 
countfinval 
i. Add a command button control to the worksheet.  VBA code will be assigned 
to this button in a later step. 
i. Insert a command button and size it to span G1:I1 (open the Control 
Toolbox, if necessary, to find the command button control) 
ii. Right-click on the command button and select properties; on the (Name) 
row, name the button cmdRank; on the Caption row, type the caption 
View Ranked Data; on the Font row, click the ellipses, select Arial, Bold, 
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8; close Properties window; exit design mode (first button on control 
toolbar) 
8. Write procedures to reproduce tables 3, 4 and 5. 
a. In Visual Basic, insert a module and name it Count (View, Properties, Name).  
Following the Option Explicit statement, paste each of the following six 
procedures. 
b. This first procedure automates pasting of the values in table 2 to table 3 and 
renames table 3. 
Sub CountPTV() 
' This first procedure automates pasting of the values 
' in table 2 (Greater than variable) to table 3 (Sorted values) 
' and renames table 3 
    Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countgreat").Select 
    Selection.CurrentRegion.Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Range("countsorttab").Select 
    Selection.CurrentRegion.Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues 
    Range("countsorttab").Cells(0, 1).Select 
    ActiveCell.Value = "Sorted values:" 
End Sub 
c. The second procedure sorts table 3 first by Count, then by Total, both 
descending. 
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Sub CountSNT() 
' The second procedure sorts table 3 (Sorted values) 
' first by Count, then by Total, both descending 
Range("countsorttab").Sort Key1:=Range("countcv").Cells(0), 
Order1:=xlDescending, Key2:= _ 
Range("countcav").Cells(0), Order2:=xlDescending, Header:=xlYes 
End Sub 
d. The third procedure searches for columns with no values in the first row of 
sorted values in table 3. 
Sub CountRCN() 
' The third procedure searches for columns with no values 
' in the first row of sorted values in table 3 
Dim countcn, counter, countcnn As Range 
Dim n As Integer 
 
' Clear existing values in column A of table 4 
Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countcnn").ClearContents 
Worksheets("Count Summary").Activate 
 
Set countcn = Range("countcn")   ' Refer to the first row in table 3 that 
contains the column (injection) node labels 
Set counter = Range("counter")   ' Refer to the second row in table 3 to 
determine if that row contains any empty cells 
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Set countcnn = Range("countcnn") ' Refer to the first column in table 4 
where the column labels that match empty cells will be returned 
 
' Loop through cells in table 3 
    Do 
     
    ' Count the number of columns in the countcn range and 
    ' assign the number to the variable n 
    For n = 1 To countcn.Columns.Count 
         
        ' Use the variable n as the row or column identifier 
        ' where applicable, ie. in the counter row, we 
        ' use 1 as the row and n to cycle through the columns 
        ' If a non-numeric cell is found in counter, the code 
        ' returns the label from countcn to the appropriate row 
        ' in table 4.  Otherwise, the row label in table 4 will 
        ' have a value of "-" 
        If IsNumeric(counter.Cells(1, n)) = False Then 
            countcnn.Cells(n, 1) = countcn.Cells(1, n) 
        Else 
            countcnn.Cells(n, 1) = "-" 
        End If 
    Next n 
    Exit Do 
    Loop Until n = countcn.Columns.Count 
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End Sub 
e. The fourth procedure returns the corresponding response node, Count and 
Total values from the first maximum value rows in table 3 to the rows 
containing values in table 4. 
Sub CountRRN() 
' The fourth procedure looks at the columns in table 3 
' that match the column (injection) node labels returned to table 4 
' to determine the first maximum value within table 3's column 
' and return the respective row (response) node label, Count value, 
' and Total value to table 4. 
Dim myrange, countcn, countrn, countar, countcv, countcav, countcnn, 
countrnn, countcvn, countcavn As Range 
Dim maxnum, m, n, r As Integer 
 
' Clear columns 2-4 in table 4 
Worksheets("Count 
Summary").Range("countrnn,countcvn,countcavn").ClearContents 
Worksheets("Count Summary").Activate 
 
Set countcn = Range("countcn")  ' Refer to column (injection) node labels 
in table 3 
Set countrn = Range("countrn")  ' Refer to row (response) node labels in 
table 3 
Set countar = Range("countar")  ' Refer to data in table 3 
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Set countcv = Range("countcv")  ' Refer to Count calculations in table 3 
Set countcav = Range("countcav")    ' Refer to Total calculations in table 3 
Set countcnn = Range("countcnn")    ' Refer to Col Node column in table 
4 
Set countrnn = Range("countrnn")    ' Refer to Mon Node column in table 
4 
Set countcvn = Range("countcvn")    ' Refer to Count column in table 4 
Set countcavn = Range("countcavn")  ' Refer to Total column in table 4 
 
' Loop through cells in table 3 
Do 
 
    ' Count the number of columns in the countcn range and 
    ' assign the number to the variable n 
    For n = 1 To countcn.Columns.Count 
     
    ' Cycle through each row (using the variable n) 
    ' in column A of table 4 
    ' to determine if the row contains a value 
    ' in order to proceed with code 
    If countcnn.Cells(n, 1) Like "J*" = True Then 
     
    ' Count the number of rows in the countrn range and 
    ' assign the number to the variable m 
    ' Use the value assigned to m as the highest value for r 
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    m = countrn.Rows.Count 
    For r = 1 To m 
     
    ' Once a value has been identified in column A of table 4 
    ' the variables r, n & m serve to select data rows 1 to m in table 3 
    ' in the column that matches the value identified 
    ' and assigns that selected range to the variable myrange 
    Set myrange = countar.Range(Cells(r, n), Cells(m, n)) 
     
    ' Using the myrange variable, maximum value is located 
    ' From the row containing the first value equal to the maximum, 
    ' the row (response) node label from table 3 is returned to the Mon 
Node column in table 4 
    '   on the same row as the matching Col Node value 
    ' the Count value from table 3 is returned to the Count column in table 4 
    '   on the same row as the matching Col Node value 
    ' the Total value from table 3 is returned to the Total column in table 4 
    '   on the same row as the matching Col Node value 
    maxnum = Application.Max(myrange) 
        If countar.Cells(r, n) = maxnum Then 
            countrnn.Cells(n, 1) = countrn.Cells(r, 1) 
            countcvn.Cells(n, 1) = countcv.Cells(r, 1) 
            countcavn.Cells(n, 1) = countcav.Cells(r, 1) 
            Exit For 
        End If 
199 
    Next r 
    End If 
    Next n 
Exit Do 
Loop Until n = countcn.Columns.Count 
End Sub 
f. The fifth procedure copies table 4 to table 5 and renames table 5. 
Sub CountPFV() 
' The fifth procedure copies table 4 to table 5 and renames table 5 
    Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countfiltval").Select 
    Selection.CurrentRegion.Select 
    Selection.Copy 
    Range("countfinval").Select 
    Selection.CurrentRegion.Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues 
    Range("countfinval").Cells(0, 1).Select 
    ActiveCell.Value = "Nodes not covered by first level node:" 
End Sub 
g. The last procedure sorts table 5 
Sub CountSFT() 
' The last procedure sorts table 5 by Count column (descending), then by 
Total (descending). 
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    Range("countfinval").Sort Key1:=Range("countfinval").Offset(0, 2), 
Order1:=xlDescending, Key2:= _ 
        Range("countfinval").Offset(0, 3), Order2:=xlDescending, 
Header:=xlYes 
End Sub 
9. Assign code to the command button control. 
a. In Visual Basic's Project Explorer window, double-click Sheet1 (Count 
Summary) and paste the following procedure into the blank Code sheet, after 
Option Explicit.  This code calls the six previously written procedures, in their 
correct order, when the user clicks the View Ranked Data command button. 
Private Sub cmdRank_Click() 
    Call CountPTV 
    Call CountSNT 
    Call CountRCN 
    Call CountRRN 
    Call CountPFV 
    Call CountSFT 
    Worksheets("Count Summary").Range("countfinval").Select 
End Sub 
Click File, Close and Return to Microsoft Excel.  Save the spreadsheet. 
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